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The relationship between religion and ethnicity is well documented. However,

previous studies have usually approached the relationship by focusing on the
converging of two 'objective' social categories, religion and ethnicity. In doing so,
the subjectivity, or the actor's own understanding of the interplay between religion
and ethnicity is typically neglected. This study fills this gap by exploring popular-

perceptions of group identities and the affiliation with imagined ethno-religious
communities.

To accomplish this, the concept of ethnodoxy, first developed by

Vyacheslav Karpov and Elena Lisovskaya, is applied that captures the belief that
affiliation to an ethnic group's dominant religion is essential for constructing and
maintaining a group's identity. The empirical component of this study examines the

scope of this belief system and how its beliefs correlate with people's socioeconomic
characteristics as well as with other social, religious, and political orientations.
The study of ethnodoxy focuses on post-communist ethnic Russians. The
conflation of religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) and ethnicity in Russian history
makes this an ideal context.

However, similar ethno-religious relationships are

explored among other ethnic and national groups in Russia and beyond as well,
thereby providing a comparative dimension to the analysis. Data from a Russian

National Survey (2005) and several cross-national survey programs (i.e., International

Social Survey Programme and World Values Survey) are used to test these relationships.
Two major conclusions can be drawn from these analyses.

First, the belief that an

individual must affiliate with their ethnic group's dominant religion is wide spread and
deeply embedded among most ethnic Russians.

Moreover, there is evidence of such

ethno-religious linkages beyond ethnic Russians as well, spanning different religious
traditions, political economies, and socio-historical contexts. Second, belief in this

specific ethno-religious ideology is associated with social, religious, and political
orientations that emphasize intolerance, xenophobia, and protectionism. In sum, these
findings support the usefulness of the concept of ethnodoxy as a valuable explanatory

tool for understanding the popular perception of ethno-religious relationships and offer
insight into the role of religion in modern society.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The relationship between religion and ethnicity is well documented. For

instance, the significant role of Catholicism in Ireland, Eastern Orthodoxy in Russia
and Greece, and Hinduism in India is often linked with each respective ethno-national
category. Moreover, ties between ethnicity and religion have been important factors
in establishing group identities, affecting the way members of such groups perceive
themselves and others. For example, post-colonial boundary-making in the Middle

East and Africa were often based on these characteristics (e.g., Hindi India and
Muslim Pakistan). In fact, failure to consider the effects of ethno-religious

relationships when constructing borders has resulted in significant conflict (e.g.,
Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey). Moreover, global trends of religious growth
(e.g., spread of Pentecostalism in Latin America and Asia, Islam in Europe and North
America, Western churches in Central and Eastern Europe) further demonstrate the

important role of religion in many modernizing) societies.

Studying the Relationship between Religion and Ethnicity: The Problem
However, efforts to study these relationships have usually examined religion

as one component, of many, that comprise ethnic categories. This approach is
problematic for two reasons. First, other types of ethno-religious relationships, such
as the ethnic marker of religious traditions (e.g., Irish Catholics) or the symbiotic

relationship between religion and ethnicity (e.g., Greek Orthodox), are ignored.
Second, approaching religion and ethnicity as social categories fails to take into

I

account the on-the-ground, taken-for-granted understanding of what it means for

individuals to belong to such communities.
The purpose of this study is to fill these gaps. To do this, a conceptual
apparatus is used which emphasizes the subjective identification of individuals to
religious and ethnic communities. Grounded in social identity theory, this concept

(first created by Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2004, 2007, 2008; with continued
development by Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012) offers a unique approach
toward understanding the relationship between religion and ethnicity that is often

ignored in the literature. A complete theoretical development of the concept, and its
operationalization, was made in a recent paper by Karpov, Lisovksaya, and Barry
(2012). As defined in Chapter III, this concept refers to a belief system that

emphasizes affiliation to an ethnic group's dominant religion as essential for
constructing ethnic identity. However, the central purpose of this study is not to
reiterate these efforts. Instead, the goal is to examine the social sources and correlates
of this belief system.

In other words, this study explores the extent to which adherence to this belief
system exists and its association with other beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. This is an
important step for establishing this concept as a viable theoretical device, which can
be used to explain many cases where religion and ethnicity are conflated. For the
purpose of this study, one such case setting is investigated: post-communist Russia.
As detailed in Chapter IV, the conflation of religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) and

etlmicity throughout Russian history makes this an ideal setting to test the scope of
this concept. Yet, the usability of this concept is not limited to contemporary ethnic

Russians alone. Considerations for applying the concept beyond ethnic Russians are
also investigated.

Outline of Study

This study includes both conceptual and empirical components. First,

previous efforts that have investigated the relationship between religion and ethnicity
are examined and critiqued, thereby identifying gaps in the literature of which the
current study fills (Chapter II). Based on these commonly overlooked areas, a
detailed discussion and theoretical development of the concept used in this study is

offered (Chapter III), thereby providing an important foundation for this study's

empirical component. Next, a contextualized background of the case study chosen

for applying this concept, post-communist Russia, is described (Chapter IV). Finally,
the hypotheses, operationalizations ofconcepts, and methods for administering the
empirical analyses are outlined (Chapter V).

In orderto assess its usability as a relevant and meaningful concept, a wide

empirical investigation is pursued. First, a descriptive analysis ofethnic Russians
exhibiting this particular ethno-religious identity is made (Chapter VI), illustrating its
multi-dimensionality and level of acceptance among most ethnic Russians. Then, six

investigations are administered that examine the association of ethno-religious
linkages across different social, religious, and political orientations, beliefs, and
behaviors. The social determinants of adherence to this belief system are explored

(Chapter VII), thereby presenting a social profile ordemographic make-up of
individuals thatespouse such beliefs. The remaining chapters, and the bulk of this

study, explore the relationship between adherence to this ideology and other

orientations, beliefs, and behaviors, including religiosity (Chapter VIII), perception of
nation and nationalism (Chapter IX), political life and affiliation (Chapter X),
attitudes towards two social issues: attitudes toward abortion and homosexuals

(ChapterXI), and level of religious tolerance and xenophobia (Chapter XII).

Completing these tasks does two things. First, the spread of adherence to this belief
system demonstrates the usability of the concept applied in this study. Second, the
relationships between adherence to this ideology and social, religious, and political
orientations depicts such 'believers' as exhibiting certain characteristics, mainly as
intolerant, xenophobic, and anti-West. The consequences of these patterns are

discussed in each chapter and connected in the final discussion (Chapter XV).

However, the application of the concept is not limited to this one case study.

In fact, it is projected that this concept may be used to understand ethno-religious
relationships in many contexts, across different religious traditions, ethno-national
histories, levels of modernity, and geographical locations. Preliminary investigations

apply this concept in contexts outside of contemporary ethnic Russians. In particular,
Muslims that currently live in Russiaare examined as exhibiting similar ethno-

religious characteristics (Chapter XIII). In addition, a dimension of this concept is

analyzed by examining religio-national relationships cross-nationally and trends of
such linkages over time (Chapter XIV). The analyses conducted in these two

chapters provide tentative support for the usability of this concept in explaining the
relationship between religion and etlmicity across a diversity of contexts and settings.

Finally, this study finishes with a discussion assessing the results from these

analyses and summarizing the main conclusions (Chapter XV). In short, not only is
the conceptjustified as a useful theoretical framework for which a specific ethno-

religious relationship may be understood, but also the structure and dissemination of
the ideology(i.e., its plausibility structure) is discussed. Finally, a note on religion, as
a main contributing component to this concept, is described in terms of its role in
modern society.

As outlined in the next chapter, the result of this investigation contributes to

both specific gaps in the literature on ethno-religious linkages as well as larger
considerations regarding identity to social groups, the role of religion in
modern(izing) societies, and, more generally, the processes and sources used to
construct and maintain our social world.

CHAPTER II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND ETHNICITY:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

While the link between religion and ethnicity is often noted in the literature,

few have provided explicit conceptual frameworks from which to understand this
relationship. The following is a review of key efforts emphasizing the link between
religion and ethnicity.

Classical Understanding

The relationship between religion and ethnicity has long been noted in the
social sciences. Weber emphasized the importance of religion for differentiating

groups ofpeople within nations (1961). Durkheim described religion as providing
social cohesion and order for groups of individuals with shared consciousness (1915).

Inaddition, Durkheim's concept of collective representations refers to beliefs and

values shared by a collective, as exemplified inreligious ideologies that provide
sources for social solidarity.

Traditionally, however, religion and its influence in society was seen as an

"artifact of anoutmoded past" (Smith, 1978). For many post-Enlightenment thinkers,

religion was a major force in human civilization, but ithad become unnecessary in
the modemworld. Instead, new meaning-systems were developing to replace

traditional religions. Comte, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, and Robespierre all saw the
traditional 'outdated' and 'irrational' beliefsystems as being replaced by 'rational'

'scientific' meaning-systems (Dumi, 1987). In addition, the rise of the nation-state

spurred the idea that nationalism and national identity would replace traditional

ideologies like religion (Durkheim, 1915; Smith, 2001, 2003; Dunn, 1987).1
Yet, these projections have largely been unfounded. In recent decades,

conventional wisdom has been more likely to acknowledge the presence and
influence of religion in modern society, than its absence. While proponents of
secularization still exist, few hold the absolutist belief that it is a universal and

inevitable outcome of modernity. Therefore, contemporary social scientists are more
likely to explore how, not if, religion influences other realms of society. The
relationship between religion and ethnicity has become one such area of
concentration.

Contemporary Conceptualizations

According to Abramson, "religion is invariably an aspect of the ethnic group"
(1979, p.9). In particular, Abramson described four manifestations of the ethno-

religious link (1980). First, religion can be the main foundation for ethnicity (e.g.,
Jews, Amish). Second, religion may be one of many ethnic foundations (e.g.,
language and territory are also influential among Greek and Russian Orthodox).
Third, many etlmic groups may be linked to one religious tradition (e.g., Irish, Italian,

1The idea that other forms of meaning are replacing religion harks backto original understandings of
secularization. While Durkheim emphasized the importance of religion for providing social cohesion,
he predicted it would eventually give way to civil religions, based on more scientific ways of thinking.
First coined by Rousseau (The Social Contract), civil religions refer to meaning-systems that support,
legitimate, and maintain a national culture. The concept of civil religion has been adopted by manyscholars to describe the substitution of religion by other meaning systems. In particular, see Robert
Bellah's work on civil religion in the United States (2005).

and Polish Catholics). Finally, religion and ethnicity may refer to the same, usually
marginalized, distinctive tradition (e.g., Gypsies, Native Americans).

Hammond and Warner applied Abramson's first three types, what they termed

'religious fusion,' 'ethnic religion,' and 'religious ethnicity,' in their study of
American immigrants and their ties to host-countries (1993). Yang and Ebaugh also
used this schema to explain how an immigrant's social status can affect their religious

and ethnic linkages (2001). However, for Yang and Ebaugh, Abramson's typology is
incomplete. It does not consider ethnic groups with nontraditional religious
identifications; nor does it explain how religion can be emphasized by ethnicity.
Indeed, Abramson's work is limited by mainly focusing on religion as a

component of etlmicity. Yang and Ebaugh resolved this issue by employing

Greeley's two-directional typology. Greeley asserted, "there is a two-way flow of
influence between religion and ethnicity" (1971, p.47). On the one hand, religious

identity is pronounced based on ethnic identity (e.g., Irish Catholics in Ireland). On
the other hand, ethnic identity is pronounced based on religious identity (e.g., Irish
Catholics in the United States).

Accordingly, there are two main emphases in the body of literature dealing
with the link between religion and ethnicity: understanding religion through ethnicity

and the preservation of ethnicity through religion. Based on the limitations of these
emphases, a third approach is discussed, which is particularly useful for this paper.

Understanding Religion through Ethnicity

According to Greeley, "ethnic groups provide subdivisions and subdefinitions within the various religious communities" (1971, p.46). He considers

world religions (e.g., Catholicism) to be too large a category for a "quasi-communal

identification," which thereby requires further delineation to make sense of (e.g., Irish
Catholic, Polish Catholic, etc.). Similarly, Kipp discussed how although universalist

religions promised "the possibility of transcending ethnic and national differences,"
most have frequently "spawned new communalistic discord within polities" (1993,
p.67).

Even Abramson saw the relationship between religion and ethnicity as a dual

movement. Again, Abramson's typology on the relationship between religion and

ethnicity includes one form - what Hammond and Warner term 'religious ethnicity'
(1993) - that describes many ethnic groups attached to one religion (1979). Again,
the multi-etlmic makeup of the RomanCatholic Churchexemplifies this form. In this

way, Roman Catholicism is supra-ethnic and supra-national, including multiple
ethnicities and nationalities. However, this is not to say that individuals accentuate

their religious identity while ignoring their ethnic or national identities. Indeed, an
individual's ethnic/national identity can be just as prominent. In fact, the relationship

between religion, ethnicity, and nationhood may be strongly intertwined, providing
different varieties of the broader religious tradition. This is the case, for instance,
among Irish and Polish Catholics.

Wnile evidence of this ethno-religious form is common, illustrated by the
multi-ethnic and multi-national Catholic Church, it is nonetheless ideal-typical. While

differences certainly exist between Irish, Polish, and Italian Catholics, they also share

many similarities being members of one transnational religious institution. This
should not be overlooked. In addition, this formulation may quickly become too

inclusive as one could argue that any reasonably-sized ethnic group that identifies
with a religious organization should be included.
For instance, Protestant and Catholic missions to Latin America, Africa, and

Asia have resulted in a growing Christian population. The CIA Wrorld Factbook
estimates that in South Korea alone, Christianity is now the dominant religion

(26.3%), surpassing Buddhism (23.3%) as the traditional faith.2 Certainly this adds to
the ethnic and national diversity of such established Protestant and Catholic churches.
Furthermore, and making matters more ambiguous, one could argue that converts in

general should be included under this ethno-religious classification. For instance,
what of American Buddhists or Ukrainian Mormons? They too provide ethnic and
national diversity to these religious organizations.

This probably goes beyond the original intent for this typology. This

particular fonn, as described by Abramson and others, seems to refer to significant
proportions of ethnic and/or national groups attached to a single religious
organization. In this way, Korean Protestants, for instance, may be included, but not
the relatively small number of American converts to Buddhism or Ukrainian converts
to Mormonism. Therefore, this typology of ethno-religious relationships implies that

such groups have large enough populations that substantive generalizations can be
made. Not all Irish are Catholics, nor are all Koreans Protestants. But, each group
2 c

Source: 1995 census
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makes up significantproportionsof the general population, making analyses of such
groups more meaningful.

Exactly what those sizes should be remain elusive. For instance, should such
groups hold a majority status, or can 'religious ethnicities' be used to describe large
minority groups as well? Below, I suggest that an answer to this question may come
from the study of actors' own perceptions of the ethno-religious links rather than
from objective demographic characteristics of such groups.

Preserving Ethnicity through Religion

Most literature on the relationship between religion and ethnicity approach the

interaction, using Greeley's typology, as a unidirectional flow: religion as preserving
ethnicity. Abramson's typology illustrates this amplification. For Abramson, religion
serves ethnicity in three ways: 1) as a force for defining ethnic boundaries, 2) as a
factor for narrowing or separating ethnicity into sub-groups, and 3) as a factor for
enlarging etlmic boundaries and identities (1980).

Smith also understood the relationship between religion and ethnicity in this

way. For Smith, religious community could either "divide an ethno-linguistic
population"or "erode ethnic differences" (1991, p.7-8). In either case, religion may
be used as a major source for preserving ethnicity. Thus, religion serves ethnicity as
a resource that can either maintain or divide a group of people based on

distinguishing symbols, practices, and beliefs. This relationship between religion and
etlmicity is well documented. According to Hastings, before the anival of universalist
faiths (e.g., Christianity, Judaism, Islam), religion was "essentially ethnic or local"
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and "provided both the mythic core in the particularization of each local ethnicity,
and a universalizing bridge in its networking with wider ethnic circles" (1997, p. 175).

After the appearance of a universalist religion, religion was no longer 'ethnicspecific' (1997). Herberg similarly described the relationship between religion and
ethnicity in the United States (1956).

Formally, religion had been but an aspect of the ethnic group's culture
and activities; it was merely a part, and to some a dispensable part, of a larger
whole; now the religious community as growing increasingly primary, and
ethnic interests, loyalties, and memories were being more and more absorbed
in and manifested through this new social structure (Herberg, 1956, p.47).

Specifically, Herberg thought identity distinction in the United States would
eventually be based on Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish affiliations. While most

contemporary scholars agree that Herberg's projection is unfounded, noting the great

religious and ethnic diversity in the United States, identity based on both ethnic and

religious sources is still evident. Others have also noted the important role that
religion plays in constructing and maintaining ethnicity. For instance. Rex

acknowledged the religious element as central to the Punjabi Sikhs in India, thereby
providing 'overall unity' (1997). In short, this approach emphasizes religion as a
vital component of ethnicity. As discussed below, this approach is particularly
prevalent in studies on immigrant groups.

Preserving Ethnicity through Religion among Immigrants

Understanding the role of religion as essential for ethnicity is especially

important for immigrant studies. For example. Smith discussed the importanceof
religion and etlmicity for immigrants when settling in the United States (1978).
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According to Smith, migration to the United States created three alterations to the
relationship between religion and ethnicity: 1) "a redefinition, usually in religious
terms, of the boundaries of peoplehood," 2) "an intensification of the psychic basis of

theological reflection and ethnoreligious commitment," and 3) "a revitalization of the
conviction" (1978, p.l 161). Similarly, Greeley emphasized the in-group/out-group

dynamic as an important characteristic inherent in the relationship between religion
and ethnicity, as evident among immigrant groups in the United States.

But another element, or perhaps another aspect of the same element, is
that presumed common origin as a norm for defining 'we' against 'they'
seems to touch on something basic and primordial in the human psyche, and
that... much of the conflict and strife that persists in the modern world is
rooted in such differences (Greeley, 1971, p.42).

Many others have noted the use of religion in maintaining ethnicity among

immigrant groups. Hartman and Kaufman explored the connection between religious
and ethnic identities among Jewish immigrants in the United States, noting how the
synagogue had become a source of ethnic, as well as religious, support (2006). Yang
and Ebaugh examined how immigrant's majority or minority status in their home or
host country influences the relationship between religion and ethnicity (2001).
Hammond and Warner used Abramson's typology to understand religious and ethnic

linkages among immigrants to America and their ties to home countries (1993).

Building on Hammond and Wamer (1993), Min (2010) also explored the relationship
between religion and ethnicity among American immigrants. Min concluded that
Amish, Jews, Eastern Orthodox and others have preserved their ethnicity not simply

through religion, but through religious and ethnic practices and rituals in the home
versus participation in congregations (2010). Similarly, Mitchell argued that religion
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provides authentic religious substance, not just mapping out identities, to the
normalization of ethnic identity in Northern Ireland (2005). Thus, religion can be an
important source for ethnic groups to preserve their uniqueness, thereby
differentiating themselves from others.

Two Wrays of Maintaining Ethnicity through Religion

Some have provided further insight into how the maintenance of ethnicity
tlirough religion occurs. In particular, two areas are usually emphasized when
exploring these roots: collective memories and geographical ties.
Smith discussed the importance of myth-making in order to maintain ethnic

communities. This is accomplished through a joint venture of both religious and civic
entities to develop narratives for preserving the particular culture.

And over all this heritage of cultural difference stand the 'guardians of
the tradition', the priests, scribes and bards who record, preserve and transmit
the fund of ethnic myths, memories, symbols and values encased in sacred
traditions commanding the veneration of the populace through temple and
church, monastery and school, into every town and village within the realm of
the culture-community (Smith, 1991, p.28).
In particular, Smith acknowledged two dimensions of myth-making: myths of origins
(where a group comes from) and myths of election (in what way are people in a group
'chosen') (2008). According to Smith, as myths are created and transmitted, so too
are they territorialized. The 'territorialization of memories' occurs when "memories
and history of a community are linked to specific places, namely, the 'naturalization

of community' and the 'historicization of nature'" (Smith, 2008, p.35). For Smith,
this process creates ethnoscapes, or etlmic communities that are rooted in specific
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historical homelands. Israel, for example, plays a very meaningful role in
constructing group identities, traditions, and histories for many Jews, regardless of
ever living or visiting the region.
Since religion plays such a vital role in myth-making and, therefore, the
construction of ethnoscapes, important geographies can become sacred, what Smith
termed the 'sanctification of the homeland.' This is accomplished when certain
territories have experienced important religious events (Smith, 2008). For instance,
conflict between Muslims and Hindu nationalists in Ayodhya, India has largely been

about (re)claiming the area as holy ground for both groups. The area is considered

the birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama. During the Mongol raids of the sixteenth
century, a Hindu temple was supposedly demolished and replaced by a Muslim
mosque until Hindu nationalists too destroyed it in 1992. Smith termed such groups
with conflated geographical, religious, and genealogical ties as 'sacred communion of

the people' (2003). In other words, a sacralization ofethnos is established that
combines a group's history, particular geographies, and lineage with its dominant
religion.

Similarly, Hervieu-Leger (2000) distinguished between two forms of religious
and ethnic attachments: natural (i.e., territory and ancestry) and symbolized

genealogies (i.e., shared beliefs, traditions, and histories). Both forms can overlap as
individuals identify with groups based on shared geography and familiar ties as well
as common beliefs, customs, and histories. Others have also noted myth-making and

ties to significant geographies as key elements in the preservation of ethnicity through
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religion. For instance, Hastings described religion as providing a 'mythical-core' in
the 'particularization of local ethnic circles' for early civilizations (1997).

A Constellation of Ethno-Religious Constructions

WMe an important step, Greeley's two-way approach, and its subsequent

application in the area of study, is limited to two directions: ethnicity defining

religion and/or religion preserving ethnicity. Hervieu-Legers efforts provide
additional development by exploring the many (if not infinite) combinations, or
constellations, of ethno-religious constructions. For Hervieu-Leger, the 'dual

movement' between religion and ethnicity refers to "operating both throughthe

ethico-svmbolic homogenization of traditional religious (confessional) identities and

through the neo-religious recharging of ethnic identities" (2000, p.161). This

approach toward the relationship between religion and ethnicity includes negotiations
between both sources of identity. Hervieu-Leger described such processes as

"renewed forms of mobilizing and inventing a common memory, from symbolic
material taken from the traditional stock of historical religions, but equally from the

resources offered by profane historyand culture" (2000, p.162). In other words,

group identities are created and legitimated by using aspects of multiple sources,
which include to varying degrees, religious and ethnic traditions, histories, and
beliefs.

In this way, religion and ethnicity are sources that are weighted differently

from group to group. For instance, one etlmic or national group may emphasize
religious affiliation, over beliefor practice (what Hervieu-Leger temis 'belonging
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without believing'), as an essential component of their ethno-national identity. This
is exemplified in Scandinavian countries like Finland where affiliation to and
confidence in the state Lutheran church is high (78.5% and 73% respectively) but

prayer (41% pray less than once a year or never) and church attendance (6% attend

monthly or more) is relatively low.3 On the other hand, an ethnic ornational group
may emphasize religious beliefs as a particularly important attribute. For many
Americans, the belief in God is an essential requirement for being 'truly' American
(Heclo, 2007).

In sum, the relationship between religion and ethnicity for Hervieu-Leger is a

negotiation between the two that is, pulling from both sources of identity,
continuously being recreated and transformed. In addition, Hervieu-Leger's

understanding of the relationship between religionand ethnicity emphasizes the
desire for group maintenance and survival.

Thus the ethno-religious element (re)constitutes itself and develops in
modem societies to a point at which the contracting membership of traditional
religions intersects with the various attempts to invent or reinvent an
imaginative hold on continuity, whereby a group or a society discovers new
reasons for belief in its own permanence, over and beyond the perils that
threaten its existence or over and beyond the atomization that constitutes a
multiple threat to its own cohesion (Hervieu-Leger, 2000, p.162).
In other words, elements from ethnic and religious sources can be used and/or

recreated to provide old and new meaning for a group, thereby legitimating their very
existence. Similar to Durkheim's collective representations, the shared belief and

affiliationto such ideologies provide meaning and order to a group's social life and

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Religion 2008
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approach toward world-building. This is an important consideration that will be

discussed later in terms of plausibility structures as defined by Berger.

Conclusion

In short, efforts to conceptualize the relationship between religion and

etlmicity are few and far between. Such linkages are often understood as either
religion reinforcing ethnicity or vice versa. The first formulation (i.e., understanding

religion tlirough ethnicity) is unclear regarding the proportion necessary of an ethnic
group to be included. The second formulation (i.e., religion preserving ethnicity)

limits the role of religion to a (sub)component of ethnicity. However, Hervieu-

Leger's formulation gives equal weight (or, at least, the possibility of) to both religion
and ethnicity as sources of identity. In this way, a constellation of ethno-religious
relationships may be formed depending on how different elements of each source are
used and constructed.

Still, there is a significant gap in this literature. Typically, previous work has
approached the relationship between religion and ethnicity as just that: the converging

of two socially constructed categories (i.e., religion and ethnicity). Therefore, up
until now, these efforts have utilized a top-down approach. In other words, scholars
define and apply concepts and note how they intersect. In doing so, the subjectivity,
or an actor's own understanding, is ignored from the analysis and conclusions about
them are drawn based on broader generalizations of particular groups, processes, and

patterns. This study fills this gap by focusing on popular perceptions about group
identities and the imagined affiliation to ethno-religious communities. To accomplish
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this, the following chapter develops a theoretical framework on a specific concept
that captures this phenomenon.
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CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

As the previous chapter shows, the relationship between religion and ethnicity
is well studied. However, few have attempted a specific conceptual framework that

focuses on the popular perceptions of this relationship. In other words, how do
individuals understand their affiliation to religious and ethnic communities, and their

perceived overlap? In order to fill this gap, I utilize a conceptual apparatus that

captures popular understanding of the link between religion and etlmicity. In short,

this is accomplished by framing the conflation of religion and ethnicity in terms of
identity.

According to Erik Erikson, identify is the fifth stage of psychological

development where individuals are first confronted with questions about who they are
and their relationship with others (1968). Erikson understood identity as, "a process
located in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture"

(1968, p.23). There are two major theoretical frameworks that have been developed
to understand identity: identity theory and social identity theory. Influenced by

George Herbert Mead (1934), identity theory focuses on the individuals' selfperceived roles and relationships based on social characteristics like race, class,
gender, and religion (Stryker and Burke, 2000). Under identity theory, religious and
ethnic identities are one of many roles individuals can have that structure interactions
and social networks.

Stemming from Leon Festinger's work (1954), social identity theory stresses
the social categories individuals perceive membership to. As Tajfel wrote, "...social
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identity will be understood as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives
from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (1978, p.63).

Furthermore, this approach is concerned more with inter-group interactions and

normative processes of self-evaluation within these groups, what Tajfel and Turner
term social categorization (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). In other words,
individuals are always self-evaluating based on the normative expectations of a

particular group. An individuals' identity, according to social identity theory, is
based on these social comparisons.

Wrhile both theoretical foundations offer insight into the way individuals
understand themselves in relation to others, social identity theory offers a more

relevant base for this study. Again, identity theory focuses on individuals' roles

whereas social identity theory examines popular affiliation to social groups and

categories (e.g., religion and ethnicity). In this way, social identity theory can be
used to show how individuals perceive membership to groups that conflate religious
and ethnic identities.

Religious and etlmic identities interpreted through social identity theory refer
to membership to 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983), or large intangible
social groups like religions, nations, and ethnicities. According to Anderson,

imagined communities are different from small everyday social communities and
networks, by evoking a sense of comradeship where individuals hold a sense of
connectedness with other members, despite not ever actually interacting with them

(1983). It is in this way that they are imagined. But the normative regulation held on
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members of an imagined community is just as palpable as with networks and
communities that include face-to-face interaction. Individuals feel pressures of

conformity and social desirability as members of a large imagined community just as
they do in smaller more intimate groups. Therefore, it is important to understand

what these normalizing forces are and how powerful they can be. What follows is a
more thorough description of religious and ethnic identities as depicted in the
literature.

Religious Identity

Based on Linton's (1936) and Parsons' (1982) separate efforts on social roles
and statuses, the literature has traditionally defined religious identity as a social role
that is either achieved or ascribed (e.g., Berger, 1967; Wuthnow, 1998; Cadge and
Davidman, 2006; Peek, 2005). Accordingly, an individuals' religious identity may

either be an innate quality or a choice made later in life. Usually, this sort of identity
refers to self-described membership to a particular religious group, organization,
and/or tradition. However, many conclude that this dichotomous approach is

restrictive in scope. For instance, Peek offered a third form of religious identity,

religion as declared, as exemplified by post-9/11 American Muslims (2005). This
refers to individuals who, sometimes abruptly, declare a religious identity in response

to a major event or situation. In this way, Peek described many American Muslims
affirming their religious identity in the wake of 9/11 (2005).

Recent literature has provided some conceptualizations of religious identity
that are more relativistic in nature. These definitions are contextually grounded, and
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vary based on cultural and historical idiosyncrasies. Roof explored 'spiritual seeking'
among Baby Boomers in the United States (1999). Wuthnow examined 'spiritual
shopping' as a consequence of America's religious diversity (2005). Ammerman
located 'Golden Rule Christians' across American's congregations (1997). Cimino
and Smith studied 'secular seekers' in secular humanist movements in the United

States (2007). In short, these conceptualizations go further than religious identity as
religious affiliation and take into account the context-specific nuances that are related
to popular self-perceptions of what it means to be religious in a particular setting.
Willie this literature includes many approaches toward understanding how

individuals identify religiously, they are not exhaustive. First, the traditional

conceptualization that religious identity is either ascribed or achieved is largely idealtypical, which fails to take into account the blending of both and/or variations over a
life course. In other words, the traditional approach is largely static, thereby ignoring

the dynamic and complex nature of such identity. For instance, an individual may

grow up with a particular religious identity, as indicated by affiliation with a familiar
faith tradition, but may make choices later in life to alter that identity. Second, the
nuanced conceptualizations as described briefly above, provide authentic

explanations of religiousness in context-specific circumstances but are therefore
limited in explanatory power to the particular setting. Therefore, few have offered a
conceptualization of religious identity that captures authentic religiosity, while at the
same time, not be limited to a particular setting. While Davie's 'believing without

belonging' (1990), John Wolffe's 'diffusive Christianity' (1994), Michael Epstein's
'minimal religion' (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999), and Lyudmila
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Vorontsova and Sergei Filatov's 'just Christians' (1994) are exceptions to this trend
in the literature, their broader empirical support is lacking.

Based on this literature, religious identity is best understood as a dynamic

attribute that has both personal and structural sources of influence. In this way, I

understand religious identity as having three possible forms: religious identity as
achieved, ascribed from below, and ascribed from above. Just as Linton and Parsons

described religious identity as achieved, and others with more nuanced interpretations

(i.e., Roofs 'spiritual seeking' and Wuthnow's 'spiritual shopping'), religious

identity can be, in part, a personal choice. However, religious identity can also be an
ascribed attribute as well. Usually, when we talk about religion as ascribed (per

Linton and Parsons) we imagine individuals growing up in familiar religious

traditions (i.e., ascribed from below). But there is another kind of ascription not often
discussed, one where individuals are influenced by larger, supra-individual forces

(i.e., ascription from above). In other words, there can be instances where cultural
norms influence the religious identity of individuals. This can manifest formally,

through official political decrees (e.g., Christianization of Europe), or informally,

through the cultural norms and values of a society. Social identitytheory is especially
useful in depicting religious identity in this third form. Again, social identity theory

emphasizes individual identity as conforming to the norms and expectations of a
particular social category. In this way, individuals may presenta particular religious
identity because it is socially and culturally accepted. It is important to note that
these are ideal types, where all three may exist simultaneously.
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Ethnic Identity

As described above, ethnic identity is best understood as the perceived
membership to an imagined community. For many, ethnic communities have
particular characteristics that differentiate them from other social groupings.
Abramson described ethnic groups as having six main characteristics (1979). Ethnic

groups are 1) comprised of individuals that share a common history 2) are culturally
and socially distinct, 3) are social units in a broader system of social relations, 4) are
larger social units than familiar, kinship, or other locality groups, 5) may have
different meanings in different social settings, 6) and have names and labels that
make sense and are understood by members and nonmembers alike (Abramson,

1979). Others have provided similar conceptualizations of ethnic identity. Smith
described ethnic communities as "human populations with shared ancestry myths,

histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of

solidarity" (1997, p.27). These efforts have become prominent resources for studying
ethnic identity, and its relationship with other social characteristics (e.g., Yang and
Ebaugh, 2001; Hammond and Warner, 1993).

For the purpose of this study, I also understand ethnic identity as perceived
affiliation to imagined communities with a shared culture, history, and geography.

However, I propose further delineation in terms of the sources of meaning used to

maintain and legitimate ethnic identities. Unlike religious identity, etlmic identity is
usually depicted as fixed. In other words, it is far easier to change religions than
ethnicities. Etlmicity, commonly linked with (and at times equated with) race, is

rooted in genealogical attributes that are naturally ascribed. Abramson's and Smith's
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separate definitions illustrate this point in their emphases on shared history and ties to

a common geography. Therefore, it rarely makes sense to talk about ethnic identity
as an achieved characteristic. Although choice has little to do with ethnic identity,

sources of meaning used to define ethnic identity, like religious identity, may be
ascribed from below and above. On the one hand, ethnic identities can be maintained

by familiar groups, immigrant enclaves, and other close-knit communities. On the
other hand, ethnic identities can be maintained through the cultural norms and

expectations of a particular society. Again, social identity theory is particularly
useful in understanding how the latter occurs. Consequently, individuals perceive

their identity to an etlmic community based on self-comparisons to the norms of a
community.

Ethnodoxy: Defining the Concept

Based on the theoretical foundation of social identity theory and the

conceptualizations of religious and ethnic identity outlinedabove, I will investigate
the conflationof religious and ethnic identities. Few have explored the conflation of
such identities in these terms. Straughn and Feld's study offered a similar approach

by exploringthe 'symbolic boundaries' that are established based on religious and
national identities in the United States (2010), but the conceptual development of this

theoretical model was limited. Also missing from the literature is a conceptualization

that encapsulates the popular perception, as understood using Schutz's 'postulate of
adequacy' (1977), of individuals' ethno-religious identity. According to Schutz,
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.. .human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act

performed within the real world by an individual actor as indicated by the
typical construct would be understandable to the actor himself as well as to his
fellow-men in temis of common-sense interpretation of everyday life (1977,
p.237).

Therefore, Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry's (2012) efforts toward developing
a comprehensive theoretical model that may be applied across different contexts,

explaining different forms of ethno-religious relationships, is unique. The purpose of
this section is to summarize the theoretical development of this concept, thereby
establishing a foundation for the rest of the study.

This concept, termed ethnodoxy, was developed based on popularperceptions
of the relationship between religious and etlmic identities. According to Karpov,

Lisovskaya, and Barry, ethnodoxy is a "beliefsystem that rigidly links a group's

ethnic identity to its dominant religion andconsequently tends to view other religions

aspotentially or actually harmful to the group's unity andwell-being and, therefore,
seeks protected andprivileged statusfor the groups' dominantfaith" (2012, p.14).
(Earlier versions of this definition are given by Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008).
While similar to Abramson's 'ethnic religion' category (Hammond and Wamer,

1993), which acknowledges religion as one of many contributing attributes (e.g.,

language and territorial origins) to ethnic identity, ethnodoxy differs by focusing
particularly on the binding and mutually dependent relationship between religion and
ethnicity. In other words, to be a member of a particular ethnic group, one must also
adhere to its' dominant religion and vice versa.

The theoretical framework of ethnodoxy includes three levels of analysis

(Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012). On a micro-level, social identity theory is
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used to explain individual's self-perceptions as members of large, intangible

imagined communities. On a meso-levei, Converse's (1964) ideas on mass belief

systems and Lippy's (1994) idea of popular religiosity are helpful in understanding
the nature of ethno-religious ideologies. On a macro-level, Hervieu-Leger (2000),

Berger, Davie, and Fokas (2008), Casanova (1994), and Taylor (2007) are referenced
in order to understand the role of religion, and its link to ethnicity, in

modern/modernizing societies. Together, these three approaches provide a

comprehensive understanding of the relationship between religion and ethnicity not
yet seen in the literature.

The Conflation of Religious and Ethnic Identities

On a micro-level, socicil identity theory is used to explore the nature of selfidentification to groups that espouse ethnodoxy. Doing so highlights two important
elements of ethnodoxy. First, ethnodoxy refers to the popular perception of
individuals' ethno-religious identity. In this way, ethnodoxy is a belief system.

Second, ethnodoxy is exclusive by nature. Specifically, ethnodoxy includes
the belief that in order to be part of a particular ethnic group, one must also be a

member of that groups' dominant religious tradition, and vice versa. Additionally,
ethnodoxy implies an active attempt to secure an advantaged social and political
position for a particular group. These exclusive and protectionist aspects of
ethnodoxy are best understood using Tajfel and Turner's concept of social
categorization (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Social categorization "sharpens intergroup
boundaries by producing group-distinctive stereotypical and normative perceptions

28

and actions, and assigns people, including self, to the contextually relevant category"

(Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995, p.260). In other words, social categorization refers to
the perceived creation of in-groups and out-groups. According to ethnodoxy,
membership to in-groups or out-groups is determined based on both, an individual's
religious and ethnic identities.

Ethnodoxy, Mass Belief Systems, and Popular Religiosity
On a meso level, ethnodoxy can be understood in terms of subsystems and

institutions. In particular, Converse's ideas on mass belief systems and Lippy's work

on popular religiosity provides useful models for analyzing the ideological make-up
of ethnodoxy. According to Converse, "however logically coherent a belief system
may seem to the holder, the sources of constraint are much less logical in the classical
sense than they are psychological - and less psychological than social" (1964, p.5).
In other words, mass belief systems are formed and followed, based not on reasons

that are logical or rational, but because they psychologically make sense and, even

more importantly, are influenced by the social conditions and context of a particular
time and place. Therefore, as Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry suggest, "beliefs rigidly
linking faith and ethnos can be expected to form coherent ideological syndromes
because they reflect shared historical experiences of ethno-religious groups" (2012).
In addition, the role of elites may be especially important for creating and

disseminating such ideologies to the wider public. "Put simply, popular beliefs may
hold together because they happened to be connected in an elite ideology designed for
mass indoctrination" (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012).
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Lippy's work on popular religiosity further contributes toward understanding
the ideological consequences of ethnodoxy. According to Lippy, "in all societies

there exists a perceivable difference between what religious authorities and
sanctioned religious institutions promote and what ordinary people are actually

thinking and doing" (1994, p.8). What people are 'actually thinking and doing* refers
to popular religiosity. Lippy conceptualized popular religiosity as follows:
There is a central zone of religious symbols, values, and beliefs many of them provided by official, formal religious traditions - that comprises
the totality of religion in a culture. But what is held in common may not

receive systematic articulation or even rational justification by the religious
elite of any one tradition, let along by the ordinary people of a culture. As
individuals draw on this central zone and on subsidiary zones, they erect for
themselves worlds of meaning, they create identities for themselves, they

engage in the age-oldtask of religion by finding a way to make sense out of
their lives" (1994, p. 10).

In other words, people take and (re)create elements from both 'central' and

'subsidiary' sources of religious traditions to make sense of their everyday lives. As
Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry point out, popular religiosity may not be

'theologically correct' or, using Converse's construct, logically coherent. But, it may
make sense given the social and historical conditions of the particular context. In this
way, ethnodoxy is similar to popular religiosity as it refers to the everyday
understanding of identity that pulls from both etlmic and religious sources. "Thus,

popular religiosity can be seen as a link betweenreligious traditions and folk
ideologies that conflate ethnic and religious identities, even ifthe ideologies
contradict official theologies" (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012).
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Ethnodoxy and Modernity
One of the tasks in this study is to investigate the sources and consequences of
ethnodoxy with other religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors. Doing so
will provide a comprehensive analysis that tests the usability of this concept for
understanding a particular relationship between religion and ethnicity. Not only does

this offer empirical support for the existence of ethnodoxy as a 'real' phenomenon; its

scope of influence in society can also tell us something about the role of religion in
modern/modernizing societies.

In recent decades, scholars of religion have increasingly moved away from

classical understandings of religion in society (i.e., secularization paradigm) toward

more nuanced approaches. This has resulted in the re-evaluation, and at times

rejection, of the secularization thesis and the development of new conceptualizations
for understanding the role of religion in modem society. Indeed, one can no longer

expect the inevitable decline of religion as civilizations 'modernize.' Instead, as
many scholars now suggest, dimensions of religion can transform, decline, and grow
simultaneously.

For instance, Casanova noted three possible modes where secularization may
occur: institutional differentiation, individual belief and practice, and the privatization

of religion (1994). Accordingly, secularizing processes may exist in some, but not
all, of these dimensions. In fact, as Karpov posited, counter-secularizing processes -

what he and Berger (1999) temi desecularization - may occur in some dimensions as
secularizing processes occur in others: "counter-secularization's component changes
may develop incongruently, be differently paced, and coexist with secularizing
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trends" (Karpov, 2010, p.17). Others have similarly described such processes (e.g.,
Greeley, 2003).

The different counter-secular movements that can occur are particularly

relevant toward understanding the significance of ethnodoxy in modernity.

According to Taylor's (2007) three-stage periodizationof society, the role of religion
transitions from a vertically distributed hierarchy (Ancien Regime), to a source of

horizontal integration (Age of Mobilization), to the individualistic pursuit of spiritual

self-expression (Age of Authenticity). As Taylor described, counter-secularizing
movements can have a particularly powerful role in cultivating ethno-national

solidarities, especially during the Age of Mobilization (2007). However, as Karpov

(2010) and Karpov, Lisovksaya, and Barry (2012) noted, the role of religion in ethnonational unity (e.g., ethnodoxy, religious nationalism) is just as evidentduring the
Age of Authenticity (i.e., today) as before. In response to Casanova's (1994)

assumption that, at least in contemporary Western Europe, religion has lost this
ability to nationally unify, Karpov suggested that "this assessment may not apply to
less and unevenly modernized settings where the mobilization agenda remains
relevant for segments of society and political elite" (2010. p.269).
Evidence of this is not so difficult to find. For instance, Russia, India, Ireland,

Turkey, etc. are societies where, formally or informally, nationhood is linked to a

particular religious institution. Even in the United States, some have noted the
Christiancomponent in Americannational identity (Straughn and Feld, 2010; Heclo,

2007). In this context, examining the scope and consequences of ethnodoxy is cmcial
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for understanding the role of religion (both its secularizing and counter-secularizing
movements) in modem and/or modernizing societies.

The Plausibility of Ethnodoxy

It is important to place the concept of ethnodoxy as a belief system into
greater context. And, like all belief systems, they must be disseminated and
maintained in order to survive. Berger's concept ofplausibility structures may be

particularly helpful in explaining how this works. For Berger, "each world requires a
social 'base' for its continuing existence as a world that is real to actual human
beings. This 'base' may be called its plausibility structure" (1967, p.45). In short,

plausibility structures are the taken-for-granted set of social processes that make up
the norms and expectations of our social world. Berger continued, "the firmer the
plausibility structure is, the firmer will be the world that is 'based' upon it" (1967,
p.47). Therefore, if the plausibility structure is accepted and not questioned, all
elements in the social world which it maintains is also accepted.

As such, the plausibility structure of ethnodoxy (i.e., what makes ethnodoxy
plausible, accepted, and taken-for-granted) has both religious and ethnic sources. In
other words, adherents to ethnodoxy may pull from their identity to religious and/or
etlmic communities in order to present themselves as 'normal' members of society, or
distinguish themselves from 'others.' For instance, ethnic Russians may draw from
their Orthodox affiliation to demonstrate what 'truly' makes them Russian. Likewise,
ethnic Russians may base their 'Russianness' on ethnic foundations - i.e., being bom
Russian.
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While intentionally searching for hard-fast empirical evidence of plausibility
structures may be difficult, identifying its manifestations are still feasible. As

discussed in greater detail in Chapter XV, this paper examines the structure and

dissemination of ethnodoxy from above (i.e., objective) and below (i.e., subjective).

Doing so shows that ethnodoxy is spreadand maintained by both elites (above) and
the everyday interactions between individuals (below). By exploring the plausibility
structureof ethnodoxy, this study contributes to a more general understanding of the

taken-for-grantedness of the social world, or nomos according to Berger, in
contemporary Russia.

As so defined, the concept of ethnodoxy may be useful in explaining the

relationship between religious and ethnic identities in many contexts. For instance,

ethnodoxy may be particularly relevant in post-communist Europe. The collapse of
the Soviet Union has resulted in the need for groups of individuals to reconstruct,

reinvent, and create new fomis of identity, many of which can include religious and

etlmic elements. Many studies have indicated the relapse to traditional institutions, in
this case the Russian Orthodox Church, during unstable periods of social change.

Furthermore, recent nationalist and pro-Slavic movements (exemplified by the Putin

administration) reach back to traditional sources of Russian identity, thereby making
the boundaries between Russian and non-Russian identity more distinct. The

following chapterfurther describes the case of post-communist Russia as an ideal
setting to apply ethnodoxy.
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CHAPTER IV: CONTEXT: RESURGENT ORTHODOXY AND RUSSIAN
IDENTITY AFTER COMMUNISM

Post-communist Russia is an ideal setting to apply the concept of ethnodoxy.

The collapse of the Soviet Union required a re-evaluation of elements and sources
used to define and maintain a cohesive cultural identity. As many have noted, the

ideology maintained by the Communist Party traditionally had this role, infiltrating
social, spiritual, and political spheres. According to White, Wyman, and
Kryshtanovskaya,

For 70 years the USSR was dominated by 'the party.' Although the
law placed no restriction upon their number, only a single political
organization - the Communist Part of the Soviet Union - had a legitimate
existence, and that party, under the 1977 Constitution, was the 'leading and
guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all
state and public organizations (1995, p. 183).

With its dissipation at the end of the twentieth century, new sources of meaning were

required. For many, the rehabilitation of two traditional sources of Russianness was

pursued. First, the Russian Orthodox Church reemerged as a socially, politically, and

spiritually influential institution. Second, the marking of ethnic boundaries was also
revitalized as a way to define what it means to be Russian. As described below, these
trends are not mutually exclusive, but have fused together to promote a specific

understanding of Russian identity. In this way, the aim of this chapter is to provide a
descriptive account of the resurgence of religion, ethnicity, and their linkages in
contemporary Russia.
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Regulations on Religion in Russia: A Brief Summary

Before examining the relationship between religion and ethnicity, it is

important to understand the historical conditions and consequences that have lead to
the current religious landscape. This section summarizes the main socio-political
changes that have occurred, influencing the post-communist religious landscape we
see today.
During the course of the Soviet Union, official atheism was established and

substantiated, at first, by Lenin's 1918 law on the separation of church and state and,
later, a stricter 1929 Stalin-era law on religion. "Khrushchev continued the
"antireligious drive" with the "dream of leading the USSR to full and true
communism by 1980" (Davis, 2003, p.33). By the early 1960's, the Brezhnev 'period
of stagnation' was free from the "agonies of the Khrushchev attack" but, nonetheless,
brought "slow erosion of the church's institutional resources" (Davis, 2003, p.47).

By the 1980's, the reformative years of the Gorbachev-era resulted in dramatic social,
economic, and political changes, which included new ways of looking at religion in
society.

A key event triggering a mass re-interest in religion, particularly Russian
Orthodoxy, was the upcoming Millennium celebrations in 1988. This year marked
the 1000-year anniversary of the Christianization of Kievan Rus\ In 1980,
committees were formed to begin preparations. A few years later, property was
returned to the ROC including the Danielovsky monastery compound, Moscow's
oldest monastery (Marsh, 2011). The celebrations of 1988, and the preparations

leading up to it, became an important moment for believers. According to Marsh,
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"the millennium of the baptism of Rus' became an opportune moment not only to
reflect on the nation's long attachment to the Christian faith, but also to redress the
state for a greater sphere in which to practice that faith" (2011, p.l 13).
Indeed, by 1988, Gorbachev had met frequently with ROC leaders and

announced that a new law on religion would be enacted. As both Gorbachev and

representatives of the ROC, like archbishop Kirill of Smolensk, would agree, this new
law would echo Lenin's 1918 law on the separation of church and state but also

guarantee religious freedoms of belief and organization. In 1990, the law on
'Freedom of Conscience and Religious Belief was issued for the Russian Republic.

As Marsh described, "This very liberal law introduced legal religious equality for the
first time in Russian history, including the establishment of a secular state and a true
separation of church and state" (2011, p. 123).

However, this new chapter of religious freedom would not last long. By 1993,
attempts to amend the 1990 law by restricting rights for foreign religious

organizations while granting special privileges to 'traditional' Russian religious faiths

was approved by the Supreme Soviet (i.e., legislative branch) but vetoed by President
Yeltsin. Soon after, Yeltsin dissolved the parliament and passed a liberal constitution

that guaranteed religious freedom and separated church and state. In the years to
follow, however, regions throughout Russia took it upon themselves to construct

stricter laws on religion. By 1997, a new legislation draft was proposed, and

eventually signed by Yeltsin, dramatically limiting the religious freedoms so briefly
enjoyed.
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The 1997 'Law on Religion' included two important dimensions. First,
Russian Orthodoxy was identified in the preamble as the foremost contributor to
Russian culture and spirituality. Second, the law categorized religious organizations

into three groups: traditional, non-traditional, and sects. Traditional religions are
those faiths with historical precedence (more than 50 years) in Russia, including
Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. These faiths are granted special
privileges and status such as access to funding and property. Non-Traditional
religions are registered religious organizations operating in Russia for less than 50
years while sects are religions faiths not recognized by the state. All religious
organizations were required to register by 1999 in order to be officially recognized.

Despite the failure of many Orthodox parishes to meet this deadline, Marsh notes "it
was the non-Orthodox churches failing to making re-registration that were targeted

for dissolution" (2011« p. 130). The preference of Russian Orthodoxy over other
religious organizations was now official.

The implications of this legislature are dramatic. The unequal distribution of
both material (e.g., funding, property) and non-material (e.g., title, status, legal
proclamation of Russian Orthodoxy as national spiritual identity) resources has
resulted in a religious monopoly. According to the religious economy theory,

religious diversity should provoke religious activity. Thus, as Pankhurst pointed out,
the monopolization of religion by the Russian Orthodox Church "bodes ill, in general,

for the vigor of religion in Russia in the future" (1998, p. 135). Froese similarly
described the effects of this socio-political history on the religious landscape.
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The story of religion in the Soviet Union is essentially about the
dramatic rise and fall of an atheist competitor and the religious market that
was left in its wake. Interestingly, years of religious repression have given
rise not to new levels of religious freedom but a return to pre-communist
relations between church and state. (Froese, 2004, p.73).

Indeed, as the following literature shows, the monopolization of religion in postcommunist Russia has produced a religious landscape with relatively low religious
belief and behavior but high levels of affiliation (to the ROC) and intense ethnoreligious identity.

The Resurgence of Religion in Post-Communist Russia

Assessing the role of religion in post-communist Russia has included a variety
of approaches. Generally, two major trends can be identified in the literature. The
first include studies that provide descriptive analyses of religious resurgence. These

are usually projects that use newly accessible survey data to depict the blossoming
religious landscape in contemporary Russia. A second trend includes stmctural issues
of religion in society. These projects consist of discussions on institutional regulation
and cooperation, public policies of religious freedom, legitimation and maintenance
of Russia's religious markets, and effects of globalization. Below is a brief summary
of the conclusions found in both trends.

Phrases like the 'rise of religion' or 'religious resurgence,' which describe the

opening of a religious market as clearly and obviously apparent in post-communist
Russia, have often appeared in scholarly and popular literature (e.g., Greeley, 1994;
Tomka, 1995; Burgess, 2009). Citing newly accessible survey results, the dramatic
increase in indicators like religious affiliation was perceived as evidence of a
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religious resurgence in Russia (Greeley, 1994; Dunlop, 1996; Mchedlov, 2005).
However, studies soon noted the complexity of the situation (Mchedlov, 2005; Marsh,
2006; Davis, 2003; White and McAllister, 2000). For instance, while rates of

religious belonging were certainly increasing, religious behavior and beliefwere
curiously lower (Mchedlov, 2005; Marsh, 2006). As Greeley noted, the
understanding of religion in post-communist Russia required a more nuanced

approach: "While surveys may sketchsome of the dimensions of the

reemergence/rebirth of Russian religion, they cannot substitute for a richer and denser
deep description of what is happening" (2003, p.l 19).

Wnile theoretical analyses of the 'rebirth' of religiosity in Russia are not

lacking, those equally supported by empirical evidence are. Forexample, Mikhail
Epstein's conceptualization of religiosity in post-atheist Russia, termed 'minimal
religion,' provides an initially attractive contextualized explanation of religion but
lacks empirical support (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999).

Another prominent trend in the literature includes systemic investigations of
institutionalized religion. Such studies span a variety of issues ranging from current

depictions of Russian religious markets, gauging religious freedom and pluralism (in
both policies and individual attitudes andbehaviors), institutional relationships
between Church and state, and effects from globalization on the Russian Orthodox

Church (ROC). This literature largelydepicts the religious landscape in

4According to Epstein's idea, contemporary Russians have, despite anonreligious upbringing,
acquired a particular religious identity. This identity iscontextually post-atheist, rooted inthe
individual, and unattached to traditional religious institutions (Sutton, 2006). Although contextualized
to the particular history and religious traditions ofthesetting, Epstein does notprovide empirical
evidence to support his argument.
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contemporary Russia as monopolistic, highly regulated by the state, and
protectionistic.

Indeed, despite many projections that religious pluralism would envelop

across post-communist Europe, Sarkissian found more evidence of relapses to
century-old traditional ethnic-churches. Using the Governmental Regulation Index,
he found that in many Orthodox countries government regulation over religion
increased, the largest occurring in Russian between 1992-2002 (Sarkissian, 2010).

According to Sarkissian, increased religious regulation negatively affected religious

pluralism. Similarly, Froese finds the religious landscape in post-communist Russia
as, contrary to classical religious market theories, containing a budding religious

monopoly due to the historical context of the Soviet Union (2004). For Froese, the

impact of Soviet atheism on religious markets and the role of religious regulation in
the post-communist era have both led to the flourishing of traditional churches.
The rise of a powerful monopolistic traditional church in post-communist

Russia (i.e., the ROC) has influenced other realms of social life, both culturally and

politically. According to Knox, Russian Orthodoxy has become a key component in
post-Soviet Russian national identity, regardless of religious belief and behavior, and
a major resource for rising levels of Russian nationalism (2008). Similarly, Burgess
noted the emergence of the traditional relationship between Church and state

(historically termed symphonia) (2009). In short, the presence of the ROC in
contemporary Russia has become a serious defining element for contemporary

Russian identity. Filatov and Lunkin noted the ROC woridview as maintaining a
'Russian civilization' (2010). Likewise, others have explained how the
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'regionalization' (Daniiova, 2009) or 'jurisdictionalism' (White, 2007) of Eastern
Orthodoxy maintains isolated and particularistic religious institutions promoting
xenophobia and mono-culturalism.

In sum, the religious situation in post-communist Russia is complex.
Individuals certainly have more accessibility to different religious sources today than
ever before. However, institutions and policies that restrict non-traditional religious

influences, both formally and informally, exist. The consequences of these conditions
has produced and maintained a specific representation of Russian identity as
intimately tied to Russian Orthodoxy.

Russian Ethnic and National Identity

Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union came the disintegration of an

official z/nethnic approach toward identity. No longer united under one party and
ideology, Russia's diverse ethnic and national makeup resurfaced. As territories
across Central Asia, Eastern and Central Europe reclaimed independent sovereignty,

the mono-national empire was quickly dissolving, revealing the ethnic and cultural

diversity it had tried to suppress and assimilate for so long. As ethnic minorities in
newly formed territories and states had ample space to (reconstruct ethnic and
national identities, ethnic Russians were also faced with the challenge of rebuilding

their new identity. What did it mean to be Russian after so much had changed, both
spatially (i.e., geography) and culturally?

Russian ethnicity is well studied. Tolz distinguished between Russians' ethnic
and civic identities (1998). While civic identity denotes citizenship and territory,
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ethnic identity refers to, "culture, religion, language, and a common ancestor of a
dominant nationality..." (Tolz, 1998, p.993). Similaiiv, Simon interpreted nationality

as Rossijskii (civic) and Russkii (ethnic). Interestingly, Russkii is more commonly

used in contemporary Russian language (2000).
Despite the analytical separation of these ideal-types of identity, Russian
ethnic identity clearly has overlap with national identity (Tolz, 1998). I pursue both

forms of Russian identity as part and parcel of what it means to be 'Russian.' Indeed,
civic and etlmic components of Russian identity are far from mutually exclusive.
Instead, both sources of identity are frequently re-affirming the other. This may be

described as a dual movement of identity maintenance and legitimation between civic
and ethnic sources. For instance, civic institutions (i.e., the state) may use ethnic
sources of identity (e.g., shared history, common customs, languages, etc.) to produce
and preserve national identity. Likewise, civic institutions can support ethnic identity

by providing protection and privileged status to ensure its survival.

This relationship between civic and etlmic forms of identity highlights the
dynamic nature, and complexity, of Russian identity. This study explores how

religion (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) has become a vital component of both ethnic and

civic sources of identity. Ethnically, Russian Orthodoxy has long preserved Russian
traditions and customs. Civically, the Russian Orthodox Church as become an
important institution for the contemporary (reConstruction of national identity.
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Ethnodoxy in Contemporary Russia
Many scholars have noted the historically intimate relationship between

religion and nationhood, often viewed as the symphonia between Church (i.e..
Russian Orthodox Church) and state (e.g.. Marsh, 2007; Turunen, 2007; Agadjanian,

2001; Krindatch, 2006; Berger et al., 2008). Davis described the pivotal role played
by the Russian Orthodox Church in establishing and protecting Russian identity

throughout the Mongol reign, conflict with pagans, Muslims, and other 'invading'
groups. For Davis, the Church is instrumental in post-communist nation-building

today (2003). Others have similarly found that the relationship betweenreligion and
state survived Soviet atheism. Franklin described the resilience of religion as

follows: "the relation of religion to national identity has re-emerged powerfully in the
post-Soviet years as a cultural issue, as a matter or representation, of debate over
cultural form, of the material, visual, and verbal environment of Russia" (2004,
p. 106).

Additionally, religious identity in Russia has been described as being an
intrinsic, or ascribed, attribute. Kaariainen and Furman wrote, "Orthodox religion

tends to be seen as a given birthright, rather than a chosen faith" (2000, p.67).

Despite religion being officially repressed for more than seventy years, religious
identification has become a significant and perceivably innate component of what it
means to be 'truly' Russian. In fact, some argue that being religious has less to do

with religion, and more about being Russian. Marsh and Froese stated, "In the end,
Russia emerged from communism with no strong religious identity other than their
historical and national connection to the Orthodox traditions" (2004, p. 145).
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A palpable manifestation of ethnodoxy in contemporary Russia is the ethno-

religious pronouncement among political and religious elites in popular discourse.
For instance, typical to Vladimir Putin's rule has been personal loyalty to the ROC

and a public depiction of the Church as rightfully aligned with the state. Once again,
the ROC has an active role in government matters, spanning military ceremonies

(e.g., blessing of secret nuclear codes, submarines, military posts, etc.), monopolizing
religious guidance for the military, to everyday consultations between Church leaders

and state representatives (Blitt, 2008). Putin often consulted with church leaders like
Patriarch Aleksey II concerning state matters illustrating the blossoming relationship
between the Church and state. According to Putin, the "revival of the [C]hurch's

unity is a crucial precondition for restoring the unity of the entire Russian world,
which has always seen Orthodoxy as its spiritual foundation" (Russia and CIS
Presidential Bulletin, 2007). In a meeting with Russian Orthodox clergy in 2007,
Putin stated:

Russian Orthodoxy has a particular role in our country's history, in the
formation of our statehood, culture, morals and spirituality... Today, we

greatly value the [ROC's] efforts to return to our country's life the ideals and
values that served as our spiritual references for so many centuries...
...The [S]tate and the Church have ample scope for working together
to strengthenmorality and educate the young generation, and of course, to
preserve our country's spiritual and cultural heritage (Putin, 2007).

Indeed, the ROC has become, encouraged by key political leaders like Putin, an
integral part of post-Soviet political and social life.
At the same time, both Putin and some Church leaders have shown

considerable interest in revitalizing the once united 'Russian world.' Politically, this
refers to maintaining, informal or formal, influence in ex-Soviet states. Thus, the
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recent 'color revolutions' (in Georgia, LIkraine, and Kyrgyzstan) have added
significant friction to such efforts. For the Church, this refers to Kievan Rus', a

similar geography once under the influence of the ROC. Patriarch Kirill has

described the important role of the Church, and the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy in

general, in the unification of the Russian world. "I believe that only a united Russian
world can become a strong actor in global international politics - stronger than any

political alliances. In addition, without coordinated efforts by the state, the Church,
and civil society we shall not achieve this goal" (Kirill, 2011, p.64). Kirill also
explained how the Church is not limited to one ethnicity:
The Church is not called Russian on ethnic grounds. This name
indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church performs its pastoral mission

among peoplesthat accept the Russian spiritual and culturaltradition as the
basis of their national identity- or at least as an important part of it... At the
foundation of the Russian world lies the Orthodox faith... (2011, p.58-59).

Furthermore, recent political events in Russia has provoked an apparent

(re)evaluation of the relationship between the Church and state. Following protests

concerning the 2011 parliamentary elections, which suspected fraudulent voting
practices resulting in a United Russia (Putin's supporting party) victory, many ROC
leaders appeared, surprisingly, critical of the results as well. Patriarch Kirill has
stressed the importance for members in a free society to have the right to protest,

heeding the state to seriously considerthese complaints. Father Chaplin, a
historically conservative state sympathizer, told reporters that if evidence of fraud
exists, it would be analyzed: "If there are proven facts, then of course we're going to

examine them, present them to the church hierarchy and discuss them with the
Central Election Commission and other government bodies" (Kishkovsky, 2011). All
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of these comments depict the Church aiming to appear supra-ethnic and supra

national, intending to serve not just ethnic Russians, but all historically 'Russian'
peoples.

However, given the socio-political culture of post-communist Russia, the

alliance between the government of the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox
Church should not be taken-for-granted. Indeed, the privileges enjoyed by the ROC,
as outlined earlier in this chapter, are more indicative of a sympathetic, not critical or
superior, relationship with the state. Indeed, while political leaders like Putin and

religious leaders like Kirill describe intentions that appear unifying and inclusive, the
findings in this study depict the populace of ethnic Russia as more in line with
protectionism and xenophobia, both politically and religiously.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is evident in
post-communist Russia. Despite nearly eighty years of official atheism, religion has
resurfaced as a powerful source for (re)constructing ethnic and national identities.
Furthermore, recent public polices have substantiated the importance of Russian
Orthodoxy to the nation's history and memory. Despite some intentions to unify a
'historical Russia,' both politically and religiously, the monopolization of the ROC
has resulted in an intimate relationship with the state. Accordingly, these conditions

make contemporary Russia an ideal context to apply the concept of ethnodoxy, an
ideology espousing ethno-religious exclusivity, superiority, and protection. The
following chapter explains how this is accomplished.
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CHAPTER V: EMPIRICAL TASKS AND METHODS

This chapter lays a foundation for an empirical study of ethnodoxy. In
particular, ethnodoxy is applied in the case of post-communist Russia. As the

preceding chapter detailed, this setting is ideal due to the historical relationship
between religion and ethnicity. However, the explanatory power of ethnodoxy is not

limited to this one case. In this way, preliminary investigation into ethnodoxy beyond
contemporary ethnic Russians is also made, thereby providing useful analytical
comparisons.

The empirical component of this study is outlined as follows. First,
hypotheses are formulated based on the theoretical considerations of ethnodoxy and
the socio-historic context of post-communist Russia. Second, the sources of data
used are described. Third, key variables and their measurement are explained.
Fourth, a brief comment on the statistical tests and types of analyses is offered.

Finally, due to the comparative nature of this study, key considerations regarding
comparative research methods are discussed.

Main Hypotheses

Based on the concept of ethnodoxy and the context of contemporary Russia, I

propose the following main hypotheses that will direct the empirical component of
this study. As this study unfolds, more specific projections are discussed according to
each module.
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First, a micro-level of analysis emphasizes two major components of
ethnodoxy: popular identification to ethnodoxy and the exclusive and protectionist
nature of ethnodoxy. According to the theoretical framework of ethnodoxy described

earlier, adherents perceive membership to an imagined community that views
affiliation to their ethnic group's dominant religion crucial for identity construction

and maintenance. Based on the particular socio-historical context of post-communist
Russia, which include a traditionally strong ethno-religious identity, / expect a

majority ofethnic Russians to share ethnodox views. Furthermore, the exclusivist and
protectionist characteristics of ethnodoxy, as understood using social identity theory,
suggest that adherents to ethnodoxy may hold intolerant beliefs toward other groups.

In particular, I expect to find widespread anti-West sentiment associated with
ethnodoxy (against foreign states, Western churches, and cultural influences), which
would indicate the emergence of strong in-group/out-group boundaries inherent in

ethnodoxy. Therefore, Iproject that as levels ofethnodoxy increase, then levels of
intolerance will also increase. This includes Orthodox, and, in particular, Western

groups and institutions.

Second, a meso-level of analysis examines the ideological characteristics of

ethnodoxy. Converse's understanding of mass beliefsystems underlines the
importance of socio-historical context, over logical constraints, in determining why
people follow ideologies. Similarly, Lippy's idea of popular religiosity emphasizes
the notion that adherents of belief systems may hold attitudes and views that are not

'theologically correct,' but instead compliment the conventional, or popular,

disposition of a particular socio-historic context. Therefore, / expect tofind social
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andpolitical attitudes ofadherents to ethnodoxy to align with despite possible
Orthodox doctrinal contradiction, the values and beliefs ofethnodoxy. Stemming
from this is the idea that adherents of ethnodoxy may not view religious belief and

behavior as essential as religious affiliation. According to the key beliefs of

ethnodoxy, religious affiliation is necessary while having specific religious beliefs
and/or pursuing specific religious rituals and behaviors are not. This is in line with
Lippy's idea of popular religiosity, which refers to the everyday understanding of an
ideology by choosing aspects of said ideology that make social and cultural sense.

Therefore, given the unique socio-historic contextof post-communist Russia, /
suspect that adherents ofethnodoxy will have weak indications oftraditional
religiosity (i.e., religious beliefandbehavior), but high levels ofreligious affiliation.
Finally, the macro-level of analysis explores the role of religion in

modem/modernizing societies. Research has frequently shown (e.g., Norris and

Inglehart, 2004; Berger et al., 2008; Chalfant and Heller, 1991; Albrecht and Heaton,

1984) that religiosity is lowerwith individuals who exhibit 'modern' characteristics
(i.e., urban residents, educated, higher income, and younger). Therefore, based on
this conventional understanding of religion and modernity, I expect that individuals
who exhibit modern characteristics will have weaker indicators oftraditional
religiosity.

However, as some have noted (e.g., Karpov, Berger, etc.), counter-

secularizing processes can also occur in modem societies. While traditional religious
adherence (i.e., belief and behavior) may still be lower for individuals exhibiting
modern characteristics, other manifestations of'being religious' may still exist. As
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discussed earlier, social elites have had a historically significant role in disseminating

and maintaining ethno-religious ideologies (Taylor, 2007; Karpov, Lisovskaya, and
Barry, 2012). This is just as relevant in modern/modernizing societies as it was

earlier (Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry, 2012). As such, although indicators of
traditional religiosity may be weaker, other indicators of religiosity emphasized by
the components of ethnodoxy (affiliation with the dominant religion, religious
exclusivism and protectionism, support for close church-state relationships, etc.) may
be strong. Therefore, / expecttofind that individuals exhibiting modern
characteristics will still be highly supportive ofethnodoxy.

Data

The primarydata used in this paper comes from a collaborative study funded

by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER) in

2004-2006.5 A multi-stage national probability area sample was designed covering
the diverse regions throughout Russia. A survey questionnaire was administered to

2,972 adults via in-person interviews.6 Oversampling key Muslim regions (Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan) was conducted in order to obtain
sufficient data from Muslims (see Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008).

This study utilizes data collected from the National Council for Eurasian and East European
Research (NCEEER). The NCEEER is not responsible for the views expressed in this study.

6These interviews utilized a specifically designed questionnaire and were conducted by trained
interviewers from the Moscow-based Institute for Comparative Social Research. This Institute was

purposely selected for its experience in conducting research in Russia and other post-Soviet states.
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The most recent national identity modules conducted (1995 and 2003) by the

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) will also be utilized.7 ISSP is a crossnational collaboration of social surveys used to measure various topics pertaining to

the social sciences. The analysis of these surveys is important for two reasons. First,
this data is used to further validate some results from the primary data source.

Second, these cross-national survey programs can be used to investigate the

applicability of ethnodoxy in other contexts outside of Russia. In doing so, the key
questions in this study are placed in a broader comparative context.
The selection of cases differs for each data source. The main portion of this

study investigates ethnodoxy among ethnic Russians. For this analysis, respondents
who claim Russian as their ethnicity in the Russian national survey were selected.

However, preliminary analyses are administered that explore ethnodoxy among other
groups, in and outside of Russia, as well. An investigation of ethnodoxy among

Russia's Muslims necessitates the selection of respondents that identify as Muslim in
the Russian national survey. Furthermore, a cross-national analysis of ethno/national-

religious relationships is made. Therefore, selecting cases in ISSP National Identity
surveys involved deciphering respondents who identify with the respective country
and ethnic group of interest.

7This study also utilizes data collected from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The
ISSP is not responsible for the views expressed in this study.
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Variables

The empirical component of this study is to investigate the scope and
correlates of ethnodoxy among contemporary Russians. To accomplish this, the

relationship between ethnodoxy and other social, cultural, political, and religious
beliefs, attitudes, and values is examined. In particular, individuals' level of

ethnodoxy is analyzed in relation to levels of religiosity, nationalism, political
orientation, attitudes about popular social issues, religious intolerance, and

xenophobia. Doing so will provide a comprehensive depiction of the embeddedness
of ethnodoxy as a popular ideology, and its correlates across other social, cultural,

and religious orientations. In addition, preliminary analyses will explore ethnodoxy

beyond the case of contemporary ethnic Russians. This will offer tentative results as
to the existence of similar ethno-religious relationships across different groups and

societies. Using survey items from the 2005 Russian national survey, the following
section reviews how these variables are operationalized.

Ethnodoxy

Based on their conceptualization of ethnodoxy, Karpov, Lisovskaya, and

Barry offeran operationalization of the concept (2012). In particular, they provide a
series of six core tenets that adherents to ethnodoxy may hold. The first tenet, tenned
'inborn faithfulness,' refers to the intrinsic belonging to a group's dominant faith,

despite authentic religious belief or behavior. Lippy's view of popular religiosity
provides a helpful foundation for understanding this belief. The next two tenets
illustrate the in-group/out-group dynamic of ethnodoxy best understood using social
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identitytheory. 'Exclusion of apostates' refers to the idea that members of a group
who convert to another faith tradition are no longer true members of the ethnic group.

On the other side, 'margmalization of converts' refers to the belief that members of
other ethnic groups cannot be truly faithful, regardless of their authentic religious
beliefs and behavior. The last three tenets of ethnodoxy exemplify the exclusivist and

protectionist characteristics of this ideology. A sense of'religious superiority' may
be held over other religious traditions and ethnic groups, emphasizing its xenophobic
nature. A 'presumptionof harm' may also be held, which sees other faiths as

potentially harmful. Following this, a group may 'seek protection' by securing a

privileged and protected status. Although these components remain the same in every
application of etlmodoxy, the specific indicators created to measure these components
are context-specific.

For instance, the measures used in this study were previously created for the

2005 Russian national survey. Based on Karpov and Lisovskaya's in-depth

interviews with clergy and lay believers, survey measures were created that captured

popular beliefs about ethno-religious relationships among everyday etlmic Russians.
These measures were matched with the central components of ethnodoxy as

developed in its conceptualization described above (see Table 1). This method of
operationalization epitomizes what Schutz described in his 'postulate of adequacy'
(1977), making concepts congruent with people's everyday understanding, and
addresses issues of functional equivalence discussed in more detail below.

As Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) admit, adherents to ethnodoxy may

only hold a combination of these beliefs. This is an important consideration when
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Table 1. Operationalization of Ethnodoxy for Survey Research in Russia (Russian
National Survey, 2005)*
Propositions

Components of Etlmodoxy

A. Russian is Orthodox in his/her heart even if

Inbornfaithfulness

s/he was not baptized and does not go to
church.

Religious superiority:

in comparison with otherfaiths

Russians, even though they are poorer than
western peoples, are spiritually richer and
stronger in their faith.

in comparison withfellow-believers of

Other nations also have Orthodox churches,

other ethnicities and nationalities

but only in Russia can one find the true
Orthodox faith

Exclusion ofapostates

A Russian who converts to another faith (e.g.
Catholicism or Islam), is no longer truly
Russian

Marginalization ofconverts

Presumption ofharm

A non-Russian (e.g., an Azerbaijani), even if
s/he is baptized and goes to church, will never
be truly Orthodox
Western churches functioning in Russia
undermine the traditional faith of the Russian

people and do the Russian people harm
* Adopted from Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Bany, 2012

determining where ethnodoxy is applied, and raises a numberof questions. How
many beliefs must be held for the concept of etlmodoxy to have any explanatory

power? Are some beliefs considered more crucial than others, or are they weighted
equally? Howdoes the socio-historic context influence whichaspects of ethnodoxy
are supported? Furthermore, what proportion of a population must adhere to

etlmodoxy, including whatever combination of beliefs deemed sufficient, for this

particular ideology to be considered dominant? Obviously, not all members of a
society must adhere to every tenet in order for ethnodoxy to hold true. However, if
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the idea of ethnodoxy provides a good-fitfor explaining certain beliefs, attitudes, and
values for a significant proportion of individuals, then its application is considered

useful. Exactly what those requirements are may seem subjective, but by grounding

findings in the literature and supported by a firm theoretical foundation, I believe
such judgments can be made.

In short, these questions illustrate the need for practical applications of the

concept of ethnodoxy. While Karpov, Lisovskaya, and Barry (2012) provide a
theoretical breakdown of ethnodoxy, pragmatic issues such as these, may only crop

up during empirical application of the concept. Therefore, one of the tasks of this
study is to identify such considerations and address any limitations that exist. In the
end, the variability of the conceptof ethnodoxy is, in fact, a virtue, providing enough
structure to depict a cohesive social phenomenon while at the same time,
acknowledging the differences in ethno-religious contexts.

Religiosity

The concept of religiosity is often understood as having three separate
dimensions: religious belonging, religious belief, and religious behavior (e.g., Berger
et al., 2008; Davie, 1990, 2000, 2007; Hadaway and Marler, 2005; Mocabee et al.,
2001; Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Steensland et al, 2000). While this study

also utilizes this approach, a fourth dimension is included: attitude toward religion.
This refers to the self-described perception of religion and what role it has or should

have in society. Regardless of a person's religious affiliation, belief or practices, any
individual can have an understanding of what place the institution of religion has or
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should have in their society. An individual's attitude toward religion captures this
often-ignored dimension. Each dimension of religiosity is operationalized with the
following commonly used indicators.

Keeping in line with Schutz's "postulate of adequacy,' religious belonging is

operationalized using self-described indicators of religious affiliation. Respondents
are asked whether they identify as a religious person and, if so, which religious

organization they identify with. If respondents answer Orthodox, they are asked to
further specify. Responses include: Christian, Orthodox, Moscow Patriarchate, Old
Believer, Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia, or unsure.

Religious belief is operationalized using measures of core monotheistic and
central Christian beliefs. Measures of monotheistic tenets include belief in God,

belief about God, belief that God created the world, belief in life after death, belief in

heaven, and the belief in souls. Indicators of core Christian beliefs include: belief that
Jesus existed, belief in the resurrection of Christ, belief that he was the Son of God,
belief in miracles and the respondent's opinion of the Bible.

Religious behavior is operationalized using common measures of religious
activities found in the literature. These measures include frequency of attendance to

religious services, frequency of prayer, and frequency of reading the Bible.
Again, attitude toward religion in society is an important dimension of
religiosity often ignored in the literature. This variable is operationalized using the
following items: importance of religion in life, confidence in Russian Orthodox
Church, reliance on authority of traditional religions, and approval of Russian
Orthodoxy being taught in school.
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Perception of Nation

In exploring the scope and consequences of ethnodoxy, an important area to

consider is the relationship between ethno-religious identity and the perception of
one's nation. In this study, the perception of nation has two dimensions: respondent's

opinion of Russia in a global context and individual levels of nationalism.
Accordingly, this concept is operationalized using two survey indicators. First,
respondents are asked if they view Russia as part of Europe, and inevitably Western.

Second, respondents are asked how proud they are of being a Russian citizen. The
latter measure is frequently used to operationalize the idea of nationalism in survey
research.

Political Orientation

Similarly, the relationship between ethnodoxy and political orientation,
attitudes, and affiliation will also provide insight into the ideological embeddedness,

maintenance, and legitimation of ethnodoxy. In this study, political orientationrefers
to an individual's political membership, behavior, and views. In particular, political
membership is operationalized by respondents identifying their political party
affiliation and which they most agree with. Political behavior is operationalized by

indicating which party a respondent would vote for. Finally, political views are

operationalized by respondents indicating their position on a conservative-liberal
scale, how much confidence they have in their president, how much confidence they
have in political parties, and their views about democracy.
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Social Attitudes

Attitudes toward social issues will also be addressed. Two particular social

issues will be explored in this study: approval of abortion and rights of homosexuals.
Attitude toward abortion is operationalized using four situational indicators for

approving abortion: approve of abortion if the pregnancy is dangerous for the woman,

if the child is expected to be born with defects, if the woman is not married, and if the
couple no longer want children. Rights for homosexuals is operationalized with three
indicators: right for homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage, right
for homosexuals to teach in universities, and the inclusion of books about legalizing

same-sex marriages in public libraries. By investigating the relationship between

ethnodoxy and attitudes toward key social issues, a better understanding of the
consequences of ethnodox beliefs on other everyday social issues is achieved.

Religious Tolerance and Xenophobia

This study will also explore religious tolerance and xenophobia. In particular,
attitudes toward Muslims, new churches, and Western influences are assessed.

Opinions about legal rights for religions in general are also addressed. This will
highlight the exclusivist and protectionistnature of ethnodoxy and its relationship
with social and cultural tolerance and xenophobia.

Attitudes toward Muslims and new churches are operationalized by asking

respondents if they would allow a church or mosque to be built in their community,

preaching in public, publication and distribution of literature, respective religious
schools, teaching respective religions in secondary schools, preaching on television,
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religious charity activities, or the collection of money for respective religious needs.
Ethnic Russians appear to be more tolerant of Muslims than new churches. Opinions
about legal rights for religions in society is operationalized by asking respondents if
all religions should have equal rights or if certain religions should have special
privileges.

Finally, attitudes toward Western influence is operationalized by asking
respondents if democracy leads to disorder in society, if Western governments try to
weaken Russia, if life would be better with more cooperation with the West, and if

attempts to arrange life according to Western standards is harmful.

o

Etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims

In order to assess the applicability of ethnodoxy among other groups such as

Muslims that currently live in Russia, a series of five context-specific indicators were
created. These include the importance of prayer for being a Muslim, whether a

person who converts to a non-Islamic religion is still truly a representative of their
nationality, whether a Russian person can truly be a Muslim, whether Orthodox

churches undermine Muslim regions, and whether the authorities of Muslim regions

should protect them from anti-Muslim threats. Just as underlying themes, or factors,
of ethnodoxy were explored among ethnic Russians, data reduction techniques are
also administered on indicators of etlmodoxy for Russia's Muslims. This will provide

To be clear, Russian Muslims refers to Muslims that were living in Russia while the 2005 Russian

National Survey was administered. As discussed earlier, these respondents were selected only if they
affiliated with Islam.
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further insight into the applicability of the concept of ethnodoxy between two groups
within the same social setting (i.e., post-communist Russia).

Religion and Ethno-National Identity

Similarly, a preliminary analysis of ethno/national-religious relationships
outside of Russia is administered. This will allow for further discussion regarding the

application of etlmodoxy across multiple contexts and provide evidence of ethno-

religious relationships in modern/modernizing societies. Ethnodoxy outside of Russia
is operationalized using a particular indicator included in both ISSP National Identity
modules (1995 and 2003). Specifically, the survey asks respondents if it is important
to be affiliated to the dominant religion of that country in order to be a true citizen.
While this one indicator does not capture all the components of ethnodoxy, it does

provide tentative insight into its main essence: the beliefthataffiliation to a national
or ethnic group's dominant religion is necessary for its identity. Therefore, it should
be noted that findings from this inquiry is not definite evidence of the existence of
ethnodoxy in other countries. However, the idea that religious affiliation is
understood as a crucial element for an individual's national/ethnic identity,

throughout the world, does present significant empirical proof that supports the

general idea of ethnodoxy and that the role of religion is still a very powerful aspect
of identity construction in modern/modernizing societies.
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Social Determinants

The variables of social determinants used in this study include: sex, age, level

of education, level of income, and place of residence. The inclusion of these

variables has two purposes. First, a social profile of adherents to ethnodoxy, and their
social determinants, can be obtained. An overview of these variables and survey

measures in the Russian national survey is as follows. Age cohorts were categorized

into four classifications: 30 years or younger, 31-45, 46-60, and over 60. Level of
education was classified into three groups: incomplete secondary education,

completed secondary education, and incomplete higher or higher education. Place of
residence was categorized as rural (population of 10,000 or less) or urban (more than
10,000). Income was measured by asking respondents to answer an open-ended

question regarding their household monthly income. To simplify, I located the
median income value (6,000 rubles) and created two categories: low and high income.
Second, based on the frequency distributions of these variables, categories can
be created that highlight what is traditionally understood as modern versus nonmodern characteristics in the literature (i.e., higher education, higher income, urban

residence). Such a categorization (i.e., modem versus non-modern) can offer

important analytic distinction when exploring the scope of ethnodoxy among elites,
and on a macro-level of analysis, in terms of the role of religion and counter-

secularizing processes in modern/modernizing societies.
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Statistical Techniques

Two main statistical techniques are used in this study. First, a data reduction
technique (i.e., principle components analysis) is conducted on key ethnodoxy
measures (seven for ethnic Russians and five for Russia's Muslims) in order to gauge

the degree of inter-correlatedness between items. Such tests will show if multiple
dimensions of ethnodoxy exist and highlight underlying themes, or factors.
Furthermore, these tests will provide a useful comparison of the different forms of

ethnodoxy between ethnic Russians and Russia's Muslims. In addition, principle

component analyses is used throughout this empirical investigation in order to capture
underlying themes (or factors) for a variety of variables (i.e., religious tolerance,
social attitudes, etc.).

Other statistical tests used in this study include generating frequency
distributions of key indicators described above and the cross-tabulation of these items

with indicators of ethnodoxy. These tests are used to create portraits of what Russians
believe, how they behave, and what elements are used to fonn their identity. In doing
so, patterns among individual's ethnodox beliefs and other beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviors are assessed.

A Note on Comparative Research Methods

A major part of this study is comparing etlmodoxy between different groups

within Russia and cross-nationally. This requires some discussion on the nature of
comparative research methods and the techniques adopted for this study. This section
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outlines the major conceptualdistinctions of comparative research, issues of
functional equivalence, and challenges concerning analysis in comparative research.

Case versus Variable-Oriented Approaches

Comparative methods of analysis are usually distinguished between caseoriented or variable-oriented approaches. Ragin understood the case-oriented

approach as 'causal-analytic,' focusing on and interpreting specific cases across

multiple settings (1987). The variable-oriented approach is theory centered,

emphasizing generality over thecomplexity in cases. "In a typical variable-oriented

study, the investigator examines relationships between general features of social
structures conceived as variables" (Ragin, 1987, p.55). In other words, unlike case-

oriented approaches, which emphasize the context-specific nature of only a few cases,
the variable-oriented approach evaluates the relationships of particular characteristics
across several societies or countries.

Many consider the variable-oriented approach dominant in comparative
research (Abbott, 1997; Bradshaw and Wallace, 1991). Moreover, these two

approaches are used interchangeably with quantitative (variable-oriented) and
qualitative (case-oriented) labels, further accentuating the divide (Ragin, 1987;
McMichael, 1990). However, some have argued against this polarization in methods.
For instance, Bradshaw and Wallace suggested that, "although the variable-based

approach is most commonly used when many different cases are involved, it may also
beemployed in case studies" (1991, p.157). Similarly, the goal of this study is to
combine both approaches. Obviously the exploration of ethno-religious relationships
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between groups within Russia and cross-nationally indicates a variable-oriented
approach. However, the contextualized background provided for comparative cases
(e.g., Russia's Muslims) typifies a case-oriented approach. By combining both

approaches, a context-rich background is coupled with a rigorous empirical analysis,
yielding a comparison that is thorough and far-reaching.

Issues of Functional Equivalency

A crucial issue in comparative research is to ensure that concepts have

achieved functional equivalence. "The most fundamental methodological issue is
whether the concepts employed in the analysis are truly equivalent" (Kohn, 1989,

p.84). In other words, while words or phrases may appear the same (or translated
similarly), their meanings can vary dramatically over time and space. In fact, "the
same variable may be indexed by a variety of items, and different items may be the

most appropriate indicators in different settings" (Verba, 1971, p.315). Therefore,
considerations must be made in order to account for such ftmctional nonequivalence.

Verba offered two possible solutions regarding this challenge.
One solution... is to attempt to define the frame of reference as

precisely as possible, which is simply to say that the questions should be
precise and unambiguous. An alternative technique, often useful in crossnational research where the possible frames of reference are uncertain, would
be to allow the respondent to set his own (1971, p.322).

The issue of functional equivalence is clearly problematic in the

operationalizing of concepts. For instance, "a misleading translation may create not
only nonexistent entities but spurious analytical problems, as well" (Keesing, 1985,
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p.204).9 Therefore, it is imperative that measurement items are both developed and
administered appropriately to ascertain accurate information from intended

populations.10 The functional equivalence ofconcepts may be achieved better if
variables are broken down into component parts, or multiple measures: this "ailow[s]
one to test whether the alternative items cluster together and can be assumed to be
indeed measuring the same thing" (Verba, 1971, p.320).

The process of operationalizing the conceptof ethnodoxy reflects these
considerations. As described earlier, the concept of ethnodoxy has been broken down

and operationalized into six, non-context-specific, component parts. Doing this has
ensured that while measures might differacross groups, cultures, and societies, the
thematic essence for each component is the same. Then, precise measurement items
were constructed, based on specific beliefs of everydayetlmic Russians, which were
then matched with each component of etlmodoxy. A similar process was

administered whencreating measures of ethnodoxy specific to Muslims living in

Russia. In this way, the functional equivalence of etlmodoxy is achieved by allowing
the concept of ethnodoxy to bebroader than any one ethno-religious context, but

9Hill has acknowledged different levels of comprehension of religious measures for certain

populations. For instance, some measures ofreligiosity are too abstract for children, poorly educated
adults, and some clinical populations (Hill and Pargament, 2003). Stirling, Furman, Benson, Cauda,
and Grimwood's study on the role of religion and spirituality among social workers inNew Zealand
provide anexcellent example regarding the re-development of measurement items and use of experts
in modifying questionnaires for differentcontextual settings (2010).

10 Traphagan's effort on studying religion cross-culturally exemplifies this importance (2005). He
argued that ifcontextual specificities are not considered, than erroneous assumptions are usually made.
ForTraphagan, a Western Christian-Judeo approach isoften used when studying religion in other
settings (e.g., Japan). Termed cultural imperialism, this isusually performed unknown to the
researcher but with suspicious findings nonetheless. Thus, Traphagan urged all comparative
researchers to thoroughly consider such obvious threats to internal validity.
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operationalized based on the socio-historic context of particular ethno-religious
relationships understood in everyday life.

Analyzing Comparative Data: Similarities versus Differences

The analysis of comparative data can have different conceptual emphases.
Kohn distinguished between two basic types of research findings: emphases of
similarities or differences. "One that looks for statistical regularities and another that
searches for cultural or historical differences" (Kohn, 1989, p.78). For Ragin,
similarities and differences are closely related to functional equivalence:

Identification of underlying commonalities often does not involve a
simple tabulation and analysis of common characteristics. Investigators must
allow for the possibility that characteristics which appear different (such as
qualitatively different systems of incentives) have the same consequences
(1987, p.47).
Verba also commented on the comparability of results: "Such similarities and

differences are always subject to challenge that they are not 'real'; that that which
seems similar is not really similar that that which seems different is not really
different" (1971, p.310).

Thus, researchers should be sure that their results implyfunctional similarities
orfunctional differences. For Ragin, the use of statistical techniques has had major

benefits invariable-oriented data analysis.l' Statistical techniques have allowed
researchers to study more cases at a time, provoked more caution when constructing

11 However, Ragin favored thecomparative method over statistical methods for four basic reasons: I)
the statistical method is not combinatorial, 2) the comparative method aims to explain for all instances
of a phenomena, 3) the comparative method is not restricted by the limitations of sample sizes and tests
of statistical significance, and 4) the comparative method requires knowledge of each case (1987).
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generalizations, and offer useful options of statistical control (1987). However,
"while statistical control allows investigators to make broad statements with relatively

little data, these broad statements are possible only because very powerful simplifying
assumptions have been made" (Ragin, 1987, p.64).

Verba argued for a data analysis technique, termed "bootstrap operations,' in
order to produce contextual comparisons (1971). Based on Duijker and Rokkan's
'second-order comparisons' (1964), bootstrap operations perform multi-level

comparisons of variables thatare substantively related within a social context (Verba,
1971). This can control for contextual discrepancies, thereby increasing content
equivalence (Verba, 1971).

11

These considerations are applied in this study as well. For instance, functional
similarities and differences are identified among different forms of ethno-religious

relationships. Second-order comparisons can be made by first locating differences
within groups/societies, which are then used as functional equivalents for cross-

group/society comparisons. In other words, ethno-religious relationships are initially
examined within ethnic Russians, Russian Muslims, and within Protestant, Catholic,
and Orthodox countries. Then, the differences found within groups/societies become

the frame of comparison between groups/societies.

12 Bootstrap operations and Rokkan's second order comparisons focus on comparing values of a
certain measure from certain subgroups cross-nationally, versus direct individual-level variations
cross-nationally. "Thus, for instance, the frequency of a specific measure of participation is not
directly compared among systems, but rather, participation rates for various groups are compared
within individual systems - with the differences among groups forming the focus of cross-system

comparison" (Verba, 1971, p.328). Of course, the selection of groups used in analysis should be
theoreticallyjustified in order to achieve meaningful content equivalence.
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Conclusion

In sum, utilizing elements from both case and variable-oriented methods will
provide a contextually rich analysis without comprising the number of cases. In

addition, recognizing the importance of functional equivalency, in conceptualizing,
operationalizing, and analyzing data, will ensure that more meaningful comparisons

are made. But, before comparative analyses can be conducted, it is vital that we
understand the spread and social make-up of individuals who believe in ethnodoxy
for the first case-group: contemporary ethnic Russians. This is accomplished in the
following two chapters.
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CHAPTER VI: THE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF ETHNODOXY IN POSTCOMMUNIST RUSSIA

Before investigating associations of ethnodoxy with religious, social, and
cultural beliefs and values, the scope and structure of ethnodoxy should be examined.
In other words, what does etlmodoxy look like for contemporary ethnic Russians and

how prevalent is it? The following chapter accomplishes this in two ways. First,
dimensions of individuals' beliefs in the seven core tenets of ethnodoxy are analyzed.

Second, a data reduction technique is administered on the indicators of ethnodoxy,
testing for underlying themes or patterns that may exist across these beliefs.

Frequency Distribution of Adherence to Ethnodoxy

As described earlier, Karpov and Lisovskaya created a series of seven
indicators to measure levels of etlmodoxy for a 2005 Russian national survey. The

frequency distribution of these indicators (see Table 2) provides preliminary insight
into the prevailing perceptions of an ethno-religious link among contemporary ethnic
Russians. While adherence varies across each ethnodox belief, a majority of ethnic
Russians agree with all but one core tenet. In fact, 75% or more of respondents
adhere to at least three of the seven items.

Clearly, these results illustrate the importance of an ethno-religious

relationship in contemporary Russian identity and provide tentative confirmation that
the concept of ethnodoxy may be useful in understanding this phenomenon. The

most popular belief is that a Russian is always Orthodox (85% of ethnic Russians
agree). In addition to such a staggering proportion who agree, the mass
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Table 2. Frequency Distributionof Ethnodoxy Beliefs among Ethnic Russians
Frequency

Percentage

480

34.3

768

54.8

689

49.2

761

54.3

A Russian is always Orthodox

1195

85.3

State should protect Russian Orthodox from

1055

75.3

1065

76

Measure

No longer Russian if converted from Russian
Orthodox Church to another religion

Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian
Orthodoxy
Non-Russian can never be a real Russian
Orthodox

Western churches undermine Russians and their
traditions

opponents

Russians are richer in their soul and stronger in
their beliefs than Western nations
«=1401

adherence to this beliefis important for two reasons. First, the notions of being

Russian and being Orthodox are clearly conflated, indicating the prevalence of an

ethno-religious identity. Second, the use of the word always (eceeda in Russian) in
this item portrays the absolutist nature of ethnodoxy. In other words, it does not

matter what changes an ethnic Russian makes in his or her life, even if one is not

baptized and does not go to church, if you were born an ethnic Russian, then you
were born Russian Orthodox.

The second most popular ethnodox beliefitem refers to the xenophobic nature

of the ideology. Indeed, 76% of respondents agreed that Russians are spiritually
richer than Western nations. This illustrates the 'us' versus 'them' dynamic by

suggesting Russian's superiority in comparison with the West. This spiritual
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superiority is clearly taken-for-granted among most contemporary Russians. In line

with Slavophile mentality, such a wide spread of belief points to a perception of
Russia as a civilization superior to the 'West.'

The third most popular belief reveals the protectionist nature of etlmodoxy.
More than 75% of ethnic Russians agreed that the state should specifically protect

Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. As discussed later, individuals that are not

particularly religious, in the traditional sense, support this idea as well. It is also
worth noting the exclusivist aspect of this belief. The 'opponents' of Russian
Orthodoxy referred in this questionnaire is not clear. Does this refer to religious

opponents, political opponents, or something else? Even more important, are the
opponents of Russian Orthodoxy the same as opponents of the suite?

The prominence of other ethnodox beliefs may answer these questions. A

majority of ethnic Russians (54.3%) believe Western churches are particularly
harmful to Russian traditions and way of life. Taken with the second most commonly
held ethnodox belief (i.e., Russians are spiritually richer than the Wresf), it would

appear that most ethnic Russians identify Western-affiliated religious organizations as
a main opponent for which they seek protection from. These considerations are

further explored in Chapter XI, by investigating the relationships between ethnodoxy
and religious tolerance and xenophobia.
The next set of beliefs illustrates what was described in Chapter II as the
sacralization of ethnos. For instance, over half of ethnic Russians (54.8%) believe

that only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian Orthodoxy. Moreover, nearly half of
ethnic Russians (49.2%) do not consider non-Russians to be 'real' Russian Orthodox.
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These beliefs illustrate what Smith termed 'sanctification of the homeland' (2008) by

restricting the authenticity of a religion to a particular geographical region.
Tied to this is the idea that ethnic groups are intimately linked with a

particular region, tenned ethnoscapes (Smith, 2008). If ethnoscapes are 'sanctified,'
then members of an ethnic group that convert to another religion may be ethnically

ostracized. Although far less accepted compared to the other six beliefs, the idea of
sanctified ethnoscapes is prevalent among many ethnic Russians. Indeed, more than
one third of etlmic Russians (34.3%) believe that a person is no longer Russian if they
convert to a different religion. The consequences of this are important as it implies

etlmic identity is not as fixed as suggested in the literature. Instead, etlmicity is

dynamic, dependent on meeting certain qualifications as so defined by popular
perceptions.

The above analysis provides an initial insight into the belief in ethnodoxy and

its wide spread among most contemporary ethnic Russians. Furthermore, these
beliefs illustrate the different analytical components of ethnodoxy described in

Chapter III. While the separate components of ethnodoxy are important for
establishing a clear structure of this ideology, there may be broader, underlying
themes that exist among these beliefs as well. To test this, factor analyses were
conducted and are discussed below.

Underlying Themes of Ethnodoxy among Ethnic Russians
In order to check for underlying themes (i.e., factors) that may exist among
ethnodox beliefs, factor analyses (i.e., principal components analysis) were
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conducted. The first factor analysis revealed a model with one factor.

In other

words, all seven beliefs loaded under one theme. This is, of course, important as it
suggests that these items capture the general essence of etlmodoxy. However, this

model explained less than half of variance. A second factor was detected with an
eigenvalue near 1.0.

Therefore, a two-factor model was tested. As expected, the

results revealed two separate factors. In other words, two separate underlying themes
appear to exist among the seven items. Below, Table 3 presents the rotated
component matrix of ethnodoxy indicators. As the results from this analysis show,

each item was strongly correlated within one of two factors. Compared to the initial
one-factor model, this two-factor model explained more variance (nearly 53%) and
was so adopted as the better fit.

In short, these two factors suggest two different dimensions of ethnodoxy. The
first factor, hereafter termed soft ethnodoxy, links with items that signify a broader

understanding of ethnodoxy.13 Indeed, as described above, these are beliefs that are
more widely held by a large majority of ethnic Russians. While still evident of
ethnodoxy as exclusive, protectionist, and absolutist, these items are more vague and
less rigid compared to the other four. The second factor, hereafter labeled hard
etlmodoxy, denotes a stronger, more direct, sense of ethnodoxy. In other words, the

second factor deals with items that imply a stricter, more absolutistic, and exclusivist

13 This analysis used Kaiser criterion of extraction (eigenvalue greater than 1.0)
14 The conventional threshold in principle components analysis is 1.0. However, oftentimes a second
factor may be extracted if the eigenvalue is relatively close. This is the case for conducting the second
model.

13 Soft ethnodoxy includes the following variables: "The State should protect Orthodox beliefs of
Russian people from their opponents", and "A Russian person is always Orthodox even if he/she is not
baptized and does not attend church", "A non-Russian will never be a genuine Orthodox", and "Even if
Russians are poorer than western nations, they are richer in their soul and stronger in their beliefs."
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Table 3. Rotated Component Matrix of Ethnodoxy Indicators
Factor I

Factor II

(Soft Ethnodoxy)

(Hard Ethnodoxy)

No longer Russian if converted from ROC
to another religion

-.050

.799

Only in Russia can one find 'true' Russian
Orthodoxy

.444

.554

.218

.679

.648

.129

.389

.510

.704

.287

.790

.056

Eigenvalue

2.738

.967

% Variance

39.1%

13.8%

Variables

Non-Russian can never be a real Russian
Orthodox

A Russian is always Orthodox
Western churches undermine Russians and
their traditions

State should protect Russian Orthodox
from opponents
Russians are richer in their soul and

stronger in their beliefs than Western
nations

Total variance explained: 52.9%

relationship between religion and ethnicity.16 While fewer respondents adhere to the
beliefs of hard ethnodoxy, a sizeable majority still claim adherence. In sum, a

majority of ethnic Russians agree with mostethnodox beliefs. More respondents
align with soft ethnodoxy, which shows general consensus that being Russian and
being Russian Orthodox are intimately inter-related and that this relationship should

be preserved. A smaller proportion of ethnic Russians adhere to the beliefof hard
16 Hard ethnodoxy includes the following variables: "Western Churches preaching in Russia
undermine Russian traditional beliefs and harm Russian people", "If a Russian person [converts to

anotherfaith] not Orthodox, he/she stop being a real Russian", "Other nations also can follow
Orthodoxy, but only in Russia one can find true Orthodoxy",
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ethnodoxy, a stricter and tinner understanding of an ethno-religious identity. The
differentiationof ethnodoxy as hard and soft should provide analytical utility.

Tfiusly, respondent's varying dimensions of ethnodoxy may be related to other
religious, social, and cultural attitudes, beliefs, and values.

Conclusion

The analyses conducted in this chapter reveal two important characteristics of

ethnodoxy as applied to post-communist ethnic Russians. First, ethnodox beliefs, as

operationalized in the preceding chapter, are adhered to bya majority of ethnic
Russians. This suggests that the application of ethnodoxy on this particular context is
a worthwhile pursuit. Second, factor analyses revealed two underlying factors, or
themes. The first factor, soft ethnodoxy, includes beliefs that are more widely

accepted, capturing a more general understanding of ethnodoxy. The second factor,
hard ethnodoxy, includes beliefs that are stricter and less popular. Still, both factors
contain items that capture the exclusivist, protectionist, and absolutist nature of this
ideology and are shared bya majority of contemporary ethnic Russians. The
existence of two factors illustrates the multi-dimensionality of etlmodoxy among

ethnic Russians. As subsequent analyses show, this may not be the case for all

contexts. The next step in generating a social profile of ethnodox adherents is to
investigate its social determinants. This is accomplished in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER VII: THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF ETHNODOXY

Now that the scope and structure of ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic
Russians has been developed, a social profile of its adherents can be made by

investigating its social determinants. In this way, a demographic makeup of
adherents to ethnodoxy is explored. Additionally, modern/non-modern categories are
constructed based on key characteristics of respondents in order to determine how

ethnodoxy fits in a modern/modernizing society. Accomplishing these tasks will

provide a clearer depiction of ethnodoxy as a popular ideology, and its followers,
before exploring its relationship withother beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.
As defined earlier, etlmodoxy is a beliefsystem. Previous research on social

determinants of religion canhelp develop hypotheses about beliefsystems related to

religion, such as etlmodoxy. After I review the existing literature on the social
determinants of religion, I develop and test hypotheses pertaining to the social
characteristics of adherents to ethnodoxy. Furthermore, a categorizationof

respondents into modern/non-modern groups is performed in order to further
understand the place of ethnodoxy in a modem society.

Background: Social Determinants of Belief Systems
The social determinants of religiosity are well documented. Although usually

leftas a subsidiary concern, patterns identified among the social attributes of

religiosity are crucial in understanding the role of religion in society. Research has
frequently presumed that religiosity is lower with individuals who exhibit 'modern'
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characteristics (i.e., urban residents, educated, higher income, and younger).

Accordingly, individuals exhibiting the opposite qualities are generally found, or

presumed, to be more religious (i.e., rural residents, less educated, lower income, and
older). In fact, this is the very basis for many proponents of secularization. Simply,
the more 'modern' individuals are, or a society for that matter, the less religion is
sought.

On the individual-level, it is often presumed that older, lower income, less
educated, and rural residents are more religious than their opposites. Many have noted

the negative relationship between level of education and religiosity (Albrecht and

Heaton, 1984).17 Place of residence has also been linked to religiosity, where rural
residents are usually depicted as more religious (Chalfant and Heller, 1991).

Levels

of religiosity based on differences across age and sex have also been commonly cited.
Berger, Davie, and Fokas explored the historically different roles of women across

Europe and the United States as influencing their religiosity (2008). Additionally,
they noted that, "older people are more religious than the young on allconventional
indicators...''(2008, p.114).

These findings apply to contemporary Russia as well. According to Norris

and Inglehart, "religious attendance in post-Communist societies being relatively
strong among women, the less educated, andthe less affluent..." (2004, p.124).
Furthermore, Norris and Inglehart explored cross-national societal-level differences
17 However, as Albrecht and Heaton noted, the issue is usually more complicated as findings vary
across denominations, religious traditions, and dimensions of religiosity (e.g., church attendance is
often positively related to level of education) (1984).

18 While the relationship between urban/rural place ofresidence and level ofreligiosity has been
noted, Chalfant and Heller find thatgeographical location (i.e., East, West, Midwest, South, etc.) has
greater explanatory power, particularly in the United States (1991).
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of modernization and development with levels of religiosity. According to their

'security axiom,' as societal security increases (operationalized using the Human
Development Index), the need for religion as a source of support decreases (2004).
Others have also noted societal-level relationships between religiosity and societal

instability (Bruce, 1999), ontological security (Kinnvall, 2004), and general

uncertainty (North, 2005). In short, the relationship between social attributes (e.g.,
sex, age, education, place of residence, and income) and religiosity have become so

taken-for-granted that their use in empirical studies are often limited to control
variables, leaving their influence as invariably assumed.
Based on this literature, one should expect a similar relationship between

ethnodoxy and social attributes of modernity. Since ethnodoxy emphasizes the

importance of religious affiliation, I expect individuals exhibiting modern

characteristics (younger in age, educated, urban dwelling, and higher income) to show
lower levels of ethnodoxy as well. Also based on this literature, I expect females and
older individuals to show stronger inclinations toward ethnodoxy. Therefore, based

on the hypotheses stated earlier and this literature on the social determinants of
religiosity, I expect individuals exhibiting modern characteristics (i.e., urban

dwelling, higher educated, higher income, younger) to show weaker levels of
ethnodoxy (Hypothesis la). Additionally, / expectfemales and older individuals to
show stronger levels ofethnodoxy (Hypothesis lb).

19 There are, ofcourse, many exceptions in the literature that highlight the complexity and, in some
cases, reversed relationships between social attributes and religiosity. For instance, Beeghley, Van
Velsor, and Bock noted this in their study on socio-economic status and religiosity in the United
States: "despite stereotypes of religion as the haven of the poor and oppressed, lower socio-economic
status whites in the general population are least likely to participate in organized religion" (1981,
p.403).
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A Social Profile of Adherents to Ethnodoxy

Table 4 shows the social breakdown of respondents that self-identified as

ethnic Russians. A majority of respondents were female (62.3%) and living in urban
areas (76.4%). Nearly a fifth of respondents have not completed a secondary
education, more than half completed a secondary level of education, and a quarter

have some higher education. There was a fairly even distribution of age across four
cohorts (22%, 23.4%, 25.6%, and 29.1% respectively). While over a quarter of all

respondents refused to identify their income level, over a third were above the median
income and over a third were below. This social profile of respondents will be crucial

for understanding the relationship between etlmodoxy and modernity. As described
below, the distribution of respondents across these categories will be used to

distinguish individuals exhibiting modern versus non-modern attributes.
Next, associations between indicators of ethnodoxy and indicators of social

demographics were analyzed (see Tables 5a-b). An initial glance shows the

popularity of most ethnodox beliefs, despite social variations. Just as the general
frequency distribution of etlmodoxy indicators depicted, more ethnic Russians adhere
to soft etlmodox beliefs. However, a near majority of respondents still agreed with all

but one indicator of hard ethnodoxy. The following is a breakdown of social
determinants between the two dimensions of etlmodoxy.

Data show statistically significant associations of ethnodoxy with most social

categories (see Table 5b). In short, females, younger cohorts, individuals with
secondary education, and urban residents show higher levels of ethnodoxy. These
results show that the social determinants for adherence to soft ethnodoxy are more
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Table 4. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Social Determinants
Frequency

Percentage

Male

528

37.7

Female

873

62.3

30 or younger

308

22

31-45

328

23.4

46-60

358

25.6

Over 60

407

29.1

Incomplete second ary

282

20.1

Secondary

769

54.9

350

25

Urban

1070

76.1

Rural

331

23.6

High

517

36.9

Low

483

34.5

Missing

401

28.6

Sex

Age

Education

Incomplete higher, Higher
advance
Residence

Income

«=1401

complex and, at times, contradict thecustomary expectations about 'modern'
individuals as less religious. Fewer relationships were statistically significant for hard
ethnodoxy. Income and age are significantly related to three of the four variables of
hard ethnodoxy and gender with one. Overall, large proportions of ethnic Russians,
regardless of variation in social attributes, adhere to some degree of ethnodoxy.
While these results illustrate some patterns that can be explained using the assumed

modernist approach (e.g., the effects of low-income), otherfindings showa far more

complicated and contradictory situation (e.g., curvilinear relationship with education
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Table 5a. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if
converted

can one find
'true' Russian

can never be a
real Russian

churches

always

protect

richer in their

undermine

Orthodox

Russian

soul and

from ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

Orthodox from

stronger in

their traditions

opponents

another

their beliefs
than Western

religion

nations
Sex

Age

37

48.8

48.7

51.7

81.6

68

74

Female

32.6

58.4

49.5

55.9

87.5

79.7

77.2

Older than 60

35.6

59.2

55

61.4

80.1

77.4

46-60

36.9

55.3

49.7

55.8

87.4

75.7

78

31-45

35.7

53.9

46.6

49.4

84.7

74

75.6

28

49.4

53.5

48.4

79.9

69.8

72.4

High

33.1

52.9

49.6

57

87.1

78.7

79.7

Low

37.2

60.8

52.3

58.3

87.3

78.9

78.5

Incomplete higher, or
higher

28.6

48

44

51.5

80.3

68.6

73.4

Secondary or technical

36.9

57.6

50.8

54

88.1

78.5

77.2

Incomplete secondary

34

55.7

51

58.5

84

75.2

76.3

Urban

31.7

53.3

48

52.2

84.8

74.2

77.7

Rural

42.6

59.8

52.9

61

86.8

78.9

70.7

Male

30 or younger
Income

Education

Residence

oo
so

Table 5b. Levels of Significance for Associations between Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if
converted from

can one find
'true' Russian

can never be a
real Russian

churches
undermine

always

protect Russian

richer in their

Orthodox

Orthodox from

soul and

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

opponents

stronger in

another
religion

their beliefs

their traditions

than Western
nations

Sex

17.244**

Age

Gamma

.032

- 074***

Income

Gamma

.048*

-.121**

Education

Gamma

Residence

Gamma

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

00

5.789

.002*

120*'

2.648

.086*

.039

3.637

-.116*

.046*

.028***

.027*

.oir

-.084***

-.060*

- 133***

11.229*

-.144*

28.625***

164*

2.653

-.079

-.156**

-.138***

-.042

.074**

.095***

.030

-.104

-.169***

.052*

and higher rates among urban residents). Further analysis of the modern/non-modem
split within ethnodoxy is necessary.

The Relationship between Ethnodoxy and Modernity
In order to further explore the compatibility of ethnodoxy and modernity, a

comparison between individuals that exhibit modem versus non-modem qualities is
made. This can be difficult, particularly in survey research, as surveys are often
limited in time, scope, and repeatability. For instance, there are unfortunately no
survey items measuring ethnodoxy two hundred years ago, which would help

compare modern and non-modern contexts. Instead, empirical tests of ethnodoxy are
limited to the cross-sectional survey used in this study. However, there are statistical

procedures that can help with this challenge. For instance, traits of modern and nonmodern societies can be recorded on the individual-level as well. Individuals who are

well educated, earn higher incomes, and live in urban areas can be considered

exhibiting more modern characteristics and individuals who have little to no
education, earn lower incomes, and live in rural areas can be seen as considered

exhibiting non-modern traits. Based on this basic conceptualization, individuals are
separated into these two groups as long as they exhibit these characteristics. Then,
we can examine the adherence to ethnodoxy for each group. While less than perfect,
this technique is sufficient for the scope and limitations of this project.
Three survey items were used to create modern/non-modern categories: level
of education, personal income, and place of residence. Based on the response items
described in the previous chapter, these categories were constructed as follows. The
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'modem' category includes respondents who had an incomplete or completed higher
education, earned more than the median annual income (6,000RUB), and lived in an

urban area (population of 10,000 or more). The non-modern category includes

respondents who had an incomplete secondary education, earned less than the median
annual income, and lived in a rural area (10,000 or less). The frequency distributions

of respondents who meet either criterion are presented in Table 6. Due to the extreme
nature of each category, the sample size is reduced for both groups. However, there
are still a sufficient number of cases to conduct a meaningful analysis.

The nature of each category accentuates the extreme characteristics of the
modem/non-modem spectrum. Administering a crosstabulation test between these

categories and indicators of etlmodoxy will suggest what kind of variation, if any,
exists between the level modernity and the adherence to ethnodoxy. As shown in
Table 7a, the results from this analysis are telling. Overall, there are more adherents
to all but one etlmodox belief among respondents who were placed in the non-modem

category. In particular, adherence to hard ethnodoxy was higher among respondents

exhibiting non-modem versus modern characteristics, and compared to proportions of
all ethnic Russians (see Table 2). Differences between non-modem and modern

categories are relatively small, but statistically significant. The correlation matrix
between modern/non-modern categories and ethnodoxy factor scores show similar
results (Table 7b). These associations are statistically significant and in a negative

direction (non-modern characteristics are correlated with stronger soft and hard

ethnodoxy) but are relatively weak. In short, these results support the hypothesis that
indicators of modernity are negatively associated with indicators of ethnodoxy.
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Table 6. Frequency Distribution of Individuals Exhibiting Modern/Non-Modem
Attributes
Frequency
Percentage
Modem

131

9.4

Non-Modern

98

7

Again, this is unsurprising based on the literature regarding the social determinants of
belief systems.

However, one should not ignore the high adherence to ethnodoxy among

individuals exhibiting modem characteristics as well. Nearly three-quarters or more

of these respondents adhere to soft ethnodoxy and almost half agree with all but one
of the hard ethnodoxy tenets. Clearly, despite slightly lower proportions compared

with their non-modem counterparts, a large proportion of modern individuals hold the
same exclusive and protectionist beliefs about their ethnic and religious identity. In
sum, the results from this test illustrate the spread of ethnodoxy among contemporary

etlmic Russians. Regardless of modem/non-modern variations and the conventional

expectations surrounding the relationship between social profile and religiosity,
adherence to ethnodoxy exists and is extensive across socio-economic groups.

Conclusion

As discussed in Chapter II, a traditional view of the relationship between

religion and modernity has been one-sided. Historically, most scholars expected the
need for religion to wan as societies became more modern. However, contemporary

social scientists, both proponents and opponents of secularization, have

acknowledged the complexity of the issue. The role of religion largely depends on
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Table 7a. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Modern/Non-Modem Characteristics and Indicators of Ethnodoxy

Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian can

Western churches

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if

can one find

never be a real

undermine

Always Orthodox

protect Russian

richer in their

converted from

'true' Russian

Russian

Russians and

Orthodox from

soul and stronger

ROC to another

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

their traditions

opponents

in their beliefs

religion

than Western
nations

Modern

32.9

44.3

44.3

54.2

84

72.5

77.1

Non-Modern

41.8

55.2

53

58.6

84.7

73.5

72.5

.005*

.060***

.005***

.016***

.027

.000***

-.086**

Gamma

p< .05; **/?<.01; ***/><.001

Table 7b. Correlation Matrix between Modern/Non-Modern Characteristics and Ethnodoxy Factor Scores
Soft Ethnodoxy
Hard Ethnodoxy
Modem/Non-Modern Characteristics

p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

oo

-.071 =

-.167*

the particular context. What I term variedreligion, refers to the relativistic and
contextualized nature of religion in society. Berger, Davie, and Fokas noted the way

religion is accepted in the United States differs from Europe due to different historical
backgrounds, intellectual traditions, and institutional maintenance (2008). Hervieu-

Leger (2000) and Davie's (2000) work described religion as having multiple forms of
social memories that can conflict, converge, and compliment each other. The idea

that religion's vitality can take different forms depending on a particular context (in

spaceor time) is captured in Eisenstadt's concept of multiple modernity. "The idea of
multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary

world - indeed to explain the history of modernity - is to see it as a story of continual
constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs" (2000, p.2). In

short, the role of religion is just as relevant today as ever, albeit in different ways

depending on the particular setting. Religion is not an absolute entity that either does
or does not exist. It includes multiple forms and dimensions, declining and/or

growing at the same time. In addition, religion does not exist inside a vacuum. It
interacts with, influences, and is influenced by other social phenomena.

The empirical data in this chapter show the intricate relationship that religion
can have with ethnicity in modem society. As the results from frequency
distributions illustrate, the acceptance of ethnodoxy, a rigid ethno-religious ideology,

is widespread among contemporary ethnic Russians. Further analysis concluded that,

despite some variation, belief in ethnodoxy is prevalent across differences in social
characteristics. Of course, it is interesting that individuals exhibiting non-modem

characteristics had higher proportions that believed in the tenets of ethnodoxy; and
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this is not all that surprising given the conventional literature on the subject. But,

what is of greater interest is that the difference between these two extreme categories
was relatively small, despite being statistically significant. Overall, individuals
exhibiting modern characteristics were nearly as ethnodox as their non-modem
counter-parts. I suspect this is evidence of what Karpov (2010) called
desecularization and Taylor (2007) described as counter-secularization; ethno-

religious relationships that are constructed and maintained in order to unify and
solidify members in society. Evidently, urban individuals who are highly educated
and wealthy also espouse ethnodox beliefs. Whether they are the actual
disseminating agents is a question explored later.

Further analysis regarding the scope of ethnodoxy and its consequences across
other beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors is necessary to continue this investigation. The

next chapter begins this task by exploring the relationship between etlmodoxy beliefs
and religiosity.

89

CHAPTER VIII: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOSITY AND
ETHNODOXY

Since ethnodoxy links ethnicity with religion, it is logical to explore the

relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy beliefs. This chapter briefly examines

religiosity among contemporary ethnic Russians and then focuses on the relationship
between religiosity and ethnodoxy.

The Role of Religion in Etlmodoxy

On the surface, evidence of ethnodoxy might imply the general importance of

religion in society and that traditional indicators of religiosity would also be strong.
If affiliation to a particular religious tradition is vital for a group's identity, one might

expect religious belief and behavior (normatively defined) to be important as well.
However, as more recent efforts in the sociology of religion suggest, rarely is being

religious a clearly defined concept. Indeed, contemporary scholars seem anxious to
conceptualize the role of religion in society as complicated, varied, and
contextualized. For instance, Davie's 'believing without belonging' (1990), John

Wolffe's 'diffusive Christianity' (1994), Roofs 'spiritual seeking' (1999),

Wuthnow's 'spiritual shopping' (2005), Ammerman's 'Golden Rule Christians'

(1997), Cimino and Smith's 'secular seekers' (2007), Michael Epstein's 'minimal
religion' (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover,1999), and Lyudmila Vorontsova and
Sergei Filatov's 'just Christians' (1994) all exemplify nuanced approaches toward
understanding the idiosyncratic nature of religiosity in modem society.
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Religious identity in contemporary Russia is no different. While earlier
studies have noted the so-called 'rise of religion' in post-communist Russia, most

now acknowledge the complexity of the situation. Despite a strong presence of the
Russian Orthodox Church in public life, religiosity measured as individual-level

beliefs and behaviors is relatively low (Mchedlov, 2005: Marsh, 2006). Indeed,
affiliation to the Russian Orthodox Church has become a key component of Russian

national identity, regardless of religious beliefor behavior (Knox, 2008). Warhola
and Lehning used the term 'monocultural Russ-centrism' to describe Russians as

identifying with Russian Orthodoxy but exhibiting weak theological foundation

(2007). Borowik explored Orthodoxy in multiple post-communist societies and
concludedthat religious identification has more to do with being a part of Orthodox
tradition than actual religious belief or practice (2006).

If identification with religious traditions has more to do with the act of

affiliation than religious beliefor behavior, how is religious identity defined? In sum,

the guiding research question for this chapter is: how is the popular understanding of
religiosity related to to ethnodoxy? The following chapter contributes to the study of
religion by providing both a conceptually rich and empirically sound analysis that
uses subjective understandings of religious identity, ethnic identity, and their overlap.

Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework of ethnodoxy and on previous studies, the

following hypotheses will guide the empirical analysis of this chapter. First, since
ethnodoxy is rooted in the idea that affiliation to an ethnic group's dominant religion
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is essential, I expect that a majority ofethnic Russians affiliate with Russian

Orthodoxy (Hypothesis 2a). Second, as the literature suggests, indicators ofreligious
beliefand behavior shouldbe markedly lower than that ofreligious affiliation

(Hypothesis 2b). Moreover, since affiliation with the ROC is expected to be high, I
also project that a majority ofethnic Russians will trust religious institutions,
especially the Russian Orthodox Church (Hypothesis 2c).

Likewise, I expect indicators of religiosity to be related to indicators of

ethnodoxy. Based on the conceptual foundation of ethnodoxy, 1expect levels of
religious affiliation (i.e., with the Russian Orthodox Church) to have a positive

relationship with indicators ofethnodoxy (Hypothesis 2d). However, as the literature
on contemporary Russian religiosity denotes, adherents to Orthodoxy may not have

strongreligious beliefs or high levelsof religious behavior. Therefore, 1alternatively
expect no relationship between indicators ofethnodoxy andreligious beliefand
behavior (Hypothesis 2e). Nevertheless, according to the conceptual underpinnings
of ethnodoxy, adherents should hold their religious institution in high regard, seeking

protective status and privilege. Therefore, / expect ethnodoxy to bepositively related
with trust toward religious institutions like the ROC (Hypothesis 2fi).

Religiosity of Ethnic Russians

This section explores four dimensions of religiosity: religious belonging,

religious belief religious behavior, and attitude toward religion in society. Religious
belonging is operationalized using self-described indicators of religious affiliation.

Respondents are asked if they identify with a religious organization and whether they
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identify as a religious person.20 If respondents answered Orthodoxy, they were asked
to further distinguish their Orthodox affiliation. The frequency distributions of these

indicators are presented in Table 8. While only 55.5% of respondents identify as a
religious believer, 84% identify as Orthodox. Of those, however, only 11.5% further
identified with particular Orthodox affiliations (either Moscow Patriarchate, Old
Believers, or Russian Foreign Orthodox Church). Most respondents simply reidentified as either Orthodox (31.1%) or, more broadly, as Christian (37.2%).

Accordingly, there is tentative support for the hypothesis that a majority of
ethnic Russians identify with Russian Orthodoxy. This support wanes as the
threshold for what constitutes affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy shifts. In

understanding religious affiliation, is it necessary for members to identify with the
Moscow Patriarchate or are vague, umbrella temis (e.g., 'just Christian,' 'just

Orthodoxy') sufficient? I have approached this by relying on subjective sources for
understanding social phenomena. In other words, keeping in line with Schutz's

'postulate of adequacy,' if individuals perceive membership to Russian Orthodoxy,

Orthodoxy, or the Moscow Patriarchate, then that identity is significant for them and
has consequences on other attitudes and values.

Religious belief is operationalized using measures of core monotheistic and
Christian beliefs. Frequency distributions of each indicator are presented in Tables 9

20 Clarification regarding the difference between the 'non-believer' and 'atheist' response items is
necessary. Beyondpost-communist Russia, and its subsidiary states, these terms may appear
redundant. In the contextof post-communist states, however, these labelsrefer to two very different
affiliations. In particular, identifying as an atheist in countries such as Russia includes a connotation
thatgoes beyond not believing in God. In addition, this is a political and cultural identity, retrieving
the unique socio-historical context of post-communist countries. Therefore, individuals identifying as
a 'non-believer' are probably thosewho may not believe in God, but who do not want associate with
the charged label of atheism.
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Table 8. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Belonging among Ethnic
Russians

d

Frequency

Percentage

Believer

777

55.5

Undecided

318

22.7

Non-believer

193

13.8

Atheist

16

5.4

Not sure

37

2.6

Orthodox

1175

83.9

Protestant

6

.4

Muslim

1

.1

Buddhist

1

.1

None

196

14

Not sure

22

1.6

Christian

521

37.2

Orthodox

436

31.1

Moscow Patriarchate

152

10.8

9

.6

1

.1

c

Ch
m

o
• i—i

<*

C

c

I
<
P
o
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c
c

2
5j

Old Believer
o

Russian Foreign Orthodox

T3
O

Church

g

Not sure

56

4

Missing

226

16.1

O

«=1401

and 10. Monotheistic tenets include belief in God, belief about what God is, belief

that God created the world, belief in life after death, belief in heaven, and the belief

that souls exist. Descriptive analyses of religious belief show the paradoxical nature

of religiosity among ethnic Russians. For instance, only 68.2% believe in God
despite 84% affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy. Furtherbelief in core monotheistic
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Table 9. Frequency Distributionof Indicators of Religious Belief among Ethnic
Russians (Monotheistic Tenets)
Belief in God

Concept of God

God created the

Frequency

Percentage

Yes

956

68.2

No

273

19.5

Not sure

172

12.3

Personal relationship

286

20.4

God is impersonal force

484

34.5

Don't know what to believe

339

24.2

Nothing exists

196

14

Not sure

96

6.9

783

55.9

Agree

world

Disagree

Belief in life

28.8

Not sure

213

15.2

Yes

444

31.7

No

676

48.3

Not sure

281

20.1

Yes

882

63

No

345

24.6

Not sure

174

12.4

after death

Belief that souls
exist

«=1401

tenets are even more wavering. Barely half believe that God created the world

(55.9%) and less than halfbelieve in life after death (48.3%). Indicators of core
Cliristian beliefs include: belief that Jesus existed, belief in the resurrection of Christ,

belief that he was the Son of God, belief in miracles and the respondent's opinion of

the Bible. Although mostetlmic Russians believe in core Christian doctrine, a
sizeable number do not or are unsure. Around 40% of respondents do not believe in
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Table 10. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Belief among Ethnic
Russians (Core Christian Tenets)
Frequency
Percentage
Belief that Jesus

Agree

960

68.5

Disagree

286

20.4

Not sure

154

11

Agree

777

55.5

Disagree

424

40.2

Not sure

199

14.2

Agree

910

64.9

Disagree

277

19.7

Not sure

213

15.2

Yes

692

49.4

No

519

37

Not sure

190

13.6

Word of God

316

22.6

Written by people

456

32.5

149

10.6

174

12.4

305

21.8

existed

Belief in

resurrection of
Christ

Belief that Jesus

is the Son of God

Belief in miracles

Opinion of the
Bible

Collection of wise

thoughts

Collection of ancient

legends
Not sure
«=1401

the resurrection of Christ or religious miracles and one fifth do not believe Jesus was
the Son of God or that he existed at all.

Indeed, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of ethnic Russians

claim a religious belonging, far less believe in basic Christian and monotheistic
tenets. Possibly evidence of what Hervieu-Leger (2000) called 'belonging without

believing' (reversing Davie's [1990] 'believing without belonging'), these findings
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shed light on what being religious means for contemporary ethnic Russians. For the
purpose of continued investigation, monotheistic and Christian belief items were

consolidated to create two indices. Table 11 presents the frequency distributions for
these two items. Surprisingly, ethnic Russians seem to hold a higher number of
Christian rather than monotheistic beliefs.

Religious behavior is operationalized with commonly used measures found in
the literature. These measures include frequency of attendance to religious services,

frequency of prayer, and frequency of reading the Bible. The frequency distributions
of these indicators are presented in Table 12. Of note, 35.5% of etlmic Russians
never attend church services, 42.5% never pray, and 58.3% never read the Bible.

Initially, these results show the paradoxical nature of religiosity among ethnic
Russians concerning their religious behavior as with their beliefs. But, further

investigation into the unique socio-historic context of Russian Orthodoxy in postcommunist Russia, and throughout Eastern Orthodoxy in general, can explain these
findings.
The fact that church attendance is markedly lower for Russian Orthodox,

compared to other European believers, is often noted (Kaariainen, 1999; Knox, 2005)

but rarely explained. According to the rational choice model, stricter commitment
demanded from churches produce fewer 'free-riders' and, hence, a more active and
devoted church population, thereby increasing the likelihood of its survival
(lannaccone, 1994). Some have used this model to explain why church attendance is

so low in Russia (e.g., White and McAllister, 2000). Simply, the ROC does not

expect/demand strong attendance from its members. Indeed, despite an increase in
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Table 11. Frequency Distribution of Monotheistic and Christian Belief Groups
Frequency
Percentage
Monotheistic

Christian

Few

605

43.2

Some

329

23.5

Many

467

33.3

Few

496

35.4

Some

460

32.9

Many

444

31.7

«-1401

Table 12. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religious Behavior among Etlmic
Russians

Frequency

Percentage

Frequency of church

Weekly

53

3.8

attendance

Monthly

107

7.6

Several times a year

326

23.3

Yearly

166

11.8

Less than a year

251

17.9

Never

497

35.5

Every day

293

20.9

Weekly

173

12.3

Monthly

113

8.1

Several times a year

164

11.7

Yearly

63

4.5

Never

595

42.5

Frequency of prayer

Frequency of reading

Weekly or more

58

4.1

the Bible

Monthly

57

4.1

Several times a year

123

8.8

Yearly

69

4.9

Less than once a year

276

19.7

Never

817

58.3

«-1401
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number of open churches and new clergy, the rate of attendance remains low

(Kaariainen, 1999), suggesting that religious practice is not an essential part of being
Russian Orthodox. Likewise, Eastern Orthodoxy has traditionally discouraged active

Bible reading on the part of lay members. Metropolitan Kallistos of Diokleia, a titular
metropolitan bishop of the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate, offers a concise

explication of Bible reading in Eastern Orthodoxy: "...we interpret Scripture through
and in the Church. If it is the Church that tells us what is Scripture, equally it is the

Church that tells us how Scripture is to be understood" (Kallistos, 1992). Many

others have also noted this patristic tradition in Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g., Arseniev,
1964; Bartholomew, 1994; Bell, 2008; Breck, 2006). This may also be a consequence

of decades-long suppression of religious activities, leaving the mind the only safe

place for religious expression. Michael Epstein acknowledged this notion, suggesting
that religion was submerged into the 'subconscious' during atheist communism, to be
released and transformed into multiple variations of religious expression today
(Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999).

... What was repressed and excluded during the Soviet epoch was
precisely religious consciousness, which occupied the sphere of the
unconscious in place of the baser instincts of hate, aggression, cruelty and
destruction, ousted from it, transformed into consciousness, and promoted into

ideological doctrine (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999,p.345-346).

Again, weak religious practice among affiliates of Russian Orthodoxy is well
documented. While these findings may not depict ethnic Russians as strong religious
believers in the traditional sense, this is not to say that religion as a social institution

is not still powerful and influential. As discussed later, Davie's idea of'vicarious
religion' is useful for understanding this phenomenon.
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Attitude toward the role of religion in society is an important dimension of

religiosity often ignored in the literature. This refers to the self-described perception
of religion and its role in society. This variable is operationalized using the following
items: importance of religion in life, confidence in Russian Orthodox Church, and
reliance on authority of traditional religions. The frequency distributions for these

indicators are presented in Table 13. Over half of ethnic Russians do not consider
religion as very important in their lives, despite 84% affiliating with the ROC.
However, nearly three-fourths of ethnic Russians have confidence in the ROC and

over half rely on the authority of traditional religions. These seemingly contradictory
results illustrate the popularattitude toward religion in society as one of functionality.
In other words, religion as an institution, which requires specific beliefs and
behaviors, is not as important for ethnic Russians, demonstrated by high proportions
of disbelief, inaction, and general importance of religion in one's life. But, religion is

also considered by most ethnic Russians to be an essential component of postcommunist society. It serves as a fundamental source for identity and is trusted and

relied on as a source of authority. Continued discussion on the functions of religion is
provided at the end of this chapter.

The Relationship between Religiosity and Ethnodoxy

The second empirical task of this chapter is the investigation of the

relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy. This is accomplished by correlating
indicators of religiosity with indicators of ethnodoxy. The results from this analysis

are presented in Tables 14-17. The wide popularity of ethnodoxy across varying
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Table 13. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitude toward Religion in Society
among Etlmic Russians

Importance of
religion in life

Frequency

Percentage

Important

652

46.5

Not important

710

50.7

39

2.8

1,042

74.4

Distrust

276

19.7

Not sure

83

5.7

Agree

748

53.4

Disagree

406

29

Not sure

247

17.6

Not sure

Confidence in ROC

Rely on authority of
traditional religions

Trust

n=1401

levels of religious belonging, belief, behavior, and attitudes about religion in society
is evident. Not surprisingly, higher proportions of ethnic Russians, despite
differences in religiosity, adhere to soft over hard ethnodoxy. Again, this confirms
the idea that ethnodoxy is a deeply embedded ideology among contemporary ethnic
Russians. Nonetheless, these findings show some variability as well.

In terms of religious belonging (see Table 14), a high proportion of

respondents adhere to both soft and hard etlmodoxy, regardless of how religious
someone considers himself or herself. Even among atheists, 54% believe a Russian is

always Orthodox and between one-quarter and one-third adhere to other indicators of
ethnodoxy. Greater proportionsof unbelievers adhere to ethnodoxy as nearly onethird or more adhere to hard ethnodoxy and over half agree with beliefs of soft

ethnodoxy. Respondents who are undecided and, of course, believers exhibit the

largest proportions of adherents to ethnodoxy with 75-90% adhering to soft

101

Table 14.

Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religious Belonging and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxv

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

Churches

always

protect Russian

richer in their

converted from

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

Orthodox

Orthodox from

soul and

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

opponents

stronger in

another

their traditions

their beliefs

religion

than Western
nations

Religious
person?

Believer

39.6

61.9

50.9

61.9

90.6

84.7

82

Undecided

35.2

56

52.6

51.6

89

76.4

78.3

Unbeliever

18.7

38.9

43.6

39.4

72

52.8

63.2

Atheist

22.4

25

32.9

30.3

54

34.2

43.5

Unsure

18.9

40.5

48.6

45.9

75.7

70.3

64.8

73 777***

122.013***

85.915***

88.679***

166.528***

196.549***

98.640***

Christian

38.2

62

51.6

59.7

90.2

85.1

83.3

Orthodox

38.1

56.4

54.8

53.4

91.5

80.1

77.8

41.5

59.8

50.7

74.4

90.8

86.2

77

23.2

50

46.4

50

89.3

60.8

73.2

38.483**

30.982

31.512*

46.925**

34.577*

38.832**

35.880*

£
Orthodox

affiliation

Moscow
Patriarchate
Unsure

i
p<.05; **p<.01; ***/?<.001

o
to

ethnodoxy and over half agreeing with most indicators of hard etlmodoxy. Results
among respondents who already claim affiliation to Orthodoxy are somewhat similar.
Regardless of Orthodox affiliation, most adhere to soft ethnodoxy, while around half
of respondents adhere to hard ethnodoxy. Of particular interest, however, is that a

much larger proportion of respondents identifying with the Moscow Patriarchate
(74.4%) agree that Western churches undermine Russians and their traditions.
Accordingly, this might imply that the intolerant, xenophobic, and exclusionist nature
of ethnodoxy is strongest for those respondents who are more religiously certain, at
least in terms of belonging. Whether the same pattern is true among respondents with

stronger doctrinal belief, more religious activity, and more positive attitudes about the
role of the ROC in society, requires further analysis.

As presented in Table 15, the relationship between religious beliefs, both
general monotheistic and core Christian tenets, and ethnodoxy are relatively
straightforward. In short, larger proportions of respondents with more religious
beliefs adhere to ethnodoxy. Likewise, respondents with fewer religious beliefs also
show weaker levels of ethnodoxy. The results are the same for both sets of religious

beliefs. Despite the variation in religious beliefs, however, a majority in each group
adheres to both soft and hard ethnodoxy. In sum, while most respondents agree with

the core tenets of ethnodoxy, religious belief and adherence to ethnodoxy are still
positively associated.

The relationship between religious behavior and ethnodoxy (see Table 16)

offers a similar depiction. In general, larger proportions of respondents adhering to
etlmodoxy attend church and pray more frequently. Nonetheless, even those
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Table 15.

Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religious Belief and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
No longer

Hard Ethnodoxy
Only in Russia
Non-Russian

Soft Ethnodoxy
Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Churches

always

protect Russian

richer in their

Orthodox

Orthodox from

soul and

opponents

stronger in

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

converted from

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

another

their traditions

their beliefs

religion

than Western
nations

Monotheistic

u. ,

Beliefs

Hlgh

39.2

62.7

46.9

58.2

88.5

83.1

83.8

Some

36.8

57.4

52.8

62.3

89

81.2

79

Low

29.1

47.3

48.9

46.9

80.3

66.1

68.4

.137**

.219***

.050***

.166***

.165***

.240***

.205***

High

43

60.1

48.4

63.3

88.8

86

83.1

Some

33.1

61.9

52.8

55.8

91.5

80

80.2

Low

27.7

43.3

46.6

44.7

76.6

61.5

66

099***

.233***

.269***

.354***

2J7***

Gamma
Christian
Beliefs

Gamma

* p < .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001

o
4^

.204***

J A $ H6 ♦ ♦

Table 16. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religious Behavior and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy

No longer

Onlv in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

Churches

always

protect

richer in their

converted

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

Orthodox

Russian

soul and

from ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

Orthodox from

stronger in

their traditions

opponents

another

religion

their beliefs
than W'estern
nations

Frequency of
church

Weekly/monthly

39.4

62.5

51.9

56.3

88.1

81.3

78.8

40.8

62.6

51.2

58.6

90.2

83.8

83.1

37.9

57.6

50.3

57.3

89.7

81.8

80.1

25.4

44.9

46.1

48.3

77.6

62.5

67.2

.226***

.112***

.126***

^95***

.260***

^J7***

attendance
Several times a
vear

Yearly/less than a
year
Never

Gamma

77/) * * *

Frequency of
prayer

Everyday

40.3

61.1

53.6

66.6

87.7

86.7

83.6

Weekly/monthly

40.9

60.5

50.4

57

90.9

81.8

80.1

year/yearly

36.2

62.6

50.3

53.7

90.3

78.4

81.9

Never

27.4

46

46

47.3

79.5

56.3

68.1

.203***

.240***

.305***

Several times a

Gamma

p<.05; **/><.01 ;***/><.001
o

.167***

^n^***

/?o***

jgg***

respondents who are religiously less active exhibit strong levels of ethnodoxy. For

instance, a large majority of respondents who never attend church (77.6%) or pray
(79.5%) still believe that a Russian is always Orthodox. While religious behavior is

related with adherence to etlmodoxy, these results again confirm the spread of this
ideology across such variations.

Likewise, the relationship between ethnodoxy and attitudes about religion in
society further emphasize the general embeddedness of this ideology among most

ethnic Russians (see Table 17). In fact, most ethnic Russians who do not consider
religion to be very important in their lives still consider religion to be an important

component to their ethnic and national identity. Even a majority of respondents who

do not rely on the authority of traditional religions and who are not trusting of the
ROC, seek state protection for Russian Orthodoxy and considers Russians spiritually
richer than the West. Clearly, the scope of ethnodoxy transcends the variations noted

across religious belonging, belief, behavior, and attitudes about religion in society.
While these differences are important, the key finding revealed from this analysis is

that a majority of ethnic Russians, regardless of their religiosity, believe that being
Russian Orthodox is inextricably linked with being Russian.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was two-fold. First, a profile of religiosity among

post-communist ethnic Russians was constructed. In an area of research where many
studies have purported the resurgence of religion, it is vital that a thorough empirical
investigation into the multi-dimensionality of contemporary Russian religiosity is
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Table 17. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes about the Role ofReligion in Society and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Hard Ethnodoxy

Soft Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if
converted from

can one find
'true' Russian

can never be a
real Russian

Churches
undermine

always

protect Russian

richer in their

Orthodox

Orthodox from

soul and

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

opponents

stronger in

another

their traditions

their beliefs

religion

than Western
nations

Importance of
religion in life

Important

38.2

58.3

49.2

58.6

89.3

82.9

80.6

Not important

29.8

51.3

48.5

51

81.7

68.3

72

Not sure

48.7

61.5

59

43.5

84.6

76.9

71.8

Gamma

.105**

.131**

.059**

140*

.205'

Agree

39.7

60.4

53.7

61.2

90.7

84.9

83

traditional

Disagree

31.8

51.2

47.8

50.2

80.5

66.7

73.3

Not sure

21.9

43.7

37.6

40.1

76.5

60.4

59.1

religions

Gamma
Confidence in
ROC

.310'

.251-

.254"

.288**'

Trust

36.6

60.2

50.6

58.2

Distrust

26.1

39.1

44.2

47.1

Not sure

31.3

39.8

48.2

29

Gamma

p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001

o

.318'

Rely on
authority of

.198'

.359'

.155***

.314'

?«***

428***

90.6

72.4
.545'

.373'

80
58.4

67.1

48.2

56.6

.499'

.335-

made. The results from this analysis are both expected and surprising. High rates of
religious affiliation, as identified in previous studies, were confirmed in this analysis
as well. However, the issue becomes more complicated when respondents are asked
to further define their Orthodox affiliation. Nevertheless, as projected in the first

hypothesis, a large majority of contemporary ethnic Russians claim some affiliation
to Russian Orthodoxy.

In terms of religious belief and behavior, however, the results suggest

something more complicated. As expected in the second hypothesis, adherence to

religious belief and rates of religious behavior were markedly lower than rates of
religious affiliation. Indeed, while nearly 84% identify with Russian Orthodoxy, only
68.2% believe in God and barely 10% attend church once a month or more. Of
course, this may be explained due to the idiosyncrasies of Eastern Orthodoxy and the

socio-religious landscape of post-communist Russia. Nonetheless, the marked
difference between respondents' religious affiliation and their religious beliefs and
behavior attests to a unique role of religion in contemporary Russia. Additionally,
and in line with the third hypothesis, the low proportion of ethnic Russians that

viewed religion as important in their lives, coupled with high percentages that trust

the ROC and rely on it as a source of authority, further demonstrates the role of
religion, in particular the ROC, more as a public identity in society rather than a
spiritual resource of individual salvation.

The idea that religions serve different functions in society is well documented.

For example, Abramson identified six major functions of religion: 1) a source of
support during grief, 2) transmission of knowledge, 3) means of social control by
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legitimating certain norms and values, 4) religious prophecy can supply reform and
social change, 5) personal growth and development, and 6) a source of group identity
(Abramson, 1980). In any given society, religion may provide some combination of
these functions. Davie's notion of 'vicarious religion,' a conceptualization of the
role of religion in society that stresses the function of traditional religions as public
institutions, captures this idea.
It is in this context, moreover, that the nature (as well as the role) of
Europe's historic churches becomes apparent, the more so if seen in a
comparative perspective. It becomes increasingly clear, for example, that
European populations continue to see such churches as public utilities
maintained for the common good, a situation quite different from that in the
United States (Davie, 2005, p. 143).

Clearly, a similar understanding of religion's function can be applied to postcommunist Russia. Based on Abramson's typology, Russian Orthodoxy is perceived

by the public as serving certain functions. According to the empirical results in this
chapter, one of the most important (if not the most essential) functions of religion is
to serve as a source for creating group identity. This is particularly important in terms
of substantiating the application of ethnodoxy in post-communist Russia. On the

other hand, low levels of religious belief and behavior suggest that a primary role of
Russian Orthodoxy has not functioned, at least not commonly, as a form of personal
piety. Nevertheless, the following chapters show that Russian Orthodoxy, as
embodied in the ROC, also provide other functions as well. For instance, the position
of the ROC both socially and politically, coupled with its high public opinion, allows
for the transmission and maintenance of certain types of knowledge and,

subsequently, capabilities for social control to occur. This becomes especially
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apparent regarding the role and influence of the ROC on social attitudes toward
homosexuality, abortion, and the cultivation of anti-West sentiments.

The second empirical task in this chapter was to investigate the relationship
between religiosity and ethnodoxy. The results from this task were less complex.
Despite some variation across levels of religiosity, most ethnic Russians adhere to

some dimension of ethnodoxy. Unsurprisingly, larger proportions of adherents to
etlmodoxy were respondents that were more certain about their religious affiliation,
held firmer religious beliefs, attended church and prayed more. These results support

the projections discussed in the beginning of this chapter. In fact, respondents who
were more certain about their religious affiliation, more religiously active, and

expressed strong institutional support for the ROC, had higher rates of support for
xenophobic and anti-West ethnodox beliefs. For instance, while only 53.4% or 59.7%
of respondents who distinguished their Orthodox affiliation as either Orthodox or

Christian (respectively), nearly 75% of respondents who identified as a member of
the Moscow Patriarchate believed that Western churches undermine Russians and

their traditions. In addition, a higher proportion of these respondents believed that the

state should protect Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. Could this imply that

respondents who have a more intimate, clearer notion of their Orthodox identity also
have more xenophobic and anti-West sentiments? Does a closer, more interactive
relationship with the ROC and its leaders contribute to the transmission and
legitimation of such beliefs?

To investigate this further, the following analysis examines respondents who
exhibited these characteristics more closely. Specifically, respondents were selected
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if they further identified their Orthodox affiliation as Moscow Patriarchate, attended
church once a month or more, held trust in the authority of traditional religions, and

were confident of the ROC (see Table 18). Differences in levels of ethnodoxy in

these groups are striking. Respondents with more certain Orthodox identity have
larger proportions of adherence to ethnodoxy than respondents who are less certain,
less active, and less trusting of the ROC and its authority in society. Even more

importantly, respondents who have more certain Orthodox identity have significantly
higher proportions that carry ethnodox beliefs that espouse xenophobia,

protectionism, and anti-West sentiments. For instance, 85.7% of respondents with
more certain Orthodox identity, versus 75.3% of their counterparts, believe that the

state should protect Russian Orthodoxy from its opponents. Additionally, 78.5% of
these respondents, versus 54.1% of less certain respondents, agree that Western
churches undermine Russians and their traditions. Evidently, ethnic Russians that are

more religiously certain, have a deeper understanding of their religious affiliation,

higher rates of institutional trust in the ROC, and have higher proportions that adhere
to ethnodoxy, especially to the tenets that are xenophobic, protectionist, and antiWestern.

Whether the church and its agents are directly, or indirectly, disseminating
these beliefs, attitudes, and values is a question requiring further empirical analysis
and contextual consideration. Subsequent chapters dealing with intolerance and

xenophobia in contemporary Russia and Russian Orthodoxy will contribute to this
discussion. At this point, it is worth noting the relationship between active and more
certain members of Russian Orthodoxy and their adherence to ethnodoxy. Clearly,
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Table 18. Crosstabulation between

Indicators of Certain/Less Certain Orthodox Identity and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

Churches

always

protect

richer in their

converted

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

Orthodox

Russian

soul and

from ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

Orthodox from

stronger in

their traditions

opponents

another

religion

their beliefs
than Western

nations

Certain Orthodox

Identity
Less certain Orthodox

Identity
Gamma

50

64.3

42.9

78.5

85.7

85.7

78.5

34.2

54.7

49.3

54.1

85.4

75.3

76.1

.388

.275

.013

.500*

.380

.557*

.196

p < .05: ** p < .01; ***/><.001
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the ROC has an important role, not only in the so-called post-communist 'resurgence

of religion,' butalso in the etlmic, national, and political spheres as well. In this way,
the next two chapters tackle the scope and consequences of ethnodoxy regarding
national and political identity, attitudes, and values.
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CHAPTER IX: ETHNODOXY AND PERCEPTION OF NATION

There has been no lack of interest in nation-building, national identity, and

nationalism in post-socialist Europe since the fall of communism. Some of these
studies have even mentioned the role of dominant religions in nation building (e.g.,

Bruce, 1999; Herbert and Fras, 2009; Knox, 2008; Merdjanova, 2000; Roudometof,
1999; Sarkissian, 2010; Tomka, 1995; White, 2007; and Warhola and Lelming, 2007).

However, religion is often reduced to a sub-component of other forms of identity.

This chapter deepens this area of research by focusing on the symbiotic bond between

religion and ethnicity (i.e., etlmodoxy), and its association with nationhood. This is
important because conceptually, ethnodoxy emphasizes a relationship between

ethnicity, religion, and nationhood, particularly in the Russian case where the
distinction between ethnicity and nationhood is often blurred. For instance, ethnodox
beliefs stress the role of the state to protect Russian Orthodoxy and compare the
nation of Russia with Western nations. Therefore, the central question for this

chapteris: how is ethnodoxy related toperceptions ofnationhood?
The influence of religion on nationhood is not an uncommon theme in the
literature. For instance, many scholars have noted the relationship between

religiousness and nationalism in times of uncertainty. North argued that humans
create institutions (e.g., religion) to manage knowledge, which in turn, reduces

uncertainty (2005). Kinnvall explored evidence of the relationship between religion
and nationalism as a way to confront insecurities brought on by rapid change (e.g.,

globalization) and conflict (2004). Norris and Inglehart suggested thattheir 'security
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axiom' best describes why levels of religiosity increased in some unstable post-

socialist societies (2004). Even Bruce, in defense of his secularization thesis, posited
that the areas of vibrant religious life were usually caused by etlmic and national
conflicts (1999). To sum up, religion has been used as an important identifier and
resource for the construction of national identity, particularly in social climates of
unrest, instability, and uncertainty.

In addition, many studies have noted the importance of dominant and national

religions for nation building in post-communist societies. Merdjanova discussed the
historically close relationship between religion and nationalism in Eastern Europe,
and conceptualized nationalism as a functionally successful political religion based on

Kauffman's six functions ofreligion (2000).21 Roudometof differentiated between
citizenship (citizen of state) and nationhood (which includes ethnic, citizenship, and
religious foundations) and emphasized the prominence of nationhood in Eastern
Europe (1999). Sarkissian explored the close relationship between religious

organizations and nationhood, concluding that both can reaffirm the other (2010). As
exemplified in the Russian case, this relationship can provide moral legitimacy to the
state and resources to the Church. Similarly, Tomka noted the role that religion has

played in providing moral and ideological substance after the collapse of the Soviet
Union (1995). He described religion as replacing the 'ideological void' leftover from
communist atheism. White also described the importance of the Russian Orthodox

Church in maintaining national religious, moral, and ethical values throughout Europe

21 Kaufmann's six functions ofreligion include: identity creation, guide behavior, overcoming
unforeseen events, encourage social integration, offer cosmic perspective, and to distance people from
their world (Merdjanova, 2000).
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(2007). Clearly, religion has played an active role in (re-)constructing nationhood
and providing ideological substance in post-socialist Europe.
The purpose of this chapter is to further explore this relationship. This is
accomplished by investigating the symbiotic relationship between religion and
ethnicity, and it's association with nationhood. As the previous chapters
demonstrated, belief in an ideology that links religious and ethnic identities is

widespread and deeply embedded among post-communist ethnic Russians. This

suggests that the conflation between religion and ethnicity plays a role in constructing
both etlmic and national identity. Therefore, it is vital that the ways in which these
beliefs relate to popular perceptions of one's nation are analyzed.

Conceptualization and Hypotheses

Anderson defined the nation as "an imagined political community - and

imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1997, p.44). I have employed

the idea of imagined communities earlier as useful models for understanding large,
intangible social groups that individuals perceive membership to such as religions and
ethnicities. But Anderson constructed the concept explicitly as a way to make sense
of the nation and national conscious, or nation-ness. Again, such social entities are

imagined because no member will ever actually meet every other member. They are
communities because they, nonetheless, evoke a degree of comradeship. They are

limited because they have boundaries regarding what is and is not part of the
community. Finally, they are politically sovereign, or having recognized authority

over a particular territory. In short, the nation for Anderson is more than a social trait
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(like sex or age). Instead, identification with a nation is similar to "kinship' or, for
Anderson, even religion, which can induce feelings of integration, belonging, and,
subsequently, norms and values.

Based on this definition of nation, national identity refers to the self-described

affiliation with a particular nation. As described in Chapter III, social identity theory
can help explain individual membership in large intangible social entities such as
national, ethnic, and religious groups. Again, social identity theory stresses the

preservation and legitimation of large social groups through the creation of norms and
self-evaluation, which maintains what it means to be a member. Doing so establishes

the boundary between in-groups and out-groups. In terms of national identity, this is

accomplished, in part, by comparatively evaluating nations. For instance, how does
Russia and being Russian compare with other nations? Do Russians consider being

Russian exceptional and distinct, or do they view being Russian as part of being
European and Western?
Nationalism, on the other hand, is usually referred to as an ideology, or a

belief system based on loyalty toward one's nation. According to Guibernau,
nationalism has a "dual character as a political doctrine and as a source of identity for

individuals living in modem societies" (1997, p.133). In this way, nationalism is
based on, firstly, identity to one's nation. Identity involves boundaries, based on
norms and expectations, between in-group and out-group. Hence, Guibernau
describes nationalism as "an ideology of inclusion and exclusion at the same time"

(1997, p.134). Secondly, nationalism is an ideology, a system of beliefs that espouse
loyalty to one's nation. For Guibernau, this includes an emotional dimension. "By
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strengtheningthe consciousness of belonging to a group with common objectives,

nationalism may arouse deep feelings of love or indeed hatred" (1997, p.134). In this
way, the perception of one's nation is, on the one hand, a deeply personal
identification and, on the other hand, a link to something much larger than the
individual.

In terms of ethnodoxy, understanding the perception of nation by ethnic

Russians is particularly important. While ethnic, religious, and national identities are,
theoretically, distinct; in actuality, their overlap and conflation are common.
Therefore, in order to understand one facet of ethnodoxy, we must understandthe
others. In other words, to understand how ethnic Russians perceive themselves

ethnically and religiously, we must understand how they understand their national
identity and nation-ness.
Based on the literature on nation and nationalism, two dimensions of the

relationship between ethnodoxy and nationhood are specified and explored. First,

popular perceptions of Russia in the global community are assessed. Due to the
exclusive nature of etlmodoxy (i.e., only in Russia is there a true Orthodox and onlya

Russian can betruly Orthodox) and the aforementioned consequences of a strong link
between religion andnationhood, I expect ethnodoxy to be linked to strong perceived
boundaries between Russia and Europe, and Russia and the West. In other words,

ethnodoxy should have an inverse relationship with perceptions ofRussia as

European and Western (Hypothesis 3a). Second, levels of nationalism (indicated by
how proud respondents are of being a citizen of Russia) are addressed. Since
ethnodoxy emphasizes a clearconceptualization of what it means to be Russian, I
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expectthat adherents to ethnodoxy also have a clearer and more pronounced national
pride. Therefore, I expect nationalism andethnodoxy to have a positive relationship
(Hypothesis 3b). As these hypotheses are empirically tested, a clearer understanding
of the relationship between religion, ethnicity, and nationhood in contemporary
Russia is obtained.

Perception of Nation among Contemporary Ethnic Russians

For the purpose this study, theperception ofnation includes two dimensions:

the opinion of Russia as European and Western and levels of nationalism. This

concept is operationalized using two survey indicators: viewing Russia as partof

Europe and inevitably Western and how proud the respondent is of being a citizen of
Russia. The frequency distributions for these indicators are presented in Table 19.

The frequency distribution of the first indicator of popular perceptions of
nation among ethnic Russians illustrates a diversity- of opinions. In short, ethnic
Russians are spread regarding their opinion about Russia being European and
Western. Of note is that nearly a third are unsure of their opinion on the matter. The

second indicator, 'proud of being a citizen,' is often used to capture levels of
nationalism. A strong majority (78%) is proudof being a citizen of Russia. Clearly,
there is an uncertain and perhaps even paradoxical perception of Russia and its place

in the global community. While most are proud of being Russian and believe
Western influences are undermining, views of Russia as European or Western are less
confident.

119

Table 19. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Popular Perceptions of Nation
Frequency
Percentage
Russia is a

Agree

459

32.7

European country
and will be part of

Disagree

555

39.6

Not sure

387

27.6

Proud

1093

78

Not Proud

238

17

70

5

the West

Proud of being a
citizen of Russia

Not sure
«=1401

Before further analysis is conducted, one limitation regarding survey

measurement is noted. In particular, the first indicator measuring the perception of
nation (i.e., Russia is a Europeancountry and will be part of the West') may be seen
as a double-barreled question because it implies Russia as both European and,
eventually, Western. While obviously Europe is commonly considered Western, the

category 'Western' includes countries outside of Europe, specifically the United
States. Given the historically fragile, if not at times hostile, relationship between the
United States and Russia, including both categories in one measurement item might

be problematic. In short, respondents may consider Russia European but not Western
because it implies a relationship with the United States. Of course, without testing
this item as separate survey questions, this consideration is only speculative.
However, the use of this indicator still outweighs this limitation as long as it is

understood as providing a preliminary, partial insight into attitudes toward Russia

more generally, and its position in the international community and other national
networks. This harks back to the definition of nation and national identity described
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above. Do Russians consider themselves exceptional regarding their national
identity, or part of a larger, collegia! community of nations?

The Relationship between Perception of Nation and Religiosity

Part of the conceptual framework of ethnodoxy emphasizes the importance of
religious identity. It is vital that adherents affiliate strictly with their ethnic group's

dominant religion and seek a protective status from its opponents. In the caseof
contemporary ethnic Russians, ethnodoxy implies involvement from the state to

provide this protection and preservation. In this way, the popular perception of
Russia as a nation is a crucial element for adhering to ethnodoxy. This section

explores howthe perception of nation is related to levels of religiosity and,
subsequently, ethnodoxy.

As noted in the literature, the relationship between nationhood and religiosity

is often strongest in climates of uncertainty and instability. The socio-historical
context of contemporary Russia is one such example. Almost twenty-five years after

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has experienced its share of
political, economic, and social volatility - including financial crises, political

corruption and suspected election fraud, suppression of the media, etc. According to
North and others, institutions like religion are established that help bring solace to

individuals during such moments of insecurity. Moreover, a link between religion
and nationhood can be created that provides further reassurance and confidence
among citizens living in an unstable society.
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To investigate this expectation, Table 20 presents results from a
crosstabulation between nationalism and indicators of religiosity. For simplicity, an

indicator of each dimension of religiosity was chosen (belonging, belief behavior,

and attitude about religion in society). The findings from this analysis are telling. A

largerpercentage of respondents who exhibit religious qualitiesare also proud of
being a Russian citizen. In particular, respondents who believe in God and admit that

religion is important in their lives show substantially higher percentages of
nationalism. In sum, these findings show a positive relationship between religiosity
and nationalism. Based on the literature, it is expected that such relationships are

established due to the volatile socio-political environment that individuals must

navigate. However, confirmation of this would require comparative analysis. For the

purpose of this study, it is important to note the relationship between religiosity and
nationalism as a crucial element of adherence to ethnodoxy.

The Relationship between Perception of Nation and Ethnodoxy

Again, the concept of etlmodoxy emphasizes a relationship between ethnicity
and religion. However, as operationalized in post-communist Russia, etlmodoxy also
stresses the important role of the state as well. If adherents to ethnodoxy seek state

protection for their ideological beliefs, what is the popular perception of their nation?
In this way, it is imperative that we investigate the empirical association between
ethnodoxy and perception of the state. This is accomplished by correlating the two
indicators measuring perception of nation with the indicators of ethnodoxy. The
results from this analysis are presented in Table 21.
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Table 20. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Nationalism
Proud of being a Russian Citizen

Religious

Proud

Not Proud

Unsure

Believer

81.3

13.8

4.9

Undecided

79.6

16

4.4

Unbeliever

67.9

27.5

4.7

Atheist

69.7

26.3

3.9

Unsure

64.9

18.9

16.2

person

200***

Gamma

Belief in

Yes

81

14.4

4.6

No

70.3

25.3

4.4

Unsure

73.8

18

8.1

God

7^5***

Gamma

Frequency

Weekly or more

88.7

3.8

7.5

86

9.3

4.7

Several times a year

80.4

16.9

2.8

Yearly

84.9

9

6

76.9

17.9

5.2

71.8

22.3

5.8

of
attendance

Monthly

Less than once a
year
Never

.202***

Gamma

Importance
of religion

Important

in life

83

12.3

4.8

Not important

73.8

21

5.2

Unsure

71.8

23.1

5.1

239***

Gamma

Authority of

Agree

81.3

14.4

4.3

Disagree

78.6

18.7

2.7

Unsure

67.2

21.9

10.9

traditional

religions
should be
rflifH on

Gamma

208***

*p<.05;**p<. 01; ***p<.001
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Table 21. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Perception of Nation and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

Churches

always

protect Russian

richer in their

converted from

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

Orthodox

Orthodox from

soul and

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

opponents

stronger in
their beliefs

their traditions

another

than Western

religion

nations

Russia is a

European country

Agree

36.4

Disagree

35.9

Not sure

29.5

48.6

53.4

86.7

75.2

11.3

62.:

55.3

61.8

88.

80.2

81.3

44.

41.1

44.7

78.6

68.5

66.9

and will be part of
the West

Gamma

.166"

jC7***

141

.155'

.199'

132'

.190'

Proud of being a
citizen of Russia

34.8

55.4

49.2

55.2

86.9

75.9

78.8

Not Proud

J2.4

53.4

50

53.1

79

73.5

66.4

Not sure

32.9

50

45.7

42.9

81.4

71.4

65.7

113'

.244'

.083

Proud

Gamma

*p<.05; **p< .01; ***p< .001
to
4^-

.096"

.085

.067

>84'

Generally, these findings are reminiscent of previous analyses. Overall, a

larger proportion of respondents, regardless of their perception of nation, adhere to
soft etlmodoxy over hard ethnodoxy. In fact, over half of respondents, and in most
cases over 75%, adhere to the beliefs of soft ethnooxy. Over one-third of

respondents, and in most cases over 50%, adheres to the beliefs of hard ethnodoxy.
In short, these findings support the running theme that ethnodoxy is an existing

ideology for mostetlmic Russians, despite differences in social demographics, levels
of religiosity, and even perceptions of nation.
Nevertheless, there is some variation across different perceptions of nation

that are worth noting. For instance, for every indicator of ethnodoxy but one ('no

longer Russian if convert to another religion'), a higher proportion of respondents
adhering to ethnodoxy disagree with the statement that Russia is partof Europe and
the West. Similarly, a higher percentage of respondents adhering to ethnodoxy are

proud of being a Russian citizen. These results should not be surprising given the
nature of etlmodoxy to foster preservation of traditional religions through protection
of the state as well as anti-West attitudes. Indeed, it is in these belief items that we

see the highest level of discrepancy.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the relationship between

ethnodoxy and popular perceptions of nation. As operationalized for the

contemporary Russian case, the concept of ethnodoxy includes attitudes toward
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Russia as a nation, and its relationship with the West. Therefore, it is imperative that

a deeper understanding of adherents' disposition toward their nation is obtained.
By completing this task, two major conclusions can be drawn. First, the
relationship between religiosity and nationalism confirms expectations from the
literature that describe the creation of institutions, like religion, as meaningful sources

of knowledge and comfort during times of societal uncertainty. Second, adherence to

etlmodoxy, while generally widespread across variations of popular perceptions of
Russia, is similarly higher for respondents with more anti-West and nationalistic

orientations. Not only do these results confirm the hypotheses set at the beginning of

this chapter, but they also suggest the establishment of ethnodoxy as a very real belief
system, related to levels of nationalism and national superiority, that may be used as a
source for stability and direction in an otherwise unstable environment.

While the analyses in this study portray attitudes, beliefs, and values for postcommunist Russians in 2005, these findings can provide tentative insight for

understanding the social, political, and religious climate of Russia in 2012. For

instance, when this paper was written, Russia was experiencing significant social and

political change surrounding the 2012 presidential elections. The prospect of, and
eventual, re-election of Vladimir Putin as president spurred public discontent and

protest against the apparent fraudulent and corrupt political system. As described
earlier, Putin's popularnationalist agenda has emphasized Russian-ness, speaking

particularly to etlmic Russians, as having historical and traditional roots (which
include a religious element) and self-reliance in terms of its relationship toward and

dependence on other nations. Therefore, the results from this chapter, which show
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that ethnic Russians are anti-W7est, patriotic, and that their perception of nation and

level of nationalism vary according to the adherence of ethnodoxy, may help explain
Putin's popularity and re-election.

Of course, the conditions of the current presidential election and the search for

genuine public opinion about Putin, his agenda, and attitudes about the functionality
of the political system in general, are complicated and beyond the scope of this study.
Instead, the conclusions from this chapter further exemplify the embeddedness of

etlmodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians and the scope of its manifestation,
including the perception of Russia and levels of nationalism. As the next chapter

demonstrates, the consequences of ethnodoxy are felt in the political realm as well.
Tied intimately with the perception of Russia, politicalorientations of contemporary
ethnic Russians further illustrate the importance of ethnodoxy.
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CHAPTER X: ETHNODOXY AND POLITICAL LIFE

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political climate in Russia has
attracted both popular and academic attention alike. Many studies have provided
useful assessments of political life in Russia, highlighting the social and political
orientations and attitudes of its citizens. The goal of this section will be to contribute

a meaningful exploration into the relationship between ethno-religious identity and
popular political sentiment. The main question for this chapter is: how is ethnodoxy
relatedtopopular attitudes andperceptions ofpolitical institutions and conditions?
Doing so will not only provide a better understanding of political views of ethnic
Russians, but may also shed light into current happenings surrounding the 2012
presidential election.

Traditionally, the relationship between religion and politics has been an

important element in understanding our social world. According to Weber, the
relationship between institutional religion and political organization can take three
forms: theocracy, hierocracy, or Caesaropapism (1921). Curiously, as Flere noted,
Weber did not include a mode that emphasizes the separation of church and state as a

possible institutional arrangement (2001). Therefore, Weber's typology is incomplete
as exemplified in constitutions among nation-states throughout the world, which

emphasize the official division between religion and politics. However, the
relationship between religion and politics is complex, including both official and
unofficial dimensions. So, even when religious and political institutions are officially
differentiated, unofficial or latent relationships may still be present. Many studies

128

have explored the relationship between religion and politics despite the legal
separation between both spheres (e.g., Casanova, 1994).

This dynamic is evident in the case of contemporaryRussia as well. The 1997
Law of Religion defines Russia as a secular country with no state religion. In

addition, this legislation sanctions the freedom of any religious group to organize and
practice within the country. However, the reality of this separation between religion
and state is far more complicated. For instance, some religious groups have been

given special privileges. In the preamble, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism
are singled out as having special historical significance to Russian. Furthermore,
Russian Orthodoxy is described as especially contributing to Russian history and
culture.

As described in Chapter IV, the Law of Religion categorizes religious groups
into three tiers: religious sects are small and are unable to register with the

government; non-traditional religious organizations must have at least ten members,

can register withthe government, but can not use the 'Russian' label until 50 years of
existence; and traditional religious organizations are those religious groups that have
been in Russia for more than 50 years. There are many examples of traditional

religious organizations, particularly the Russian Orthodox Church, as receiving

special advantages and privileges over non-traditional religious groups (Marsh and
Froese, 2004). So, while Russia is officially a secular society unattached to a state

church, specific interests have been maintained, especially with the ROC,

emphasizing a close relationship between religion and politics. Basil described three
approaches toward understanding the relationship between church and state in Russia:
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traditional, separatist, and cooperationist views. The traditional view maintains a

tight church-state relationship, the separatist perspective calls for a separation
between Church and state, while the cooperationist approach envisions an
accountable and sincere collaboration between the two. For Basil, neither has been

fully supported and each offer a unique set of advantages and disadvantages (2009).
Nevertheless, at this point it is enough to note that religion and politics are not as
distinct as would officially and legally appear.

The purpose of this chapter will be to gauge how closely religion, etlmicity,

and politics are related. In doing so, two main dimensions of political life are

explored: 1) individual political orientations and behavior and 2) attitudes toward

systemic political trends. While there has beeninterest in post-communist political
life, few have purposefully explored the influence of religion and none investigating
the relationships between ethno-religious linkages and political life.

Individual Political Orientations and Behavior

Conceptually, the following analysis explores individual political orientations
and behavior that include political party membership, support for political parties, and

voting tendencies. The development of a multi-party system in post-Soviet Russia
has not been without obstacles. While the existence of multiple political parties has

proceeded, supportand active membership has not corresponded. Based on a 1992

survey, White, Wyman, and Kryshtanovskaya stated, "parties are widely believed to

be playing a role of little significance in Russian politics, andthat there is little
interest in their activities" (1995). In addition, while the public certainly had varying
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social and political views, these were not proportionally reflected in the existing

political parties. In other words, Russia had a "political system without parties"
(White et al., 1995). Moser explained the weak upstart of political parties and low

membership based on three historical conditions: 1) an underdeveloped civil society,

2) the sequencingof founding elections, and 3) communist-eraantiparty attitudes
(2001).

Accordingly, many have questioned the integrity of democracy in Russia.
The Freedom House downgraded Russia to the 'Not Free' category and the Duma

(parliament) has been described as 'tamed' (Litvinovich, 2003) and 'toothless'

(Orttung (2008), some suggest that democracy in Russia has been *derailed' (Fish,
2005). However, Russia's multi-party system, albeit weak and volatile, is for some,

theonly proofthat some version of democracy still exists in Russia today. Brader and
Tucker note that the very existence of multiple political parlies is evidence that at
leastsome form of democracy is still present (2009). Furthermore, basedon their

2006 survey-based experiments, political parties were significantly influential in
tenns of cueing voters about popular policies. Therefore, while the political climate

has forced many to question the integrity of democracy in Russia, the fact that
multiple political parties existand influence voters should not be overlooked.
In general, most research has used an objective approach toward
understanding political parties and voting in contemporary Russian. For instance,
Kunicova and Remington investigated how differences in the way Duma

representatives were elected affected floor votes (2008). Ishiyama and Shafqat
examined changes in political party identity after the collapseof the Soviet Union
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(2000). Dawisha and Deets analyzed voting behavior based on the

institutionalization and normalization of political learning brought on by previous
elections (2006). By exploring membership to and support for political parties in
Russia, I will contribute to this literature by assessing popular perceptions (i.e.,
subjective) of affiliation and support to political parties. In addition, the association
between religion and political life will be addressed. As Dawisha and Deets noted, it
is vital that the complexity inherent in background influencers in candidates and

voters alike, such as ethnicity and religiosity, must be acknowledged in order to
obtain a clearer understanding of political life in contemporary Russia (2006).

Attitudes toward Political Institutions and Democracy

In addition to individual affiliation and support for political parties, it is

important to understand popular perception of Russian political life in terms of
institutional and societal trends. Doing so offers a comprehensive depiction of
political life among etlmic Russians, and its popular reception. This is accomplished

by exploring attitudes toward political institutions and opinions about the influence of
democracy. While both areas have been covered in the literature, rarely do previous
efforts investigate the relationship between ethno-religious and political identities.
This chapter contributes to the following literature base by filling this gap.

Attitudes toward Political Institutions in Contemporary Russia

In order to understand popular attitudes toward public institutions in

contemporary Russia, the unique cultural and historical context must be considered.
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The following review summarizes major efforts at understanding post-communist
attitudes toward and confidence in political institutions.

Based on institutional theory, Mishler and Willerton combined cultural

explanations to understand differences in public support for Yeltsin and Putin (2003).
Wnile institutional theory emphasizes institutional performance (in this case, the

presidency), cultural explanations refer to Russia's historical orientation toward
authoritative leaders to explain Putin's increase in popularity. In short, Mishler and
Willerton found evidence of both, what they termed a 'dual political culture' (2003).

Following Oliver's efforts on deinstitutionalization, Batjargal used institutional

theory and cultural explanations to compare networks of entrepreneurs in China and
Russia (2007). In short, he found that due to deinstitutionalization processes leading
to an institutional void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, new rules and norms

have been created, dissolving old networks and relationships but accruing overall low
levels of trust. Batjargal's investigation highlighted the unique cultural psyche

among Russians, grounded in mystic and transcendental traditions of Russian
Orthodoxy, which has made them "more tolerant of uncertainties and comfortable
absorbing mutually exclusive and contradictory thoughts and mental positions"
(2007, p.401). This idea may be problematic however, as most contemporary
Russians do not practice Orthodox mysticism.

Others have similarly noted the influence of cultural factors on public trust, or
rather distrust, of institutions in contemporary Russia. Indeed, as described in

Shlapentokh's study, Russians hold an everyday taken-for-grantedness that no one
should be trusted (2006). As noted journalist Yulia Kalinina wrote, "lying and
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deception has become a norm of life," and, rather extremely, divided Russians into
two types of people: those who deceive other people and those who fail at doing it
(2005). Rose described this normalization of distrust as a "pervasive legacy of
communistrule," resulting from the repression of all aspects of social life by the one
political machine (1994, p.18). Based on this historical context, Shlapentokh

provided survey evidence depicting Russia as "a country, much more than any other,
that mistrusts almost all social institutions in the country and political institutions in

the first place" (2006, p.155). Indeed, the general distrust in social institutions has

apparently become nonnalized in Russian culture. One of the tasks in this chapter will
be to explore this assumption further. In particular, public trust/distrust toward

political institutions (i.e., president, political parties, government) is examined,
contributing to a fuller understanding of the political orientation, attitudes, and
behaviors among ethnic Russians and how these characteristics are related to
ethnodoxy.

Attitudes toward Democracy in Contemporary Russia

In addition, it is essential that popular perceptions about democracyand its

consequences are assessed. As discussed in preceding chapters, attitudes toward the
West and its influence are important elements making up ethnodoxy. Attitude toward
democracy, then, becomes an obvious manifestation of such influences. The

following review explores previous efforts aimed at explaining popular perceptions of
the West and the role of democracy in post-communist Russia.
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In general, most research shows a decreasing interest in the West, democracy,

and integration with Europe as manifested in public policy and individual political
agendas. In Chandler's comparative study of attitudes toward welfare refonns
between Russia and Latvia, Russian leaders were found to be less open to Western-

oriented policies (2001). In their comparative analysis of attitudes toward Europe and
the West in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, White, McAllister, and Valentina (2010)

described Russians as unsurprisingly pro-Slavic, more likely to regret the demise of
the USSR, and more interested in unification among the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS). In addition, Russia's political influence in Ukraine and,

especially, Belams are felt as 'Europeanness' in such countries has declinedover the
past decade (White, McAllister, and Valentina, 2010).

Such depictions of Russia as against, or at least uninterested in, Western

democracy have largely blamed the pro-nationalist Putin administration. In fact, as
Rivera and Rivera noted, Yeltsin's Russia was far more democratic, compared to

otherpost-communist states, than most research speculates (2009). Indeed, Russia
during the 1990s had, as Brader and Tucker described, "all the trappings of a newly
emerging democracy: unpredictable elections, competing political parties, a

parliament capable of opposing the president and a vibrant (if at times biased) media"
(2009, p.844). By the end of his tenure, support for Yeltsin had dramatically declined
due to weak presence in the Duma, a stagnated international reputation, unfinished
conflict in Chechnya, and an erratic personal life (Mishler and Willerton, 2003).

Moreover, mass discontent of the economy, made worse with the 'Ruble crisis' in
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1998, further contributed to the increasing skepticism of democracy in Russia and a
move toward more authoritarian alternatives.

By the end of the 1990s, other options were becoming increasingly popular.
(In fact, even as early as the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin's triumph over the

communist nominee, Geimady Zyuganov, is still contested to this day.) Specifically,

Putin's strong and well-received pro-nationalist agenda ushered in a new era for

Russian political life. Not without struggle, as Warhola and others described, Putin
pushed for 'monocultural Russocentrism,' insisting on a strong Russian Orthodoxnationai identity as exemplified in the proposal for Orthodox culture courses in public
schools (Warhola, 2007; Warhola and Lehning, 2007).

Putin's restoration of a traditional pro-Slavic, and anti-West, Russia has been

well documented. For many, this has become a zero sum issue. Either, Russiaadopts
Western liberal democracy, or retains its 'outdated' and incompatible authoritarian

traditions (Levinskaya, 2007). According to DeLue, this problem is bestexplained in
terms of public memories. For DeLue,

National identity is in large part predicated on shared, public memories
that not only point to common cultural and historical realities but to the
publically legitimated moral values that each individual should accept as the
basis for being a citizen in good standing in a given society (2006, p.403).

In short, DeLue suggested that low levels of tolerance and liberal attitudes ofjustice
in Russia are due to weak public memories of radical injustice maintained by the
authoritarian nature of Russia's political climate (2006).

However, some say that Russia's traditional ties to authoritarianism and

openness to Western liberalism are not mutually exclusive. In their analysis of

presidential popularity in post-communist Russia, Mishler and Willerton found
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evidence of a dual political culture; one that has ties to values of traditional
authoritarian culture, but which provokes citizens to hold leaders individually

accountable for their perfonnance, thereby exhibiting a liberal ideal of strong public

opinion (2003). As Riveraand Rivera note, a prominent explanation as to the
foundation of Russia's autocratic tendencies has been due to its relationship with

Eastern Orthodoxy (2009). Prodromouexplored the doctrinal compatibilities

between Orthodoxy and democracy, highlighting external and internal signs of

pluralization (2004). For Prodromou, Western democratic pluralism has been

portrayed as absolute and universal, whereas in reality, there can be many different
ways for societies to achieve democracy, tolerance, and freedom of rights (2004),
Indeed, Agadjanian and Rousselet examined Metropolitan Kirill's negotiation
between traditional (Orthodox) and liberal values (secular globality) in the face of

globalization (2005). Kirill has called for a combination of both inside each nation.
In other words, an internalization of this combination within each national, or

regionalized (Danilova, 2009), Orthodox Church, would allow 'progression' but
within the control of each Church (Agadjanian and Rousselet, 2005). Clearly, the

role and perception of democracy in Russia is complicated. Moreover, the Church
has added to the complexity by instilling contradictory positions on such issues. In
this way, it is vital that on-the-ground perceptions of democracy and the West are
understood, and how these views correlate with ethnodox beliefs are examined.
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Hypotheses

Again, the purpose of this chapter will be to explore how adherence to
ethnodoxy is related to political orientations and attitudes. Based on previous

research, the following hypotheses are projected. Membership to political parties will
be assessed but mostly in a descriptive capacity. Based on the literature, / do not

expect high levels ofaffiliation to or supportfor political parties (Hypothesis 4a).
However, because of Putin's strong popularity and nationalist agenda, I expect that
individuals who adhere to higher levels ofethnodoxy will affiliate with and support

political parties and leaders with pro-nationalist tendencies (Hypothesis 4b). Based
on the literature emphasizing popular distrust in social institutions, / expect thatmost
ethnic Russians will be distrusting ofpolitical institutions (Hypothesis 4c). Finally,

due to the particularistic nature of ethnodoxy, which includes exclusive definitions of
being 'Russian' and 'Orthodox,' I expect there to be a positive relationship between

ethnodoxy and anti-West/democratic attitudes. In other words, iflevels ofethnodoxy
increase, then levels ofsupportfor anti-West/democratic political parties and leaders
will also increase (Hypothesis 4d).

Frequency Distributions of Indicators of Political Orientation
In this study, political orientation refers to individual political membership,
behavior, and views. In particular, political membership is operationalized with

respondents identifying their political party affiliation and which they most agree
with. Political behavior is operationalized by indicating which party a respondent

would vote for. Finally, political attitudes are operationalized with respondents
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indicating how much confidence they have in their president, political parties,
government, and their views toward democracy. The frequency distributions of these
indicators are presented in Tables 22 and 23.
Interestingly, most etlmic Russians (94.2%) are not affiliated with any

particular political party. However, while over half of ethnic Russians (51.5%) do not
agree with a political party, many do admit to agreeing with political parties (36.8%).

Specifically, the largest proportion of respondents who agree with political parties
(17.6%), agree with United Russia. Again, it is important to note that United Russia is

the supporting party for Vladimir Putin. The second and third most popular political
parties are the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). However, most would vote for United Russia in
the next elections (23.4%) while 16% are against all political parties, 16.8% would

not vote, and 20.6% are unsure altogether. Interestingly, more respondents would
vote for United Russia than admit to agreeing with the political party. As described
later, this is indicative of a political culture that maintains change and individual
impact as generally futile.

LInsurprisingiy, most (75.8%) ethnic Russians distrust political parties and the

government (53.8%). At the same time, 75.6% of respondents trust the current

president (i.e., President Putin). Therefore, it would appear that although political
parties are weakly supported and negatively perceived, the opinion of President Putin
is mostly positive. Furthermore, a majority of respondents (53.3%) believe that
democracy leads to social disorder. These results are suggest that most ethnic
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Table 22. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Political Orientation and Behavior
Frequency
Percentage
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Russians support President Putin and his pro-Slavic agenda while, simultaneously,
being rather intensely anti-government and distrusting of the political system.

These findings are not surprising given the context described in previous
literature. Clearly, post-communist Russians are unsure of the dependability of
political institutions, but at the same time supportive of Putin and his agenda. As

described in previous chapters, Putin has been anything but silent regarding his vision
for Russia that reconstitutes traditional sources (i.e., ROC) for (re)creating
contemporary etlmo-national identity. In line with the concept of ethnodoxy, Russian
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Table 23. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Political Attitudes
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Orthodoxy has beenone key resource emphasized by Putin and is illustrated by the
intimate relationship with the state and the ROC. Therefore, it is important to
imderstand how etlinic Russians perceive their etlmo-religious identity and what
patterns emerge regarding their political orientation.

The Relationship between Political Orientation and Etlmodoxy

Investigating the relationship between political orientation, attitude, and
behavior and adherence to ethnodoxy is essential for gauging the relevance and
embeddedness of ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians. Indeed, the

political sphere becomes an integral part of ethnodoxy, both directly and indirectly.
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Directly, a major tenet of soft ethnodoxy is the belief that the political state has the
authority to and should act on protecting and preserving the Russian Orthodox

Church. This despite the legal separation between church and state as exemplified in
the national constitution, which titles the Russian Federation as a secular state.

Indirectly, soft and hard ethnodox beliefs establish boundaries between Russia and

Westernnations and churches, by demonizing the West and upholding a clear and
strict definition for being Russian and Orthodox. These are important considerations

as they coincide with then (and once again) President Putin and his pro-Slavic
political agenda. Therefore, the following analyses explore the relationship between

political characteristics of contemporary ethnic Russians and their adherence to

etlmodoxy. In short, these analyses show that political variations among respondents
coincide expectantly with levelsof ethnodoxy, supporting the hypotheses above.

General Patterns

This section explores the relationship between political orientation, altitudes,
and behavior with indicators of ethnodoxy. The political characteristics used in this

analysis were described in the preceding section. The measure of political affiliation
will not be included in this analysis since a large majority of respondents identifiedas
either a non-member or were unsure (96.6%). Therefore, inclusion of this indicator
would not be meaningful.

As presented in Table 24, most ethnic Russians, despite differences in
political party preference and voting behavior, adhere to the tenets of soft ethnodoxy.
In addition, a largeproportion, if not a majority in most cases, adheres to the tenets of
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Table 24. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Political Orientation and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
No longer
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hard ethnodoxy. Similar to previous findings, most ethnic Russians, regardless of
their social, religious, or political characteristics, adhere to the tenets of ethnodoxy.
However, some important differences still exist and should be explained. For
instance, individuals who exhibit stronger political involvement, regardless of which

party they affiliate with, also have larger proportions of adherents to ethnodoxy. In
particular, respondents who agree with and vote for United Russia and CPRF have the

highest percentage of adherents to both soft and hard ethnodox beliefs. The belief in
ethnodoxy among CPRF supporters is especially interesting given the importance of
religious affiliation. Indeed, almost 92% of respondents who agree with and vote for
the CPRF believe that a Russian is always Orthodox. In fact, supporters of the CPRF

have much larger proportions of respondents who adhere to hard ethnodoxy than
United Russia supporters. For example, 67.3% of respondents who agree with the
CPRF believe that Western churches undermine Russians compared with 56.3% of

respondents who agree with United Russia. Similarly, 67.4% of respondents who
would vote for CPRF adhere to the same hard ethnodox tenet versus 57.9% of

respondents who would vote for United Russia.

Initially, these results seem ironic given the historical link between
communism and atheism. In fact, communists in Russia have moved closer to the

ROC, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to Verkhovsky,
"It cannot be said that the ROC approves of the programme of the CPRF; but in the
second half of the 1990s the ROC and the CPRF and other 'communist-patriotic'

organizations even had joint semipolitical structures" (2002, p.334). Therefore,
perhaps a better explanation has more to do with differences betweenpolitical action
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and apathy than which political party one adheres to. This idea is further developed
in the next section.

A second dimension regarding the political climate in post-communist Russia
is trust in political institutions and attitudes toward democracy. As previous literature

suggests, institutional trust is relatively low. While many have offered different
explanations, most agree that the unique histo-cultural context of Russia as

maintaining a tradition of distrust. This idea is exemplified in the frequency
distributions of confidence in political institutions described in the previous section.
It is worth noting that while a majority of respondents are distrusting of political

parties, their government, and democracy in general, most trust the president (at the
time, President Putin).

Table 25 presents the results from the crosstabulation between attitudes
toward political institutions and democracy and indicators of ethnodoxy.
Respondents who are trusting of the president and political parties clearly have

slightly larger proportions of adherents to both soft and hard ethnodoxy. Confidence
in the government shows similar patterns for some, but not all, of the indicators of
ethnodoxy. Finally, respondents who agree that democracy leads to disorder also
show larger percentages of adherence to ethnodoxy. Not surprising, adherents who
are unsure about their confidence in political institutions and attitude about
democracy also show the lowest percentages of adherence to ethnodoxy. Therefore, it
appears that more certain respondents, regardless of whether they trust or distrust
political institutions, also have higher percentages of adherents to ethnodoxy than

respondents who are less certain. As the findings in Table 24 suggest, there is a
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Table 25. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes toward Political Institutions and

Democracy and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxv
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greater difference between respondents who are politically engaged versus

disengaged than between respondents supporting different parties in tenns of
adherence to ethnodoxy. Perhaps, the same is true for institutional trust. In other

words, does being more certain about trusting, or distrusting, political institutions
correlate with greater adherence to ethnodoxy than actual differences between

trusting and distrusting? The following section will explore these considerations.

The Relationship between Political Support and Ethnodoxy

As discussed in the previous section, the differences in political orientation,
behavior, and attitudes is clearly related to variability in adherence to ethnodoxy.

But, these findings may be less about differences in party politics, and more about

political action/inaction. This section explores political action versus inaction among
contemporary etlmic Russians, and how it relates to adherence to ethnodoxy.

By selecting out respondents from both extremes (politically engaged and

politically disengaged), we can examine this idea further. Politically engaged refers
to respondents who agree with some political party and who would vote in the next
election. Politically disengaged refers to respondents who do not support or vote for
any political party. Table 26 presents the frequency distribution of two groups. As
shown, each category has a sizeable number of respondents, making continued
analysis worthwhile.

Next, we can compare these groups in tenns of attitudes toward political
institutions, democracy, and adherence to ethnodoxy. Table 27 presents the
crosstabulation results of each group with trust in political institutions. Clearly,
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Table 26. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Politically Engaged/Disengaged
Groups
Frequency

Percentage

Politically engaged

466

33.3

Politically disengaged

396

28.3

Table 27. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Politically Engaged/Disengaged
Groups and Indicators of Trust in Political Institutions
Trust in

Trust in

Trust in

President

Political

Government

Democracy
leads to
disorder

Parties

Politically engaged

78.9

23

42.7

55.6

Politically disengaged

67.2

7.3

30.1

55.8

.203**

.017

Gamma

.258***

3 yj-^^f. >j«

* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001

respondents who are more politically engaged, also have greater tmst in the president,

political parties, andthe government. According to the previous literature on the
culture of distrust in Russia, these results are not surprising. However, it is important

to note that even among the politically disengaged, trust in the president is strong.
Furthermore, there is basically no discrepancy between the politically

engaged/disengaged regarding the beliefthat democracy leads to disorder. Again, this
affinns the idea that while many ethnic Russians may not be particularlypolitically

engaged or trusting of the political system, support for Putin and anti-West rhetoric is
high.

Finally, the relationship between politically engaged/disengaged and
adherence to etlmodoxy projects a similar pattern. As shown in Table 28, politically

engaged respondents have higher proportions adhering to ethnodoxy than the
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Table 28.

Crosstabulation between Indicators of Politically Engaged/Disengaged Groups and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy
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53.9
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politically disengaged. Not surprising, the largest variation between groups (80.5%
versus 70.2%) was found in the belief that the state should protect Russian Orthodoxy
from its opponents. In other words, respondents who are politically engaged (at least,
in the established political system), have higher proportions of respondents adhering

to ethnodoxy. The consequences of this are important. Beyond just having social and
political views and opinions, if adherents to ethnodoxy are more politically engaged,
then more decisions, voting behaviors, and other political actions are made by

individuals who adhere to the xenophobic, particularistic, and protectionist tenets of
ethnodoxy.

At the same time, regardless of these differences, large proportions of the
politically disengaged adhere to ethnodoxy too, confirming its deep embeddedness

across different political temperaments. Indeed, the key finding here is the
widespread belief in most ethnodox tenets, despite adherent's political conviction
support, and intensity.

Conclusion

The main task in this chapter was to explore the relationship between political
conviction and belief in ethnodoxy. According to the literature, contemporary

Russians are commonly portrayed as politically apathetic, based, in part, on a
traditional culture of distrust in social and political institutions. Despite this general

description, the empirical analyses administered in this chapter provide deeper insight
into the political life among ethnic Russians. For instance, while it is true that most
etlmic Russians do not officially affiliate with a political party (96.6%), 36.8% still
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agree with one and 46.5% will vote for one. Clearly, contemporary ethnic Russians
may not be as politically apathetic as popular discourse suggests.

However, this is not to say that a culture of distrust and pessimism in the

political system does not exist. Indeed, the above results depict this, as a majority of
Russians do not trust political parties or the government. I believe this is a more
accurate explanation for low formal political affiliation (i.e., party membership).
Furthermore, the strong presence and influence of United Russia as the prevailing

political party contributes to popular feelings of insignificance and triviality regarding
individual political behavior. Simply, there is no other option.
While the data used in this study depict a 2005 cross-section, these themes

still resonant today. In particular, the 2011-2012 parliamentary and presidential
elections have stined countless debates about current Russian political life. United

Russia and its presidential nominee, Vladimir Putin, have achieved unsurprising
victories. While pegged as conupt and fraudulent in the West, the outcomes of these
elections are understood differently for many ethnic Russians at home. For instance,
Svetlana Babaeva, a senior analyst with the US Bureau of the Russian News Agency

(RIA Novosti), explained Putin's recent triumph in March 2012 as follows:

First, he performed a very aggressive campaign, and, regardless of all
that so-called administrative approaches, that was really campaign. The
second reason is that those ~ his rivals, whose names were permitted on the
ballot, were not so attractive for a large number of voters. And the third
reason, which is very important, that the fact is, just because of many people
are not happy and satisfied with Putin anymore, that does not automatically
mean that they're ready to vote for any other candidate. That's the point
(Babaeva, 2012).

In short, support for Putin, at least according to Babaeva, is more a surrender of
options than genuine desire. Babaeva continued, "Putin strangely preferred numbers
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instead of getting legitimacy" (2012). Again, this is indicative of a public that is
politically interested and trapped rather than unconcerned and apathetic.

Another way to read Babaeva's interpretation of Russian political
expectations is that Putin's platfonn resonated for a majority of ethnic Russians. The

fact that a majority of respondents in 2005 (75.6%) trust the president despite
distrusting political parties and the government further indicates Putin's popularity
and influence. As described in detail earlier, Putin's pro-Slavic agenda, which

emphasizes Russian solidarity through traditional sources and ant-West sentiments,

has remained popular. The results from this chapter support this. Despite differences
in political conviction, a similar proportion agrees that democracy leads to disorder.
In addition, most ethnic Russians adhere to the tenets of etlmodoxy. Since ethnodox

beliefs highlight clear boundaries regarding who is and is not Russian coupled with
anti-West rhetoric, Putin's continued support is not all that surprising.

As this paper unfolds, I posit that ethnodoxy has become a popular worldview
for most contemporary ethnic Russians. In other words, for ethnic Russians, the
adherence to ethnodoxy is part of what it means to be a normal member of society.
As Converse (1964) noted, it is not important that elements in a belief system are

'logically coherent,' but that they psychologically and socially make sense. In other
words, so long as a worldview is understood as plausible by its adherents, and thereby
normalized in popular perception, the logic is irrelevant.

The analyses in this chapter found that a majority of respondents who agree
with and support the main communist political party (CPRF) adhere to ethnodoxy.
On the surface this is paradoxical and illogical since ethnodoxy stresses the
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importance of religious affiliation, contradicting the conventional ideology of a
traditionally atheist socio-political group. However, based on Converse's ideas, the

tenets of ethnodoxy have become such an integral part of the general worldview for
ethnic Russians, that adhering to it is simply a given, despite it's illogical

consequences. To recap then, ethnodoxy has become part and parcel for what it
means to be Russian, despite differences in religious and political orientations. A
further indicationof its scope is made evident as popular attitudes toward

contemporary social issues are investigated. Specifically, the following chapter

explores opinions about abortion and homosexuality and howthese attitudes are
related to ethnodoxy for contemporary ethnic Russians.
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CHAPTER XI: ETHNODOXY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD POPULAR SOCIAL
ISSUES

As the previous chapters depict, the belief in ethnodoxy resonates with most

etlmic Russians, despite differences in social demographics, religiosity, perception of
nation and nationalism, and political orientation. This chapter continues this

investigation by exploring attitudes toward key social issues - specifically, attitudes
toward abortion and acceptance of homosexuals. Both social issues have become

populartopics in public discourse, highlighting the apparentclash between a residual
Soviet-era culture and a growing post-communist pro-Slavic nationalism. For
instance, the Russian Orthodox Church and first lady Svetlana Medvedev have

become key figures in the campaign against an open abortion culture normalized

during the Soviet Union. The issue of homosexuality in Russian society is no less
socially, politically, and religiously charged, exemplified in the banning of gay rights
demonstrations in Moscow during 2011. Even more recently, a new city law in St.

Petersburg banning 'homosexual propaganda,' and supported by the ROC, has
received widespread criticism within Russia and beyond. Clearly, understanding

popular perceptions of key social issues like abortion and homosexuality is an
important element when making sense of contemporary Russian identity.
Although some have investigated attitudes toward popular social issues in
post-communist Russia, these are usually descriptive assessments aimed at

determining if Russian political policy and public opinion are becoming more or less

open to Western liberalism. Few have specifically explored public opinions of social
issues like abortion and gay rights in post-communist Russia, fewer yet have

154

intentionally examined the relationship between religiosity and opinions toward key
social issues, and none (that this author is aware of) have specifically explored the

relationship between religious and ethnic identities with attitudes toward social
issues. This study fills these gaps in the literature by investigating the relationships
between religiosity, ethnodoxy and attitudes toward two key social issues: attitudes
toward abortion and rights for homosexuals. The central question for this chapteris:
how is adherence to ethnodoxy related to attitudes toward key social issues such as
acceptance ofabortion and rightsfor homosexuals?

Social Issue One: Attitudes toward Abortion

The relationship between religion and attitudes toward abortion is well

documented. It is not surprising that religion is often used as a resource when making
decisions about defining life and when or if to end it (Stephens et al., 2009). Cochran
et al. noted the considerable literature on religion and abortion, and contributed with a

study emphasizing the influence of personal religiosity, religious affiliation, and
spouse's affiliation on attitudes toward legalizing abortion (1996). In their 2009
study, Stephens et al. also acknowledged the impact that personal religiosity has on
decision-making concerning abortion for American believers. Flowever, they also

note the complexity of decision-making, and that influencers (such as religion) rarely
function in a vacuum. Instead, multiple sources of influence can exist

simultaneously, and oftentimes conflict. For instance, Stephens et al. found evidence
that a balance is often struck among American believers between religious and

secularmorality, what Audi called a 'theo-ethical equilibrium' (2005). Therefore, it
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is important to note how sources of influence like religion interact and exist within a
larger paradigmatic framework.
Similarly, Emerson described woridviews as essential structures that frame

individual's reference-points, thereby directing them in decision-making (1996). In
the United States, for instance, religion influences attitudes toward abortion as

moderated through a specific worldview (i.e., conservative vs. liberal). Others have
also noted the idea that religion as a source for decision-making, exists and interacts
within broader woridviews. For example, Dillon's study on abortion attitudes across

Catholic Europe described the Catholic Church as drawing more heavily on cultural,
rather than doctrinal, sources of legitimation (1996). Similarly, Minkenberg's

analysis concluded that differences in religious heritage mattered more than levels of
religiosity on abortion policies across Europe (2002).

In this way, religiosity, however perceived, can be one of many sources of
influence. For Emerson, woridviews are multi-dimensional including, in the case of

abortion, religion, sexuality, and morality (1996). Similarly, Peterson recognized the

interaction between multiple sources of influence existing within a single plausibility
structure (2001). In particular, he focused on the conelation between religion and
education in affecting attitudes toward abortion. In this way, it is easy to assume that

other sources of identity may be just as important. In particular, I suggest that
ethnodoxy has become an important factor related to attitudes and opinions about
abortion in post-communist Russia.

Attitudes towards abortion in post-communist Russia, or post-communist

Europe for that matter, have been scarcely explored in Western academia. Besides a
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few exceptions, most attention concerning abortion has focused on public policies

ratherthan personal attitudes (e.g., Dillon, 1996). Only one study, that this author is
aware of, investigates popular perceptions in the post-communist 'abortion culture'

(i.e., Karpov and Kaariainen, 2005). Karpov and Kaariainen s study has provided a

unique insight into popular attitudes toward abortion and the influence of religion. In
short, they explain the normalization of high acceptance rates toward abortion as
remnants of the Soviet past. Unlike other industrialized societies, abortion is "not an

issue subject to moral judgment; rather, it is still seen as a justifiable, "normal" option
for resolving personal family problems" (Karpov and Kaariainen, 2005, p.28).

Indeed, even personal religiosity (i.e., affiliation with Russian Orthodoxy and church
attendance) is weakly associated with opinions toward abortion. Thus, the Church's

firm stance against abortion appears unpersuasive.2" These findings suggest that
abortion attitudes have become "deep-seated in the post-Soviet mentality" (Karpov

and Kaariainen, 2005, p.29). Therefore, the source of decision-making regarding
abortion has less to do with religion, and more to do with the greater worldview

among contemporary ethnic Russians. One task in this section is to explore this
projection.

22 According to the Bases ofthe Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church, "The Church sees the
widely spread andjustified abortion in contemporaiy society as a threat to the future of humanity and a
clearsignof itsmoral degradation. It is incompatible to be faithful to the biblical and patristic teaching
that human life is sacred and precious from its origin and to recognizewoman's free choice in
disposing of the fate of the fetus." Again, for the full text of the BasesSocialConcept, see
http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/
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Hypotheses

Based on this review of the literature, including conventional wisdom

regarding the relationship between religion and attitudes toward abortion and findings
from Karpov and Kaariainen's analysis on abortion attitudes in Russia, I offer two
hypotheses to guide further analysis. First, despite overwhelming research to the

contrary, and following Karpov and Kaariainen's findings, 1 expectpersonal
religiosity to be associated weakly, ifat all, with attitudes toward abortion

(Hypothesis 5a). Following the literature concerning the multi-dimensionality of
woridviews as moderating multiple sources of decision-making, I suspect ethnodoxy
to be associated with attitudes toward abortion. Again, while religion is not expected

to be a strong influence toward abortion attitudes, the argument in this paper is that
the relationship between religion and ethnicity (i.e., ethnodoxy) is becoming a
legitimated component of the general worldview for many contemporary ethnic
Russians. Part of this ideology is a more prominent role of the Church, which

adamantly opposes abortion. Therefore, I project that increasedlevels ofethnodoxy
are associated with less accepting attitudes towardabortion (Hypothesis 5b).

Operationalizing Attitudes toward Abortion

Attitude toward abortion is operationlized using four situational indicators for

approving abortion: approve of abortion if the pregnancy is dangerous for the woman,
if the child is expected to be born with defects, if the woman is not manied, and if the
couple no longer want children (see Table 29). Ethnic Russians adamantly support
abortions if the pregnancy is dangerous (78.2%) or if the child is expected to have
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Table 29. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitudes about Abortion
Percentage
Frequency
If pregnancy is
78.2
1095
Approve
danger to woman
13.6
If child is expected
to have defects

If woman is not
manied

Disapprove

191

Not sure

115

8.2

Approve

1070

76.4

Disapprove

180

12.8

Not sure

151

10.8

Approve

531

37.9

Disapprove

596

42.5
19.6

Not sure

If couple does not
want more children

Approve

713

50.9

Disapprove

457

32.6

Not sure

231

16.5

w=1401

defects (76.4%). A smaller majority approve of abortions if the couple no longer

want children (50.9%). However, most etlmic Russians are disapproving of abortions
of the woman is not married (42.5%).

Clearly, these distributions tentatively support the idea that most ethnic
Russians are accepting of abortions under at least three conditions. Just as Karpov

and Kaariainen posited, such high acceptance is probably a residual effect from the
'abortion culture' cultivated during the Soviet-era. Simply, abortions were
considered a 'normal' solution to financial and personal predicaments, where having

an unwanted child may be more burdensome. However, more than two decades have

passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, an important question is
whether this same 'abortion culture' is thriving and by what agents of dissemination,

or fading and why. The following analysis will contribute toward understanding
these issues.
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Religion and Attitudes toward Abortion in Post-Communist Russia
According to the literature described above, religiosity is often related to

negative attitudes toward abortions. However, Karpov and Kaariainen's study found
that religiosity (specifically, religious affiliation and church attendance) was weakly
associated with abortion opinions. They concluded that attitudes toward abortion
were probably influenced by a Soviet-era 'abortion culture' rather than religious
institutions and dogma.

Table 30 presents the results from crosstabulating indicators of religiosity with
indicators of ethnodoxy. Religiosity was operationalized using three commonly used
measures: 1) whether a person considered themselves religious, 2) how many core

Christian beliefs they held, and 3) how often they attended church. As these findings

indicate, religious belonging, belief, and behavior is clearly related to less accepting
attitudes about abortion. For instance, religious believers are less accepting of
abortion than religious non-believers, larger proportions of respondents who hold
fewer religious beliefs are more accepting, and higher percentages of respondents
who attend church less often are also more accepting.

However, in line with Karpov and Kaariainen, these relationships are weakly
associated, probably due to the overwhelming majority of ethnic Russians that are

accepting of abortion for each of these conditions. In other words, while the level of
religiosity may matter, the more significant finding is the still widespread acceptance

of abortion twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Clearly, the Sovietera abortion culture is still being disseminated and maintained today. By exploring
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Table 30. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Attitudes about
Abortion
If

If child is

If women

If couple

pregnancy

expected

is not

does not

is danger

to have

married

to woman

defects

want
more

children

Religious

75.4

72.7

34.2

46.1

Undecided

83

81.8

44

56.6

Unbeliever

80,3

81.9

41.5

60.1

Atheist

85.5

85.5

48.7

60.5

Not sure

67.6

59.5

21.6

35.1

27.962***

32.016***

38.159***

29.872***

Many

76.8

71.2

32.3

44.4

Some

77.4

76.5

39.1

51.3

80

80.8

41.7

56.3

Gamma

-.073

-.189***

Weekly/monthly

68.8

63.1

28.1

36.9

81

78.5

41.1

51.8

Yearly/less than
yearly

81.3

77.9

37.6

50.4

Never

76.7

77.9

39

55.1

Gamma

-.028**

-.122***

- 099***

-.145***

Believer

Person

£
Core

Cliristian

Beliefs

Few

Church

17Q***

-.162***

Attendance

Several times a year

* p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001

the relationship between ethnodoxy and attitudes toward abortion, further insight into
this phenomenon is provided.

Ethnodoxy and Attitudes toward Abortion in Post-Communist Russia

By investigating the relationship between ethnodoxy and attitudes toward
abortion, a deeper understanding of what contemporary ethnic Russians believe and
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how they construct their identity is obtained. Particular to popular attitudes about
abortion, I puiport that there are conflicting woridviews in contemporary Russia. On
the one hand, accepting attitudes about abortion are legitimated by a Soviet-era
system of beliefs and values that normalized abortion as an accepted choice for
dealing with unwanted financial and family predicaments. On the other hand, the

belief in a firm Russian identity that links religious and ethnic heritage (i.e.,

etlmodoxy), accentuates the role of the Church and, therefore, opposes the act of
abortion. As discussed later, examining how these two ideologies coexist is cmcial
for better understanding larger woridviews maintained by ethnic Russians today. But

first, this chapter continues by examining how beliefs in ethnodoxy are related to
attitudes about abortion.

Table 31a presents the results from crosstabulating indicators of ethnodoxy
with attitudes toward abortion. While there is some variation among adherence to

ethnodoxy across differing attitudes toward abortion, these patterns are weak and not
widespread. In other words, while there are some relationships where a larger

proportion of respondents who disapprove of abortion adhere to ethnodoxy (e.g., if
pregnancy is a danger to woman and the belief that a Russian is always Orthodox),
this is not a general finding. Instead, the proportions are relatively similar, and

usually a majority, across most relationships between attitudes toward abortion and
the belief in ethnodoxy. Conelating ethnodoxy factor scores with abortion factor
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Table 31a. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes about Abortion and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Ethnodoxy
No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

protect Russian

richer in their

Orthodox from

soul and

opponents

stronger in

can never be a
real Russian

Churches

converted from

can one find
'true' Russian

always

undermine

Orthodox

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

Russian if

their beliefs

their traditions

another

than Western

religion

nations

If pregnancy is

Approve

34.2

54.8

48.9

55.2

85.3

76.5

76.5

Disapprove

37.7

62.3

56.5

54.5

91.1

77.5

75.9

Not sure

29.6

42.6

39.1

46.1

75.7

60

71.3

danger to
woman

If child is

Gamma

.066***

070***

A?'?***

.776'**

051***

Approve

34.5

55

50.7

56.4

86.4

76.5

11

Disapprove

33.9

58.3

47.2

47.8

85

77.2

71.7

Not sure

33.1

49.7

40.4

47.7

78.1

64.2

74.2

Gamma

.081***

.061***

.151***

.165***

/ *7^ ^^ ^

152**

.106*

Approve

37.3

56.5

53.9

55.2

86.3

75

76.8

Disapprove

35.2

57.4

48.7

56.4

86.2

79.5

79.5

Not sure

26.3

46

41.2

48.2

81.4

66.8

66.8

expected to
have defects

If woman is

jnj###

.082

not married

If couple does

j j j***

Gamma

]43***

.118***

.156***

.065***

.100***

084***

Approve

35.8

54.4

50.4

53.6

85

74.8

76.7

Disapprove

32.8

60.6

51.2

57.3

88.2

78.8

79.4

Not sure

32.5

44.6

41.6

50.6

80.5

70.1

67.1

jgg***

067***

.046***

.037***

.100***

not want more

children

Gamma

5\

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

jj2***

n??***

scores showed similar results (see Table 3lb).23 The correlation between abortion
attitudes and soft etlmodoxy is statistically significant but weak and not significant
with hard ethnodoxy. Therefore, the key finding here is that, regardless of differences
in abortion opinions, the adherence to ethnodoxy is prominent among most ethnic
Russians.

In fact, I submit that the Soviet-era abortion culture is waning, and giving way

to new discourses about abortion. No longer does the Party ideology monopolize

decision-making about issues like abortion. Instead, the collapse of the Soviet Union
has resulted in many sources of knowledge that can influence decisions about such

issues. Table 32 provides percentages of abortion attitudes in post-communist Russia
over time. While a majority of respondents are accepting of abortion in two
situations for over two decades, clearly, these proportions are changing. Indeed,

percentages of respondents that approve of abortion for both scenarios have dropped
as much as 20%. For each situation, respondents are becoming less accepting of
abortion for either reason.

Specifically, I suggest that ethnodoxy and, therefore, the Church have become

prominent sources of knowledge and identity, influencing social issues like attitudes
toward abortion. As proposed throughout this paper, the belief in ethnodoxy has

become a widespread and salient ideology spanning social, religious, and political
attributes. Since ethnodoxy requires direct identification with the dominant religious
institution, in this case the ROC, it is not surprising then, that more conservative

positions toward social issues like abortion are disseminated across the wider public.
' An abortion factor score was created by administering factor analysis on all four items measuring
abortion attitudes. All items loaded under one component (.735, .793, .735, and .768). Eigenvalue was
2.299 and explained 57.48% of variance.
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Table 31b. Correlation Matrix between Abortion Attitudes and Ethnodoxy Factor

Scores

___^_

Abortion Attitudes

Soft Ethnodoxy

Hard Etlmodoxy

-.078**

.032

* p< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Social Issue Two: Acceptance of Homosexuals
As with the literature on abortion, research on acceptance of homosexuals in

society has often included the influence of religion. As the following review
illustrates, however, very little attention has been given to post-communist Russian
attitudes toward homosexuals and the influence of religiosity. The aim of this section

will be to explore the role of religion and its relationship with ethnicity (i.e.,
ethnodoxy) toward acceptance of homosexuals.

The role of religion as an influencing factor for individual acceptance of
homosexuals in society has been well documented. As Tridico, Armstrong, and
Barry note.

Opposition to homosexuality has been a central tenet of many
orthodoxy wings of established religions... Through the identification and
condemnation of a minority sexual identity sector, organized religion has set
the parameters for acceptable and unacceptable principles and actions. Thus,
homosexuality could be regarded as a direct assault on the traditions of most
faiths and attempts to gain tolerance or acceptance of homosexuality have
been met with resistance to forceful opposition (2009, p.l).

In this study, Tridico et al. investigated the difficulties inherent for gay rights
movements to receive legitimacy and overcome heterosexism in societies where

majority religious organizations share similar outlooks with the state toward

165

Table 32. Frequency Distributionof Indicators of Abortion Attitudes Over Time in
Russia

1991

[998

2008

Not wrong to have an abortion if
,%
. . .
serious defect in baby

83.6

00 ,

_, n

na 0

Not wrong to have an abortion if
.
?
~ .,
very low income family

01
81

nr. n
70.9

CCi c
60.6

fl.y

/U.x

Source: ISSP Religion I, II, and III

homosexuality (Tridico et al., 2009). The strengthening relationship between the
Church and state in contemporary Russia epitomizes this scenario.

Others have also explored how the cultural and societal contexts influence
attitudes toward homosexuals. Adamczyk and Pitt investigated differences in cultural

contexts and how they are associated with particular attitudes toward homosexuals

(2009). By distinguishing countries as either 'survival' or 'self-expressive' culturally
oriented, Adamczyk and Pitt found that in more self-expressive countries (e.g., the
United States), religion has a greater influence on attitudes toward homosexuals. On

the other hand, more self-expressive countries have more diverse opinions toward
homosexuals but are overall more accepting than countries that are survivor oriented.

Schulte and Battle analyzed how different socicil and cultural identities influence

individual perceptions about homosexuals (2004). In their study of religion,
ethnicity, and attitudes toward homosexuals in the United States, they found that
religion was always a significant factor while ethnicity was significant when acting as

a proxy for religion (e.g., 'Black Churches'). In this way, Schulte and Battle alluded
to, knowingly or not, the idea that while religion is an important source for

166

individuals generating opinions about homosexuals, it is done so in a complicated
context that can include other factors (e.g., ethnicity).
In short, the literature is not without research on the relationship between

religion and attitudes about homosexuals. Most, however, describe religion as an

independent and static attribute, rarely approaching it as dynamic and interacting with
other social attributes. In fact, much of the literature on religion and attitudes toward

homosexuals apply qualitative methodologies,24 due to small sample sizes and
accessibility, which make analyzing the relationship between multiple variables
difficult.

In addition, few have attempted to explore conditions and popular attitudes

toward homosexuals in contemporary Russia. Healey's efforts (2001, 2002) have

largely focused on Soviet-era policy andsame-sex prostitution. He described the
historical ebb and flow of Russian public policy regarding the criminalization of
homosexual behaviors. As Healey explained, the decriminalization of homosexuality

during revolutionary Russia became a standard for progressive sexual politics (2002).
However, between 1933-34, Stalin recriminalized homosexuality due to, according to

Healey, supposed Nazi infiltration of homosexual circles as well as social cleansing
of'anomic' identities (2002).

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, homosexuality was redecriminalized in 1993 and de-pathologized in 1999 (Kon, 2010). No longer was

homosexuality, at leastin writing, legally defined as a disease or unlawful. However,
as Kon described, these re-evaluations of homosexuality occurred rapidly compared
24 For example, see LaSala and Revere's (2011) study on social and cultural hindrances for gay rights
movements in Estonia and Wolkomir's (2001, 2006) studies on ex-gay and gay affirming Christian
groups in the United States
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to Western societies with little to no justification (2010). By 2002, Putin's nationalist

agenda followed increased levels of xenophobia and homophobia. Kon's analysis of
results from multiple national survey programs found that in 2003 and 2006, more

than half ofrespondents had hostile attitudes toward homosexuals.25 In 2007, 41% of
respondents thought homosexuals should be criminally prosecuted." Clearly, public

opinion is not very accepting of homosexuals in contemporary Russia, despite official
legislation guaranteeing some level of protection. However, according to Graupner's
analysis on sexuality policies across Europe, this is not surprising (2008). Graupner
found that despite formal protection of homosexuals in many European and trans-

European constitutions, the reality of enforcing suchagendas are quite difficult. In

fact, only in areas with corresponding public attitudes and high levels of social
development is putting these policies in action probable (2008).
The Russian Orthodox Church has become a major player in demonizing

homosexuals for the vices of society (Kon, 2010). According to the Bases ofthe
Social Concept ofthe Russian Orthodox Church,

[The Church] believes homosexuality to be a sinful distortion of
human nature, which is overcome by spiritual effort leading to the healing and

personal growth of the individual.... [T]he Church is resolutely against the
attempts to present this sinful tendency as a norm and even something to be
proud of and emulate. This is why the Church denounces any propaganda of
homosexuality. Without denying anybody the fundamental rights to life,
respect for personal dignity and participation in public affairs, the Church,
however, believes that those who propagate the homosexual way of life
should not be admitted to educational and other work with children and youth,

nor to occupy superior posts in the army and reformatories."

25 Results from data collected by the LevadaCenterand Public Opinion Foundation.
26 Resultsfrom data collected by the Levada Center.

27 For the full text ofthe Bases Social Concept see: http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/socialconcepts/
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Unlike the Church's seemingly limited influence on popular opinion toward abortion,

it appears more persuasive about issues of homosexuality. In addition, this excerpt

emphasizes the unwillingness to allow rights for homosexuals (i.e., presence in
schools, work with children and military), something not considered for women who
choose to have an abortion. As social issues, attitudes toward abortion and

homosexuals have distinct qualities. An important difference is the point of

reference. Abortion largely concerns the individual with very little to no inclusion of
others as part of the 'problem.' Attitudes toward homosexuals, however, refers to a
social problem and whether such individuals should be treated the same as 'normal'
citizens. Survey questions about abortion often refer to the conditions individuals
would accept for the act to occur, not if a woman having had an abortion should be

treated equally. In this way, the issue of homosexuals in society is in fact a question
of tolerance and the willingness to accept members of a social 'out-group.'
Therefore, this becomes an issue of identity; what does being a 'true' Russian

mean in terms of attitudes toward social out-groups like homosexuals? According to
the theoretical tenets of ethnodoxy, the ROC has become an important source of

Russian identity. While previous efforts offer important insight into the issue of rights
and treatment of homosexuals in contemporary Russia, very little is discussed

regarding popular attitudes and none, that this author is aware of, explore the
influence of religious and etlmic identity. The following empirical analysis aims to
fill this gap.
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Hypotheses

Based on the preceding literature review7 and context of contemporary Russia,

I offer the following hypotheses to guide this analysis. I expect personal religiosity to
be associated with acceptance of homosexuals as outlined in the literature.

Accordingly, I suspect high levels ofpersonal religiosity to be related to

disapprovingattitudes toward homosexuals in society (Hypothesis 5c). In addition, I
expect ethnodoxy to be inversely associated with acceptance of homosexuals. In
other words, 1project high levels ofethnodoxy to be related to disapprovingattitudes
toward homosexuals in society (Hypothesis 5d).

Operationalizing Acceptance of Homosexuals

Acceptance of homosexuals is operationalized using three indicators: the right

for homosexuals to speak publically about same-sex marriage, the right for
homosexuals to teach in universities, and the inclusion of books about legalizing

same-sex marriages in public libraries. Table 33 presents the frequency distributions
for these measures. In short, a majority of ethnic Russians are opposed to

homosexuals speaking about same-sex marriage in public (69%), the inclusion of
books about legalizing same-sex marriage in public libraries (61.9%), and allowing
homosexuals to teach at the university (53.6%). Clearly, ethnic Russians are far less

accepting of homosexuals than they are of abortion, social issues that are commonly
described as being related in the literature.
As described above, the socio-historic context of Soviet and post-Soviet

Russia can help explain the legacy of public policy about homosexuality. But,
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Table 33. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitudes about Homosexuals

Frequency

Percentage

Allow homosexuals

Allowed

244

17.4

to speak publically
about same-sex

Prohibited

967

69

marriaSe

Not Sure

190

13.6

Allow homosexuals

Allowed

376

26.8

Prohibited

751

53.6

Not Sure

274

19.6

Allowed

319

22.8

867

61.9

215

15.3

to teach at

university
Allow books about
legalizing same-sex

marriage in local
library

Prohibited
Not Sure

«=1401

usually these efforts have failed to specifically investigate public opinion about this
issue. As with the issue of abortion, the role of religion is commonly cited as a major

factor for influencing attitudes about homosexuality. Therefore, it will be considered

in the following section. Then, acceptance toward homosexuality will be explored in
terms of its relationship with indicators of etlmodoxy. Administering these empirical

analyses will contribute to the sparse literature on public perception of homosexuality
in contemporary Russia while further exploring the scope of etlmodoxy across other
social attitudes.

Religion and Acceptance of Homosexuals in Post-Communist Russia
Public positions against homosexuality in society among key figures in the

Church emphasize the role of religion on this issue as well. However, the public
pronouncement about the 'dangers' of homosexuality from religious leaders,
unofficial or official, is one issue. The popular perceptions and acceptance of
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homosexuality is a different problem and, as the previous literature review denotes,

an area largely under-researched. The following analysis contributes by exploring the
relationship between religiosity and popular acceptance of homosexuals.

Below, Table 34 presents the crosstabulation results between indicators of

religiosity and acceptance of certain rights for homosexuals. As expected based on
the frequency distributions above, most ethnic Russians prohibit rights for

homosexuals, regardless of differences in religiosity. However, some variations still
exist. For instance, a larger proportion of religious believers would deny rights for

homosexuals compared to unbelievers and atheists. A higher percentage of

respondents who hold more religious beliefs are not accepting of rights for
homosexuals than those who have some or few beliefs. Similar results are seen

among avidchurch attendees as well. Curiously, however, respondents who attend

several times a year have larger proportions of respondents that would deny rights for
homosexuals than any other group, even those attending weekly or monthly.

Moreover, in some cases, respondents attending church infrequently or not at all are
less willing to grant rights to homosexuals.

This finding goes contrary to conventional wisdom about the relationship
between church attendance and attitudes toward social issues like homosexuality and

abortion (especially in the United States). I propose that this is probably an artifact of
the unique social demographics of contemporary Russia. For instance, rural churches

were usually the first to close and the lastto re-open after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, the allocation of church restoration funds was often directed
toward urban versus rural churches (Davis, 2003). Thus, surveys show that rural
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Table 34. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Attitudes about
Homosexuals

Religious
Person

Cliristian

Beliefs

Prohibit

Prohibit

homosexuals

books about

to speak
publically

to teach at

legalizing

university

same-sex

about same-

marriage m

sex marriage

local library

Believer

72.6

57.5

66.7

Undecided

67.6

50.3

59.4

Unbeliever

65.3

50.3

53.4

Atheist

51.3

42.1

46.1

Not sure

62.2

40.5

59.5

19.377*

18.934*

24.770**

Many

74.1

61.7

70.3

Some

70

53.5

61.5

63.5

46.6

54.6

e
Core

Prohibit
homosexuals

Few
Gamma

Church

Weekly/monthly

Attendance

Several times a year
Yearly/less than
yearly

.159**

7 JO***

.188***

65

45.6

59.4

76.1

61.3

67.5

68.3

54.9

61.4

Never

66.2

50.1

59.4

Gamma

.064*

.043**

.052

* p < .05; ** p < .01; ***/><.001

residents have larger proportions of non-attendees than urban residents, typically
because there is no church to attend (Table 35). Moreover, urban residents are more

likely to be higher educated and younger, attributes that are often associated with
more tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals. All of which makes the finding about

church attendance and attitudes toward homosexuals less surprising. Beyond the

scope of this paper, the consequence of church attendance in post-communist Russia
is one area of research lacking thorough examination.

173

Table 35. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Church Attendance and Place of

Residence

Rural

Urban

Monthly or more

9.4

12

Several times a year

19.7

24.4

Yearly/less than yearly

25.8

31

Never

45.2

Gamma

.797***

* p < .05; **p< .01; *** p < .001

The relationship between religiosity and acceptance of homosexuals in society

is not that surprising given the previous literature and the socio-historic context of
Russia. Furthermore, as illustrated in the preceding chapters, the ROC has become
one of the most trusted institutions in society, thereby providing a significant resource

of knowledge on perplexing modern social issues such as homosexuality. Indeed,
affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy has become an important element for being Russian

today. The next section continues this investigation byexploring the relationship
between attitudes toward homosexuals and indicators of ethnodoxy.

Ethnodoxy and Acceptance of Homosexuals in Post-Communist Russia
As with attitudes toward abortion, it is important that exploring social issues

like acceptance of homosexuals in society be done in order to better understand what
it means to be Russian in contemporary post-communist society. Again, previous

chapters show that belief in ethnodoxy is generally salient across social, religious, and
political attributes. However, some variations exist according to common differences
cited in the literature along with the unique socio-historical context inherent in the
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Russian case. The relationship between attitudes toward homosexuals and ethnodoxy
is no different.

As presented in Table 36, large proportions of respondents, regardless of their
attitudes toward homosexuals in society, adhere to ethnodoxy. However, a higher

percentage of respondents who prohibit rights for homosexuals also adhere to soft and
hard ethnodoxy. Given the Church's clear public and doctrinal opposition to gay

rights, the relationship between anti-homosexuality and ethnodoxy is not surprising.
Furthermore, acceptance toward homosexuality may be understood as a human rights

issue specific to the West. Rahman discussed this in his study of gay Muslims, noting
sexual diversity as "antithetical" to non-Western cultures (2010). Therefore, due to
the anti-Western element inherent in ethnodox beliefs, acceptance of homosexuals

could be considered anti-Russian and just another negative influence from the

'soulless' West. In fact, the largest gap between respondents who allow and prohibit

rights for homosexuals resides in the beliefthat Western churches undermine
Russians and their traditions.

To further test this idea, Table 37 presents crosstabulation results between
indicators of anti-West sentiments with attitudes toward homosexuals. Clearly, a

higher percentage of respondents who oppose democracy and agree that Western

influences are dangerous, also prohibit rights to homosexuals. In short, negative
attitudes toward homosexuals in society are evidently linked with anti-Western

sentiments as well as beliefs in ethnodoxy. As developed in the theoretical

foundation of ethnodoxy in the beginning of this study, a key component in this belief
system is the strict understanding of who is and is not Russian. Any characteristic or
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Table 36. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes about Homosexuals and Indicators of Ethnodoxy
No longer

Hard Ethnodox}'
Non-Russian
Only in Russia

Soft Ethnodox}'
Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Churches

always

protect Russian

richer in their

Orthodox

Orthodox from

soul and

opponents

stronger in

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

converted from

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

their beliefs

their traditions

another

religion

than Western

nations
Allow

Allowed

27

46.7

41.8

42.2

79.5

65.6

73.4

homosexuals to

speak
publically

Prohibited

37.3

57.2

52

59.5

87.8

79.6

78.4

about same-sex

Not Sure

27.9

53.2

44.2

43.7

80

65.8

67.4

Gamma

-.090***

010***

- 034***

-.034***

.020***

001***

- Oil***

Allowed

29

49.7

44.7

46.3

83.5

73.4

13.1

Prohibited

40.5

58.7

54.6

60.7

88.3

78.7

79.2

Not Sure

24.5

51.1

40.5

47.8

79.6

68.6

70.4

Gamma

.250***

.145***

.209***

2^4***

jg4***

^7£***

Allowed

24.8

48.6

38.2

45.5

81.5

69.6

76.8

Prohibited

38.9

57.4

54.9

60.3

87.7

79.7

77.9

Not Sure

29.8

53.5

42.3

43.3

81.4

66

67.4

Gamma

-.057***

.001***

- 013***

-.058***

.012***

-.045***

-.125***

marriage

Allow

homosexuals to
teach at

university

Allow books

1Q1***

about

legalizing
same-sex

marriage in
local library

p < .05: ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 37. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Anti-West Sentiments and Attitudes

against Rights for Homosexuals

Democracy leads

Agree

Prohibit

Prohibit

Prohibit books

homosexuals to

homosexuals to

about

speak
publically

teach at

legalizing

university

same-sex

about same-sex

marriage in

marriage

local library

58

60.5

57.6

Disagree

30.8

28.8

30.7

Unsure

11.2

10.8

11.8

Gamma

22?***

?^y***

yj2***

to disorder

Arrange life to

Agree

58.4

61

58.8

Disagree

29.1

27.4

28.8

Unsure

12.5

11.6

12.3

Gamma

.210***

186***

y7?***

Western standards
is harmful

*p < .05; **p< .01; *** p < .001

trait outside the mold set by elites disseminating these beliefs - i.e., pro-Slavic

political and ROC religious leaders and platforms - is not included and instead
demonized. Such rigid understanding of the social, religious, and political attributes

of Russian identity thereby necessitates an investigation into the tolerance of'others/
In this way, the next chapter explores dimensions of intoleranceand xenophobia
among adherents to ethnodoxy.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore popular attitudes about key social
issues and how these perceptions are related to beliefs in ethnodoxy. To accomplish
this task, attitudes about abortion and rights for homosexuals in society were
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analyzed. The results from these analyses provide greater insight into the everyday

perceptions of contemporary etlmic Russians rarely discussed in the literature. Based
on the unique socio-historic context of the Russian case, opinions about abortion and

homosexuals appear to stem from two existing, and sometimes conflicting,

ideologies. On the one hand, a residual Soviet-era 'abortion culture' remains in
effect, albeit waning over time. As Karpov and Kaariainen (2005) described, this
'abortion culture' maintained the normalization of abortion as an accepted solution to

burdensome financial and personal situations. On the other hand, the post-communist

resurgence of pro-Slavic nationalism, based partly on the increased influence of the
ROC, is adamantly opposed to the act of abortion and perceives homosexuality as a
sin worth criminalizing.

These two ideologies more obviously conflict concerning the issue of abortion
since homosexuality has been negatively viewed during both communist and post-

communist Russian history. However, as the analyses in the chapter suggest, the
Soviet-era 'abortion culture' may be fading. For instance, proportions of Russians

that accept abortion for any reason have decreased over the past 20 years by as much
as 20%. Another way to explore this trend is to examine support by age group. Table
38 presents crosstabulation results between age group and indicators of attitudes
toward abortion and homosexuality. Although the relationship is weak, older cohorts

clearly have more accepting attitudes toward abortion. Whereas, cohorts born at the
end or after the collapse of the Soviet Union, display less accepting attitudes about
abortion. The exact opposite is true for attitudes about homosexuals. Indeed,

younger cohorts are far more accepting of rights for homosexuals in society. This
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Table 38. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes toward Social Issues and

Age

oAwtiaurdce :AboHuaolmitvo

30 or

If pregnancy is
danger to woman
If child is expected

o

o

31-45

46-60

Over 60

Gamma

23.1

24.1

25.4

27.4

.136

23.8

24.5

24.6

27.1

.183**

23.5

23.5

27.9

25

.083*

23.8

26.9

26.6

22.6

75^***

36.5

24.6

28.3

10.7

-170***

29

28.7

23.4

18.9

- 759***

33.5

27

26.3

13.2

7g j ***

less

to have defects
If women is not
married

If couple does not
want more children
Allow

homosexuals to

speak
Allow

«3 8

homosexuals to
teach
Allow books about

legalizing samesex

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

table identifies two main patterns. First, the Soviet-era 'abortion culture' is

subsiding, being replaced by systems of belief less accepting of abortion. Second,
younger cohorts of ethnic Russians hold more liberal views about rights for
homosexuals. Further illustrating this second pattern, Table 39 presents the results

from crosstabulating indicators of anti-West sentiments and age groups. Accordingly,

younger cohorts are more accepting of democracy and Western influences than older
respondents.

While further analysis concerning attitudes toward Western influences is

pursued in the next chapter, the results above offer important insight into the current
make-up of ethnic Russians, their attitudes about social issues, the ideological
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Table 39. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Anti-West Sentiments and Age
Democracy leads

30 or less

31-45

46-60

Over 60

Agree

38.3

48.5

56.4

65.6

Disagree

47.7

42.7

31.3

19.2

14

8.8

12.3

15.2

to disorder

Unsure

.210*

Gamma

Arrange life to

Agree

36.7

51.5

57.8

66.6

Disagree

48.4

34.5

28.2

17.4

Unsure

14.9

14

14

16

Western standards
is harmful

Gamma

.221*

*/?<.001

frameworks from which these beliefs have been based, and how these ideologies are

changing. The empirical evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that ethnodoxy
is becoming a more widespread source for generating opinions and attitudes about
social issues among contemporary Russians. This is shown in the relationship
between religion, and more specifically the importance and role of the ROC,
ethnodoxy, and attitudes toward abortion and homosexuals in society. While the
belief in ethnodoxy is held by a majority of contemporary ethnic Russians, regardless
of orientation toward social issues, the vaiiations that do exist confirm the hypotheses

proposed earlier. Religion is weakly associated with attitudes toward abortion, but
nonetheless related. Further evidence suggests that the Soviet-era 'abortion culture'

is waning, and being replaced with new systems of belief. As this paper purports, one

such ideology is a pro-Slavic, ROC supported, nationalist ideology. Indeed, the belief
in ethnodoxy is similar across attitudes toward abortion, confirming the limited
influence of the traditional 'abortion culture.' In tenns of attitudes toward rights for
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homosexuals in society, both religiosity and adherence to ethnodoxy are related to
negative orientations.

In short, the findings in this chapter continue to confirm the conclusions in

this paper, which posit that a new ideological framework is being created during the
aftermath of the Soviet Union. This ideology, i.e., ethnodoxy, draws from traditional

conceptualizations of Russian identity, linking religion, ethnicity, and nationality as
compulsory characteristics for what it means to be Russian today. Furthermore, these
results contribute to the idea that ethnodoxy has become an important component of a
worldview for many ethnic Russians.
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CHAPTER XII: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, XENOPHOBIA, AND ETHNODOXY

The issue of tolerance and xenophobia is of particular interest when
examining the ideology of ethnodoxy. Again, ethnodoxy is a belief system that

separates individuals into in/out-groups. For instance, an individual is either etlmic
Russian and affiliated with Russian Orthodoxy, or something else. This may result in

special treatment for the dominant religion, ethnicity, and nationality, while viewing
all others as inferior. Particular to the ideological framework of ethnodoxy is the
separation of individuals and groups based on religious affiliation. Therefore, it is
pertinent that this analysis investigates the tolerance of other religious groups.

Furthermore, ethnodoxy depicts the West as harmful and an influence that threatens
the traditions of Russia. Therefore, xenophobia is addressed by exploring popular

opinions about the West and its influence on Russia. The central question for this
chapter is: how is ethnodoxy related to indicators ofreligious tolerance and
xenophobia?

Religious Tolerance in Contemporary Russia

The last fifty years has been a crucial period in tolerance research. Studying
tolerance toward out-groups is conceptually and empirically epitomized in Samuel
Stouffer's Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955), which set the stage

for future research. According to Stouffer, tolerance referred to the allowance of civil
liberties to social out-groups. While follow-up studies have complemented (e.g.,
Davis, 1975; Cutler and Kaufman, 1975; Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter, 1976;
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McClosky and Brill, 1983), challenged (e.g., Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus, 1979,
1982), and expanded (e.g., Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, and Hout, 1989;

Mueller, 1988; Armstrong and Karpov, 2010) Stouffer's findings, his conceptual
approach to tolerance has generally remained the same: the emphasis of civil liberties
as a way to gauge political, religious, and social tolerance of out-groups.

For the purpose of this study, I will approach religious tolerance similarly. In
particular I refer to Karpov and Lisovskaya's conceptualization of religious tolerance

(2007), which builds on Stouffer's work on political tolerance along with Zagorin's
definition of religious toleration. According to Zagorin, religious toleration "implies
religious freedom in some measure" and is based on the principle
.. .that society and the state should, as a matter of right, extend
complete freedom of religious belief and expression to all their members and
citizens and should refrain from imposing any religious tests, doctrines, or
form of worship or religious association upon them (2003, p.7).

Coupled with Stouffer's approach toward political tolerance as the willingness to

grant civil liberties, Karpov and Lisovskayadeveloped the following definition.
Religious tolerance is "the willingness to grant religious freedom to people and

groups of other faiths" (Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007 p. 883). Based on the tasks in
this chapter, Karpov and Lisovskaya's definition of religious tolerance is used to
better understand the creation of boundaries between in/out-groups as specified by the

tenets of etlmodoxy. Doing so further contributes to the exploration of the scope of
ethnodoxy among contemporary ethnic Russians.

Research on religious tolerance has often explored the influence of religiosity
toward dispositions of ethnic, social, and religious out-groups. While some have
hesitated when making the link between religiosity and tolerance (e.g., Kunovich and
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Hodson, 1999)28, most agree that the relationship is strong regardless ofreligious,
ethnic, temporal, or spacial context (e.g., Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello, 2002;

Glock and Stark, 197; Airport and Ross, 1967)29. While this body ofliterature has
provided important contributions to the field, few have explored the relationship
between religion and ethnicity and its influence on religious tolerance. This study

fills this gap by examining the relationship between adhering to etlmodoxy and
religious tolerance among contemporary Russians.

The literature on religious tolerance in Russia includes two main emphases:

doctrinal (i.e. what does the Russian Orthodoxy Church have to say about religious
tolerance) and socio-political (i.e., what does public opinion and policy say about

religious tolerance). Often, these issues are framed for gauging how compatible
Russian Orthodoxy is, and Russia in general, with Western democratic ideals (e.g.,
Levinskaya, 2007; Stockl, 2006; Borowik, 2006).

The doctrinal emphasis refers to issues of religious tolerance relating to

official Church positions, theological interpretations, and the role of the Church in
Russian society. For instance, Papademetriou examined early and contemporary
illustrations of Orthodox Christianity as basically tolerant of other faiths, "especially
In their study, Kunovich and Hodson examined the relationship between religiosity (i.e., church
attendance and religious beliefs) and ethnic intolerance in Croatia. Against conventional thought, they
found no causal relationship between religiosity and ethnic intolerance. Instead, they posited
competition for resources, conflict, and the polarization of groups to be the more likely causal
mechanism (1999).

29 Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello examined the relationship between religiosity andethnic prejudice in
eleven European countries. Theyconcluded that Catholics and Protestants were moreprejudice than

thenon-religious. In addition, church attendance and religious beliefincreased the likelihood of
prejudice, while religious particularism decreased the chances (2002). However, Glock and Stark
efforts on anti-Semitism in the United States does emphasize the influence of religious particularism

inherent in Christianity toward religious intolerance (1973). A final example rests in Allport and
Ross's study on the relationship between religiosity and prejudice in the United States. While they
alsonotethe relationship between church attendance and prejudice, they also found it to be curvilinear.
In addition, they point out how differences in religiosity, extrinsic (someone who uses religion) versus
intrinsic (someone who lives their religion), may also influence the level of prejudice (1967).
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among the monotheistic religions" (2002, p. 105). As Papademetriou explained,

Patriarch Metrophanes III of Constantinople "issued a sharp condemnation of the
maltreatment of the Jews in Crete in an encyclical written in 1568" (2002, p. 105).

More recently, Patriarch Bartholomew offered the following statement to the United
Nations: "From an Orthodox Christian perspective, the virtues of diversity and

tolerance provide the fundamentals for a Christian life" (1994). Stockl noted the
'westernization' of Orthodox theology as indicated in the adoption of'modem' (in
the Western sense) liberal ideals (2006). However, some consider the Church to be

too firmly rooted in a religiocentric past memory to be compatible with modern day
issues of diversity, pluralism, and tolerance (Levinskaya, 2007). Thus, as Walters

succinctly wrote, the ROC is faced with two possible scenarios: "outward looking or
inward looking" (2007, p.853).

In addition to analyzing Church positions, official or unofficial, on issues of

tolerance and pluralism, the everyday and popular acceptance or rejection of such
views is also examined. Indeed, the existence of genuine religious tolerance among

contemporary Russians is a complicated issue. As Bahry, Boaz, and Gordon noted,

even "people who profess democratic values (demophiles) appear to be all too willing
to deny rights to groups they dislike" (1997, p.484). Verkhovsky's study on Russian
Orthodox nationalists, although in no way representative of all ethnic Russians or
adherents to Russian Orthodoxy, highlights how the ideology of this group "focuses

both on its principal enemy, the Antichrist, and on those enemies subordinate to the
Antichrist: Jews, Catholics, the West, the New World Order and so on" (2004, p. 127).

As some have pointed out, the basis of intolerance may have more to do with the
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particular social context than on doctrinal creed. For instance, Bahry et al. argued
that unwillingness to grant basic civil rights, even among demophiles, is best
explained as a logical and rational approach in an unstable political climate (1997).
Karpov and Lisovskaya also acknowledged the importance of socio-political
conditions in order to understand religious intolerance in contemporary Russia (2007,
2008). Results from a Russian national survey showed levels of intolerance to be

highest among ethnic Russians residing in non-Muslim regions as well as in the
tumultuous Caucasus. They concluded that intolerance in this case has more to do

with "reactionary ideological influences and regional socio-political conditions than
with Orthodox and Muslim core religious beliefs and practices" (2008, p.361).

However, religious intolerance is not limited to Muslims. Karpov and Lisovskaya
found that "Western Churches are the out-groups least tolerated by both the Orthodox
and Muslims" (2007, p.891). In addition, "only a minority of the self-identified
Orthodox and Muslims would allow Jews any religious activities" (Karpov and
Lisovskaya, 2007, p.888).
Clearly, religious (in)tolerance in Russia is a complicated issue. On the one
hand, most literature describes a highly intolerant religious landscape for anyone not
Russian Orthodox. On the other hand, some describe the ROC and its theology as

inherently tolerant, celebrating the ideals of diversity and pluralism. One of the tasks
in this chapter is to further explore these issues by examining surveys of actual
attitudes rather than normative statements.
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Hypotheses

To do this, two non-Orthodox religious groups are analyzed. Muslims were

chosen as an example of a traditional non-Orthodox religion and WTestern churches as

an example of a new and foreign non-Orthodox group. Based on the literature, I
expect ethnic Russians who affiliate with Russian Orthodoxy to have overall
intolerant attitudes toward non-Orthodox religious groups. In particular, I expect

mostethnic Orthodox Russians to deny the rights ofreligiousfreedom for Muslims

and Western churches (Hypothesis 7a). According to the theoretical foundation of

this study (i.e., ethnodoxy), which emphasizes in-group preference, special privileges,

and status, / expect individuals with high levels ofethnodoxy to have high levels of
religious intolerance (Hypothesis 7b).

Operationalization and Frequency Distributions of Religious Tolerance
The first task in this chapter is to explore attitudes of religious tolerance and

how they are related to etlmodoxy. In particular, attitudes toward Muslims, new
churches, and opinions about legal rights for religions in society are addressed.
Given the focus on tolerance toward religious out-groups, respondents were selected
based on two characteristics, self-identification as ethnically Russian and Russian

Orthodox. In this way, the following analysis explores attitudes from respondents
who share a key characteristic of etlmodoxy (i.e., self identification as ethnically
Russian and Russian Orthodox). Attitudes toward Muslims and Western churches are

operationalized by asking respondents if they would allow a church or mosque to be
built in their community, preaching in public, publication and distribution of
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literature, respective religious schools, teaching respective religions in secondary
schools, preaching on television, religious charity activities, or the collection of
money for respective religious needs.
Tables 40 and 41 present the frequency distributions of these indicators. In

general, ethnic Orthodox Russians appear to be more tolerant of Muslims than of new

churches. Specifically, most respondents would allow the construction of newr
mosques (56.6%) but not churches (58.1%), charity activities for Muslims (62,8%)
but not for new churches (46.7%), and the collection of money for Islamic religious

needs (48%) but not for new churches (58.3%). However, a majority of respondents
are less willing to allow Muslims to preach in public (57.1%), on TV (51.8%), or to

allow the teaching of Islam in public schools (74.4%). Respondents are even more

unwilling to allow new churches these same rights (70.5, 66.6, and 80.4%

respectively). These preliminary results depict ethnic Orthodox Russians as less
tolerant of Western churches compared to Muslims, but generally intolerant of both.
Furthermore, these results correspond with findings from previous studies as well
(Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008).

Opinions about legal rights for religions in society is operationalized by

asking respondents if all religions should have equal rights or if certain religions
should have special privileges. Frequency distributions of these indicators show

paradoxical results (see Table 42). While a majority of ethnic Orthodox Russians
agrees that all religions should have equal rights (52.1%), most believe the Russian
Orthodox Church should be granted special privileges (73%) while Islam should not

(78.9%). Furtherpuzzling is the distribution of respondents when asked if all
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Table 40. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Willingness to Grant Rights for
Muslims

Allow new mosque
in city

Allow preaching
Islam in public

Allow Muslim

literature

Allow Islamic

schools

Allow teaching of
Islam in schools

Allow Islamic

preaching on TV

Allow Islamic

charity activities

Allow Islamic

fundraising

Frequency

Percentage

Allow

754

56.6

Prohibit

433

32.5

Unsure

144

10.8

Allow

393

29.5

Prohibit

760

57.1

Unsure

178

13.4

Allow

580

43.6

Prohibit

598

T'T". 1

Unsure

164

12.3

Allow

586

Prohibit

577

43.4

Unsure

168

12

Allow

177

13

Prohibit

990

74

Unsure

164

12

Allow

447

33

Prohibit

689

51

Unsure

195

14

Allow

836

62

Prohibit

338

25

Unsure

157

11

Allow

639

48

Prohibit

502

37.7

Unsure

190

14.3

n=1331
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Table 41. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Willingness to Grant Rights for
New Churches

Frequency
Allow new church

in city

Allow preaching
new religion in
public
Allow new church
literature

Allow new church
schools

Allow teaching new
church in schools

Allow new church

preaching on TV

Allow new church

charity activities

Allow new church

fundraising

Percentage

Allow

384

28

Prohibit

773

58

Unsure

174

13

Allow

232

17

Prohibit

938

70

Unsure

161

12

Allow

320

24

Prohibit

851

63.9

Unsure

160

12

Allow

283

21.3

Prohibit

886

66.6

Unsure

162

12.2

Allow

109

8.2

Prohibit

1070

80.4

Unsure

152

11.4

Allow

259

19.5

Prohibit

887

66.6

Unsure

185

13.9

Allow

534

40.1

Prohibit

622

46.7

Unsure

175

13.1

Allow

376

28.2

Prohibit

776

58.3

Unsure

179

13.4

_ _ _ _ _

190

Table 42. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Willingness to Grant Religious

Rights
Frequency

Percentage

Agree

971

73

Disagree

250

18.8

Unsure

110

8.3

Agree

114

8.6

1051

78.9

Unsure

166

12.5

All Russian traditional

Agree

490

36.8

religious should have
equal rights compared
to foreign religions

Disagree

612

45.8

ROC should have some

privileges

Islam should have

some privileges
Disagree

17.2

Unsure

All religions should
have equal rights in

Agree

694

52.1

Russia

Disagree

493

37

Unsure

144

10.8

«=1331

traditional religions should be granted special privileges. Nearly 20% were unsure,

while the remainder are split between agreeing (36.8%) and disagreeing (45.8%).

While requiring further analysis, these results may signify a clash between genuine
attitudes toward non-Orthodox religions and the social desirability to allow all groups

the same rights and freedoms in society. Interestingly, respondents were first asked if
they thought all religions should have equal rights. Then, they were asked if the
ROC, Islam, and traditional religions in general should be granted privileges. The
initial 'tolerance' among responses in this first question (i.e., all religions should have

equal rights) may be the result of respondents unwilling or hesitant to admit that
certain religious groups should be treated differently but were more 'certain' when
asked directly about specific faiths.
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The Relationship between Religious Tolerance and Ethnodoxy
Clearly, ethnic Russians that identify with Russian Orthodoxy show intolerant

attitudes toward other religions, both traditional religions in Russia like Islam and,
especially, foreign religious groups. These results are not particularly surprising
given the tenets of ethnodoxy. This section explores the relationship between
religious intolerance and adherence to ethnodoxy more closely.

Since the task of this section is to examine general attitudes of religious
tolerance, the indicators described in the previous section (i.e., willingness to grant

rights to Muslims and new churches) were tested for underlying themes and compiled
into one variable. To do this, principles components analysis was administered for
both sets of items. A single underlying factor was extracted for each group,

suggesting one general theme (i.e., religious intolerance) is captured for each set of
items (see Table 43). This is important as it implies that despite the different types of

rights in question (i.e., freedom of speech, religious publication, religion in schools,
etc.), etlmic Orthodox Russians approach them similarly for both Muslims and
Western churches. The two factor scores (again, one for tolerance toward Muslims
and another for tolerance toward Western churches) were correlated with indicators
of ethnodoxy (see Table 44).
Measures of tolerance toward both Muslims and Western churches are

significantly correlated with measures of both soft and hard ethnodoxy. The negative
association implies that as soft and hard ethnodoxy scores increase, the factor score
for religious tolerance decreases. These findings confirm the expectation concerning
the relationship between religious tolerance and ethnodoxy. For both traditional and
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Table 43. Component Matrix for Indicators of Tolerance toward Muslims and
Western Churches

Variables

Rights for Muslims

Rights for Western
Churches

Allow new mosque/church

.777

.838

Allow preaching in public

.754

.824

Allow religious literature

.856

.878

Allow religious schools

.816

.852

.564

.668

Allow preaching on TV

.762

.849

Allow religious charity activities

.765

.757

Allow religious fundraising

.812

.842

Eigenvalue

4.713

5.327

Total variance explained

58.9%

66.6%

Allow teaching religion in public
schools

Table 44. Correlation Matrix between Measures

of Religious

Tolerance and

Etlmodoxy
Tolerance toward

Tolerance toward

Muslims

Western Churches

Soft Etlmodoxy

-.105*

-.179*

Hard Ethnodoxy

-.108*

-.168*

*p<M

foreign religious groups, ethnic Orthodox Russians are not particularly willing to

grant religious freedoms and rights. Furthermore, these attitudes are associated with
respondent's adherence to ethnodoxy. In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates how
rigid boundaries are created based on the characteristics emphasized according to the

ideological framework of ethnodoxy. Regardless of the historical presence of a
religious group, a non-Orthodox is non-Orthodox and is therefore non-Russian. This
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notion of rigid boundary making is continued in the next section by focusing on
xenophobia and attitudes toward the WTest.

Xenophobia in Contemporary Russia

Closely linked with religious intolerance are attitudes of xenophobia.

According to Pain, xenophobiarefers to "various expressions of intolerance towards
groups which are perceived in the public consciousness as 'strangers.' The term

xenophobia itself signifies fears, suspicion, and ill will (i.e., phobias) towards
strangers" (2007, p.895). Indeed, targets of xenophobia and religious intolerance

overlap in thecaseof Western churches. Furthermore, xenophobic trends in
contemporary Russia are commonly described as being rooted in Russian Orthodoxy.
Sarkissian noted that while there are countless benefits that stem from a tight

church-state relationship, which include religious education and property
rehabilitation, there is also evidence of increasing right-wing, xenophobic, fascist, and

nationalistic attitudes (2010). White also discussed rises in xenophobia due to

Orthodox jurisdictionalism, where expansion of exclusive ethno-national identity is
linked with Orthodoxy across Europe (2007). Similarly, Turunen explored evidence
of Orthodox monarchism in Russia, which emphasizes the element of messiahism

implying ethnic Russian Orthodox as the 'chosen people' (2007). Filatov and Lunkin
described the exclusive and privileged status of the ROC as emphasizingthe
worldview of maintaining the 'Russian Civilization' (2010). As described by Pain,

current trends of xenophobia among ethnic Russians are due to political, economic,
and social instabilityduring the 'traumatic transformation' of the late twentieth

194

century; where "traditionalism is intensified, and manifestations of xenophobia
become commonplace" (2007, p.9()2). Pain continued,

Thus, we see that the process of consolidation within these
'primordial' communities can cause an upsurge in xenophobia, since the same
social-psychological mechanisms used to distinguish the in-group from the
out-group during the initial stages of the process of consolidation are at the
same time at the root of xenophobia as well (2007, p.902).

Others have similarly noted the link between traditionalism and xenophobia in

contemporary Russia. For instance, Plekon understood contemporary Orthodox
traditionalism to be "more akin to fundamentalism," resembling similar extremist

tendencies and xenophobic attitudes toward out-groups (2010). According to Plekon,
fundamentalists of Russian Orthodoxy have historically "decided to distance
themselves from Western culture, politics, and society, existing as a remnant or

enclave, awaiting the fall of the Soviet regime, the return of the monarchy and 'Holy
Russia,' the seamless unity of church and state they idealized" (2010, p.203).

Father Georgii Chistiakov's insight on the clash between religious tradition

andmodernity is especially revealing. According to Chistiakov, a "modern religious
society in Russia" has emerged, which is "xenophobic, closed, and highly intolerant
of other faiths and the West in general" (2006, p.13). For Chistiakov, the new

Orthodoxy has become a 'substitute ideology' in place of the failed Communist

paradigm, viewing others as the "bourgeois, enemy civilization in opposition to us"

(2006, p.13). In this way, Christianity is used as a mask - "not rooted in the life of
the divine service, the life of prayer, and the generally mystic life of Eastern

Christianity" (Chistiakov, 2006, p.13) - to maintain a pure Russian national identity.
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While doctrinal interpretation by Orthodox leaders and scholars is important,
understanding the popular perceptions about religious influences toward tolerance
and xenophobia is vital. Although some have explored xenophobia among everyday

Russians, usually these efforts focus on attitudes toward minority groups within
Russia. Ziemer's study on minority groups in southern Russia uncovered tactics

developed for these groups to survive a racist and xenophobic environment (2011).

Specifically, such groups have broadened their identity by creating a supra-ethnic
label, "Caucasian brotherhood," in order to close the gap between majority and

minority groups (2011). Based on national survey data, Alexseev's empirical
examination of xenophobic attitudes in contemporary Russia is particularly

interesting (2010). Alexseev concluded 1) ethnic minorities are less hostile to
migrants than ethnic Russians, 2) among national-level minorities, titular ethnic

groups are more intolerant than non-titular ethnic groups, and 3) tolerance and
intolerance are asymmetric and intolerant attitudes are usually "stronger and stickier"

(2010). Thus, according to Alexseev, what forms of intolerance and xenophobia do
exist in Russia today, may be difficult to remove.

As these studies show, xenophobia in contemporary Russia is clearly linked

with particular facets of Russian Orthodoxy. The collapse of the Sovietregime has

provoked a resurgence of traditionalism (Chistiakov, 2006), a historically reminiscent
definition of national identity (Plekon, 2010), and the strict delineation between

in/out-groups (Chistiakov, 2006; Pain, 2007). As many of these authors have noted,
the West has epitomized such an out-group, 'enemy,' or 'stranger.' These depictions

are familiar given what we know from Chapter IX on popular perceptions of Russia
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and levels of nationalism. The last task in this chapter is to further explore

xenophobia among contemporary ethnic Russians, the relationship between such
attitudes and religiosity, and its association with ethnodoxy.

Hypotheses

While this literature offers insightful depictions on tolerance and xenophobia

in contemporary Russia, most studies focus either on doctrinal interpretations and
official Church positions (e.g., Plekon, 2010; Pain, 2007; Dzhaloshinsky, 2006) or are

empirical assessments of hostility toward out-groups residing within Russian territory
(e.g., Yaz'kova, 2006; Ziemer, 2011). Few have explored xenophobic attitudes

toward groups outside of Russia.30 This study fills this gap by examining popular
perceptions of the West among contemporary ethnic Russians. Based on the research
described above, / expectmostethnic Russians to exhibit high levels ofxenophobia
towardthe West (Hypothesis 7c). Furthermore, the literature depicts Russian

Orthodoxy as a contributor of current xenophobic attitudes. Therefore, 1project a

positive relationship between indicators ofreligiosity andxenophobia (Hypothesis

7d). In addition, the conceptual apparatus used in this study (i.e., ethnodoxy) implies
a particularistic and exclusive understanding of out-groups, identifying the West as

especially harmful. Therefore, 1predict that iflevels ofethnodoxy increase, then
levels ofxenophobia toward the West will also increase (Hypothesis 7e).

30 Oneexception is Alexseev's study on xenophobia among both ethnic and ethnic non-Russians
(2010). However, this project focused primarily on attitudes toward specific minority groups, not, as I
have in this paper, assessing popular perceptions of the West.
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Operationalization and Frequency Distribution of Attitudes toward the West
Attitudes toward Western influence is operationalized with the following
survey indicators: if democracy leads to disorder in society, if Western governments

try to weaken Russia, if life would be better with more cooperation with the West,
and if attempts to arrange life according to Western standards is harmful. Since this

analysis focuses on general attitudes about the West, and not particular religious
traditions, respondents that identified as ethnic Russian were selected. Table 45

presents the frequency distribution of these indicators. Generally, ethnic Russians
appear to hold negative perceptions of Western influence. A majority of respondents
believe democracy leads to disorder (53.3%), that Western governments try to

weaken Russia (68.3%), and that attempts to arrange life in Russia according to
Western standards is harmful (54.3%). However, a large proportion of respondents

were either unsure (18.7%) or agreed (35%) that life would be better with more

cooperation with the West. It seems that while current perceptions of the West are
clearly negative, there is some willingness to admit that Western influences are not all
harmful.

The Relationship between Xenophobia and Religiosity
As indicated in the literature, the Russian Orthodox Church is commonly

described as hesitant, if not combative, against Western influences. Seen as a threat

to the traditional Russian way of life, this hesitation has long been present throughout
Russian history. Therefore, it should not be surprising that individuals who think
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Table 45. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Anti-West Attitudes
Democracy leads to

Frequency

Percentage

Agree

746

53.3

Disagree

477

34

Unsure

178

12.7

Agree

956

68.3

Disagree

253

18

Unsure

192

13.7

Agree

490

35

Disagree

649

46.3

Unsure

262

18.7

Agree

760

54.3

Disagree

434

31

relil4.8

14.8

disorder

Western

governments
weaken Russia

Life will be better
with more

cooperation with
West

Attempts to arrange

life according to
West is harmful

Unsure
«=1401

highly of the Church and identify religiously, may also adhere to anti-West rhetoric.
This is the supposition explored in this section.

To do this, the relationship between indicators of religiosity and anti-West

attitudes is analyzed. In particular, four items measuring common dimensions of

religiosity were included: if the respondent considers him/herself religious, number of
conventional Christian beliefs held, frequency of church attendance, and, since the

hypothesis guiding this analysis emphasize the influential role of the ROC, how much
confidence a respondent has in the Church. Table 46 presents the crosstabulation
results from this analysis. In general, these results do not offer conclusive empirical

support for the hypothesis that respondents with strong religiosity are more
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Table 46. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Attitudes toward the West

Confidence in ROC

Christian beliefs

Frequency of church

Western governments

Life will be worse with

Attemptsto arrange life

disorder

weaken Russia

more cooperation with

according to West is

West

harmful

Agree

54.2

68.9

45.8

55.8

Disagree

52.2

69.6

51.4

53.6

Unsure

44.6

55.4

36.1

j>7.j

Gamma

Religious person

Democracy leads to

.068'

.076*

.058'

/ ^o***

Believer

54.1

71.2

45.9

57.7

Undecided

53.5

64.5

45.6

52.8

LInbeliever

56.5

66.8

49.2

50.3

Atheist

36.8

63.2

42.1

44.7

Unsure

51.4

56.8

54.1

35.1

Gamma

.033

.099

.002

.122'

Many-

>2.5

72.7

43

57.4

Some

53

67.4

47.4

54.3

Few

54

64.9

48.2

51.4

Gamma

.010

.097

.018

.089

Weekly/monthly

48.1

69.4

40.6

58.1

Several a year

59.2

70.2

48.5

54.6

Yearly/less than a year

51.3

66.4

42.9

54.2

Never

52.5

68

49.5

52.9

Gamma

.01:

.031

.021

.037

attendance

to

8

7?<.05, **p< .01, ***p<.00\

xenophobic. In fact, some relationships depict the opposite. Let us examine these
relationships separately.

One would suppose that of all the indicators of religiosity, a respondent's
confidence in the ROC would show the clearest relationship with ant-West

sentiments. This is not necessarily the case. Indeed, respondents who are confident
in the ROC have only slightly larger proportions that hold anti-West attitudes

compared to those who are not confident or are unsure. In fact, respondents

untrusting of the ROC have a higher percentage that believes life will be worse if
Russia cooperates with the West. The relationships associated with this particular
indicator of xenophobia are continually perplexing, as seen below.

In terms of whether respondents consider themselves religious, support for the

hypothesis that strong religiosity is related with xenophobia is unconvincing. While
self-described believers have larger proportions that think Western government

weaken Russia (71.2%) and that attempts to arrange life according to the West is
harmful (57.7%), the difference between respondents who are undecided, unbelievers,
and even atheists in some cases, are not considerable. In fact, unbelievers have the

largest proportion (56.5%) that believe democracy leads to disorder and respondents
unsure of religious belonging have the highest percentage (54.1%) that think life will
be worse if Russia cooperates with the West.

Similar contradictory results are found among the relationships between
Cliristian beliefs and anti-West attitudes. Although respondents who hold many

Christian beliefs have the largest proportion that believe attempts to arrange life

according to the West is harmful (57.4%) and that Western governments undermine
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Russia (72.7%), the differences between respondents who hold some or few beliefs
are negligible. Moreover, respondents with few Christian beliefs have the highest
percentage that believe life will be worse with more cooperation with the West
(48.2%) and that democracy leads to disorder (54%). Further inconsistent is the

relationship between church attendance and anti-West attitudes. Respondents who
never attend have the highest percentage that believe life will be worse without more

Western cooperation (49.5%) and the differences between those who attend are not

very revealing. For instance, compared to those who attend more regularly,
respondents who attend several times a year have the largest proportion that believe
democracy leads to disorder (59.2%). Finally, frequency of church attendance does

not seem to matter regarding the belief that WTestern governments undermine Russia
or that attempts tot arrange Russian life according to the West is harmful.
In short, the results from this analysis does not support the hypothesis that

religiosity has a positive relationship with xenophobia. In most cases the relationship
is inconclusive, or even negative. This is not to say, however, that these findings do
not still say something about contemporary ethnic Russians. In fact, these results say
a great deal about most ethnic Russians as having anti-Western attitudes, regardless
of differences in religiosity. In other words, xenophobic attitudes appear to have less

to do with religious conviction and/or influence from the ROC, and more about being
generally ethnic Russian. As the preceding chapters show, ethnodoxy has become a
prominent ideology among contemporaiy ethnic Russians. Therefore, I suspect that
the relationship between xenophobia and ethnodoxy will be far more apparent.
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The Relationship between Xenophobia and Ethnodoxy

As the previous chapters show, ethnodoxy has become a widely accepted
belief system among most ethnic Russians today. Again, the belief that being

Russian Orthodox is necessary in order to be 'truly' Russian, and vice versa, is held
by a majority of Russians, regardless of social, religious, or political orientations and
attitudes. In particular, respondents with different levels of religiosity were shown to

agree with the tenets of ethnodoxy. In other words, even respondents with weak
levels of religiosity adhere to ethnodoxy, despite the importance of claiming a

religious identity as part and parcel for being Russian. Indeed, the role of religion in
ethnodoxy is limited. While it is important in terms of initial affiliation (i.e., to be
Russian is to be Orthodox and to be Orthodox is to be Russian) and the maintenance

of that relationship (i.e., state protection of the ROC), other traditional dimensions of

religiosity (e.g., frequency of attendance, belief, and even confidence in the Church)
seem superfluous.

The results from this chapter confirm this idea. Although the Russian
Orthodox Church has traditionally taken positions against Western influences, the

level of religiosity among contemporary ethnic Russians does not seem to matter in
terms of anti-West attitudes. Indeed, xenophobic attitudes are held by a majority of
ethnic Russians, regardless of the level of religiosity. Therefore, I argue that

xenophobic and anti-West orientations are perpetuated by a different belief system.
Specifically, I suggest that ethnodoxy has become such a belief system and that,
while certainly influenced by religious sources (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy), is a separate

ideology that includes beliefs about the West as harmful and a threat to the traditions
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of contemporary ethnic Russians. The following section explores the empirical
evidence that can support this idea.
In order to do this, indicators of xenophobic attitudes and indicators of

etlmodoxy were crosstabulated. The results from this analysis are presented in Table
47. In short, two themes can be extracted from these findings. First, a majority of

ethnic Russians, regardless of attitudes toward the WTest, adhere to all indicators of
soft etlmodoxy and most indicators of hard ethnodoxy. Nonetheless, some
differences exist across variations in anti-West sentiments. Second, spanning each

indicatorof xenophobia, respondents that agree with anti-West statements have the

largest proportion that adheres to every tenet of ethnodoxy. In other words, some
adherence to ethnodoxy is held by a majority of etlmic Russians, no matter their

perceptions of the West. However, what differences there are in perceptions of the
West and its influence on Russia is associated with ethnodoxy in a positive direction.

Clearly, ethnodoxy has become a powerful ideology and source for

understanding the world. The relationship between ethnodox beliefs and xenophobic
attitudes about the West confirm the breadth and depth of these beliefs across

contemporary Russians. However, these findings do not completely ignore the
influence of the ROC concerning these matters. As the previous literature depicts, the

prevalence of negative opinions about the West and its influence among popular
Church leaders certainly carries some weight. Simply, the results in this section

depict the Churchas a sourceof xenophobia but working as part of a much broader
ideological framework, i.e., ethnodoxy. As demonstrated in the first sectionof this

chapter, religious intolerance was also found to be associated with ethnodox beliefs.
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Table 47. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Attitudes toward West and Indicators of Etlmodoxy
Hard Ethnodox}'

Soft Ethnodoxy

No longer

Only in Russia

Non-Russian

Western

A Russian is

State should

Russians are

Russian if

can one find

can never be a

Churches

always

protect

richer in their

converted

'true' Russian

real Russian

undermine

Orthodox

Russian

soul and

from ROC to

Orthodoxy

Orthodox

Russians and

Orthodox from

stronger in

their traditions

opponents

another

religion

their beliefs
than Western
nations

Democracy leads to

38.3

61.8

55.1

63.5

88.2

80.7

81.1

31

49.5

43.4

45.3

83.6

73

73.2

Unsure

25.8

39.9

39.9

39.9

77.5

59

62.4

Gamma

.196***

.239***

jgg***

2Q4***

.229***

.290***

oyj***

Agree

37.7

60.7

51.8

62.7

88.3

79.4

80.6

Disagree

27.3

49

48.2

36.8

82.6

71.5

71.1

Unsure

26.6

33.3

37.5

35.9

74

59.9

59.4

Gamma

222***

J7Q***

jgg***

307***

.338***

Agree

disorder

Disagree

Western

governments
weaken Russia

Life will be worse

O'Jf jfsjj:^

0 "JC H= ?K %

Agree

37.1

61.6

55.9

63.8

87.5

79

81.7

Disagree

33.9

52.2

45.7

48.2

88.4

75.1

75.3

Unsure

27.9

42.7

38.9

42.4

74

66.4

63.4

j?n***

.100***

.092***

.060***

*JHA # *£$

.106***

J3g***

with more

cooperation with
West

Gamma

Attempts to arrange
life according to

Agree

38.2

61.6

54.2

64.5

88

80.1

81.1

West is harmful

Disagree

30.4

48.8

44

45.6

85

73.3

73.5

28

42.5

41.5

35.3

75.8

61.8

62.8

34$***

230***

.263***

2gj***

Unsure
Gamma
O

p<.05, **p< .01, ***p<.001

jgg***

2^4***

7 ^CifcsfcJfc

Therefore, these analyses depict a belief system that creates, maintains, and

legitimates rigid in/out-group boundaries, based on religious and cultural/national
foundations.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the relationship between

ethnodoxy and attitudes toward perceived out-groups for ethnic Russians. According
to the basic tenets of ethnodoxy, this analysis focused on tolerance toward non-

Orthodox groups, both domestic and foreign faith traditions, and attitudes toward the
West and its influence on Russian society. As a result, these analyses provide insight

on the rigid boundaries that are created and maintained, separating in-group from out-

group according to ethnodox beliefs. As hypothesized, the results from this
investigation depict etlinic Russians as generally intolerant of non-Orthodox religious

groups and Western influences. While many studies note the influence of the Russian
Orthodox Church on perpetuating these attitudes, the findings in this chapter depict a

phenomenon far more complicated. For example, while religious conviction and trust
in the ROC were at times related to more xenophobic attitudes, this pattern was not

always significant, thereby making the influence of religion andthe ROC less
compelling. Instead, the influence of religion and the Church may be better
understood as part of a broader belief system- specifically, ethnodoxy.
The idea that religionand religious organizations play a smallerthan expected

role, particularly in Russia, in impacting attitudes of tolerance compared to larger,
socio-cultural structures has already been noted. Karpov and Lisovskaya described
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the socio-political context of Russia as having a greater influence on religious
tolerance than actual religious doctrine (2008). Father Georgii Chistiakov described

post-communist Orthodoxy as a 'substitute ideology,' replacing the communist

ideological system, which continues to maintain the same intolerance and xenophobia
against the West. Chistiakov's argument depicts the new Orthodoxy as a mask,

hiding the 'true' authentic, tolerant, and accepting theological tradition. In other
words, the religious doctrine of Russian Orthodoxy should not be blamed for the

perpetuation of intoleranceand xenophobia. Instead, it is the popular application and

perceived function of Russian Orthodoxy and the ROC in contemporary Russia that
should be of focus. As previous chapters illustrated, affiliation to the ROC is an

essential component for a large majority of ethnic Russians when defining what it
means to be Russian, religious belief and behavior less so. In this way, the role of

religion becomes a sub-component of a much larger and broader ideology, i.e.,
ethnodoxy, which influences the identity and attitudes of contemporary ethnic
Russians. Part of this system of beliefs is the element of boundary making between

cultural and religious in/out-groups and state protection from perceived threats.

Religious rhetoric can and has certainly fueled these beliefs, but does so as part of the
wider belief system of ethnodoxy.

The consequences of this are obvious. The recent political climate, as

described in Chapter X, exemplifies a popular pro-Slavic and anti-West platfonn. As
Vladimir Putin regains the presidency, the relationship between the US, West, and
Russia are revisited. While these are certainly important questions that have been

explored, and will continue to be so, in both academic and popular discourse, there
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are more fundamental questions that are often overlooked. For instance, what is the
impact of an emerging belief system like ethnodoxy on the everyday lives of
contemporary ethnic Russians? In other words, how does an ideology such as
ethnodoxy, which accentuates elements of intolerance and xenophobia, impact the
lives of the individuals themselves?

In Chapter XI, analyses provided tentative insight into the changing attitudes
and, as I argued, shifting ideological worldview regarding the acceptance of abortion.
If ethnodoxy is becoming a major system of beliefs shared by most contemporary
ethnic Russians, then evidence of its growth may be found in the changing trends of
other attitudes as well. While the longitudinal data on tolerance and xenophobia
among everyday ethnic Russians is limited, the World Values Survey can provide
some tentative insight. Tables 48 and 49 present percentages of Russians that

answered questions relevant to understanding everyday attitudes about social outgroups over the past twenty years. Table 48 displays percentages of all Russians,
while self-identified Orthodox Russians were selected and percentages presented in
Table 49 to provide comparison.
The indicators in this analysis include which types of individuals/groups

respondents would not want as neighbors and whether respondents trusted individuals
from other countries. Relevant to this chapter, I focused on attitudes toward Muslims
and immigrants/foreigners. In 1990, 15.5% of Russians and 17.9% of Orthodox
Russians mentioned Muslims as individuals they would not want as neighbors. This

percentage decreased only slightly by 1999. More interesting is the sharp increase in
percentages of both Russians and Orthodox Russians that specified immigrants and
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Table 48. Measures of Tolerance Xenophobia for All Russians Oveir Time (%)
1990

1995

1999

2006

Muslims

15.5

NA

13.7

NA

neighbor

Foreigner/Immigrant

11.8

11.9

11.4

31.5

Trust in someone

Trust

44.5

NA

NA

39.9

country/nationality Neither

27.9

NA

NA

NA

Distrust

27.5

NA

NA

60.1

Mentioned not
wanting as a

from another

Source: World Values Survey

Table 49. Measures of Tolerance and Xenophobia for Orthodox Russians Over Time
(%)
1990

1995

1999

2006

Mentioned not

Muslims

17.9

NA

14.4

NA

wanting as a
neighbor

Foreigner/Immigrant

13.2

12

11.6

31

Trust in someone

Trust

44.9

NA

NA

41.3

country/nationality Neither

22.8

NA

NA

NA

Distrust

32.3

NA

NA

58.7

from another

Source: World Values Survey

foreigners. In 1990 only 11.8% of Russians and 13.2% of Orthodox Russians
mentioned immigrants/foreigners, which changed very little over the next decade. By
2006, however, 31.5% of Russians and 31% of Orthodox Russians identified

immigrants and foreigners as individuals they would not want as neighbors. In sum,

while opinions about Muslims as neighbors have changed relatively little, negative
attitudes about foreigners as neighbors increased dramatically since 2000.
Respondents' trust in individuals from other countries was also revealing. In
1990, 27.5% of Russians and 32.3% of Orthodox Russians distrusted someone from

another country. By 2006, that percentage increased to 60.1% and 58.7%

respectively. Of note, the 2006 wave did not provide respondents with a 'neither'
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response item, thereby forcing fence sitters to choose. While this may have provided
slightly different results, the dramatic increase (e.g., percentages more than doubled
for Russians) is compelling regardless. Clearly, attitudes toward foreigners have

become increasingly more intolerant since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, these trends are relatively similar for both Russians writ large and

Russians affiliating with Orthodoxy. This may not be surprising given the immediate
'revival' of religious affiliation that has been noted in this paper and the general
literature.

These analyses provide only a glimpse into possible trends of intolerance and
xenophobia that appear to be occurring among most post-communist Russians.
Nonetheless, these results are convincing and, taken with the other findings from this

chapter, clearly depict the spread and depth of an ideology that maintains and
legitimates such attitudes and positions. Indeed, the dissemination of ethnodoxy,

from religious and political leaders, not only influence popular perceptions of
external, supra-individual, matters such as foreign relations and political agendas, but
also the everyday lives of individuals regarding who they would live near and what
types of people they would trust.

This is an important concern as it speaks to a change in how most Russians
fundamentally think they should live their lives, which influences the way they
interact with other groups in and outside of Russia. For instance, Muslims residing in
Russia (the second largest religious tradition) are one group with which ethnic
Russians have historically had volatile relations. Like ethnic Russians, Russian
Muslims have also constructed strong ethno-religious identities. The next chapter
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explores how ethnodoxy may be applied in the case of Russian Muslims, thereby
notingthe similarities and differences between ethnodoxy for ethnic Russians.
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CHAPTER XIII: BEYOND ORTHODOXY: ETHNODOXY AMONG RUSSIAN
MUSLIMS

The application of ethnodoxy in this study has been used to describe a

majority of ethnic Russians that claim Russian Orthodoxy as an essential part of their
etlinic identity. However, ethnodoxy may be applied to understand ethno-religious

linkages among other groups as well. The next two chapters explore how ethnodoxy

may be applied on non-Orthodox groups in and outside of Russia. For instance,
adherents to Russia's next largest religious tradition, Islam, have been similarly

depicted as exhibiting strong ethno-religious attachments. At a seventh of the
national population, enclaves of Russian Muslims reside throughout the country.

Datafor the analyses conducted in this chapter come from the same 2005 Russian
National Survey. Again, oversampling key Muslim regions (Tatarstan,

Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Dagestan) was conducted in order to obtain
sufficient data from Muslims (see Karpov and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008). Table 50

presents the frequency distribution of Russian Muslim respondents and their

proportion within predominantly Muslim regions throughout Russia. The puipose of
this chapter is to examine how ethnodoxy may be conceptually useful in explaining
the ethno-religious link for Russian Muslims as well.

Table 50. Frequency Distributionof Russian Muslims by Region

Frequency

Percentage

Tatarstan

165

47.8

Dagestan

298

91.7

Kabardino-Balkaria

246

75

Bashkortostan

126

39

«=835
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Background on Russian Muslims

Islam has always had an important place in Eurasia. According to Kopanski,
"The Muslims of CIS are proud of fact that when Slavs, Ruses and Scandinavian

Varangians were still heathens, Islam was embraced en masse by the non-Slavic
people in Daghestan, Khazaria and Itil-Ural in 922" (1998, p. 194). Throughout

Russian history, the close contact with Islam along Russian borders generated both

conflict and cooperation (Jersild, 2000). In contemporary Russia, the presence of
Islam is just as 'problematic' For instance, while the population of ethnic Russians is

decreasing, the population of ethnic minorities that have traditionally affiliated with
Islam is increasing (Shlapentokh, 2007). The consequences of these trends are

important for understanding majority/minority relations and how this influences the
shaping of ethnic and national identities.
Some believe that rises in individuals declaring Islamic affiliations in Russia

is due to the growth of Russian Orthodox fundamentalism (Kopanski, 1998) as well
as responses to conflict in predominantly Muslim regions (e.g., Bosnia, Chechnya)
where Russian support and special treatment of Orthodox adherents over Muslims is
evident(Shlapentokh, 2007). This Islamaphobic and, as described in the preceding

chapter, intolerant and ethnocentric movement has provoked the unification of
Russian Muslims. For instance, Kopanski referred to the pan-Turkic solidarity found
in Tatarstan and Boshkortostan where the idea of a confederation of predominantly

Muslim regions is prevalent (1998). Similarly, Shlapentokh noted, "the resurrection
of interest in Islam has often merged with rising ethnic nationalism" (2007, p.55).
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The increasing interest in and unification of Russian Muslims might suggest

the presence of ethnodoxy. However, the application of this concept is different for
Russian Muslims than it is for ethnic Russians. This difference lies mainly in Islamic

doctrinal self-representation as supra-ethnic/national. Horowitz described Islam as
"not just a religion but a national identity that may take different forms. Islam is a
collective identity that, in many forms, competes to be the legitimate unit of political
self-determination," and continued,

Islamic national identity claims to be universal - to be necessary and
exclusive. It claims to supersede and ultimately to erase alternative sources of
national identity, such as ethnicities, regional institutional structures and
patron - client networks, and other religions. Those holding legitimate power
have no right to appeal to any other collective identity (2007, p.914).
In this way, affiliation to Islam is the ultimate identity for Muslims, overriding

ethnicity, nationality, etc. This is an important attribute when attempting to
understand Russian Muslims through the conceptual framework of ethnodoxy.
Again, ethnodoxy is the belief that a group's etlmicity is strictly linked with that
group's dominant religion. Based on Horowitz's understanding of Islamic identity, if

an ethnic group's dominant religion is Islam, then their Muslim identity is superlative

while all other sources of collective identity (i.e., ethnicity, nationality, etc.) are
secondary, if not irrelevant. In the case of ethnic Tatars, for example, one cannot

apply etlmodoxy in the same way as with ethnic Russians. In other words, it is
erroneous to say that 'only a true Tatar is Muslim, and only a true Muslim is Tatar.'
Instead, a more accurate statement would be that 'ethnic Tatars are one of many
groups of people that are, above all, Muslim.'
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Others have also noted this characteristic of Muslim identity. According to

Shlapentokh, " [Muslims] vehemently discard nationalism as a dangerous idea that
could just separate Muslims from each other. It is not race/ethnicity but common
beliefs that unite or separate people" (2007, p.55). For Warhola and Lehning,
...what unites 'ethnic Russians' - a sense of national self-awareness

based on ethno-linguistic and cultural moorings - is conspicuously absent
among Muslims, for whom religion is the common unifying factor, even
though religious practice may be marginal or absent altogether (2007, p.938).

Therefore, as these authors suggest, Muslim identity stresses religious over ethnic or
national affiliations.

The presence of a religious identity that spans different etlmic and national

groups has particular ramifications on their status in contemporary Russian society.
Shlapentokh provided three possible models for Russian Muslims as their growth
continues in the face of Russian Orthodox extremism. First, Russian Muslims can

move away from being the 'younger brother' and strive for equal status with ethnic
Russians. Second, Russian Muslims can move even higher and become the 'older

brother' of ethnic Russians, initiated by taking the lead in global affairs. Finally,
Russian Muslims can enact Islamization in parts of Russia, particularly Tatarstan,
which calls for "a loose federation with Moscow or even complete separation"

(Shlapentokh, 2007, p.56). The Putin administration's application of the first model
(i.e., Eurasianism) has been challenged by some, pushing for either the second or
third model. According to Shlapentokh, "some of them, the radical Islamists, for
example, reject not only the leading role of etlmic Russians and their Orthodox faith,
but the very existence of a Russian - and consequently Orthodox - centered
civilization of Northern Eurasia" (2007, p. 58).
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Clearly, Muslim identity is more a matter of religion than ethnicity. But, the
suppression of other collective identities by an ultimate religious one is an ideal type.

Other collective identities surely matter in the everyday lives of minorities as they
interact with individuals from majority and other minority groups. Warhola and

Lehning noted the importance of ethnic boundaries among Russian Muslims:
The ethnic and religious divides in Russia are thus complex. Perhaps
the most salient characteristic is that among ethnic Russians there is a
multiplicity of religious orientations along both confessional (Orthodox,
Baptist, etc.) and behavioral lines. Among Muslims, however, there are
somewhat similar lines of division, plus the significant divides along etlmic,
ethno-linguistic, and regional lines (2007, p.935).

Similarly, Marsh explored the importance of religious and etlmic identities in postcommunist conflicts: "From Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia and

Kosovo, groups withcross-cutting ethnic and religious attacliments have engaged in
some of the bloodiest and most impassioned conflicts that the post-Cold War has

seen" (2007, p.811). Particularly relevant to this paper, Karpov and Lisovskaya
explored empirical evidence of ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims and its
relationship with intolerance towards Orthodox Russians (2008). They found that
adherence to ethnodoxy influenced religious intolerance greater than traditional

religiosity (conventional religious beliefand practices) (Karpov and Lisovskaya,
2008).

In short, these studies show that while religion is certainly an essential source

of identity for Russian Muslims, ethnicity and nationality still matter, albeit in
different ways. This chapter explores these issues by applying etlmodoxy to the case
of Russian Muslims. Doing this will show the versatility of the concept beyond
Orthodox Russians. After which, the similarities and differences of etlmodoxy
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between Russian Muslims and ethnic Russians are discussed. Of note, the purpose of
this chapter is not to replicate Karpov and Lisovskaya's extensive analyses explaining
the influence of ethnodoxy on religious intolerance (2008). Instead, this chapter

provides a more descriptive profile of adherents to ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims
and how the characteristics of ethnodoxy compare with ethnic Russians.

Hypotheses

Based on this literature, I suspect the application of etlmodoxy to be relevant

in explaining ethno-religious linkages for Russian Muslims, but different compared to
ethnic Orthodox Russians. For instance, in their study, Karpov and Lisovskaya found

that etlmodoxy was more strongly associated with intolerance for ethnic Russians
than Russian Muslims (2008). In other words, different aspects of ethnodoxy are

highlighted for ethnic Russians compared to Russian Muslims. Therefore, while I

expect there to be evidence ofethnodoxy among Russian Muslims, 1suspect different
components ofethnodoxy to be emphasized when compared with ethnic Orthodox
Russians (Hypothesis 8).

Operationalizing Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims

In order to assess the applicability of ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims, a
series of five context-specific indicators were specifically created based on the five

central components of ethnodoxy (see Table 51). These items include the importance

of prayer for being a Muslim, whethera person who converts to a non-Islamic
religion is still truly a representative of their nationality, whether a Russian person
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can truly be a Muslim, whether Orthodox churches undermine Muslim regions, and
whether the authorities of Muslim regions should protect them from anti-Muslim

threats. For the purpose of this analysis, respondents were selected if they identified
as Muslim.

Table 51 presents the frequency distribution for these variables. Russian
Muslims adamantly agree that you do not have to pray to be Muslim (80.8%) and that
authorities of Muslim regions should protect against foreign threats (60.1%).
However, most do not believe that Orthodox churches undermine Muslim regions

(65.1%) and are split regarding attitudes toward converts to other religions and
whether a Russian personcan be truly Muslim. Therefore, a tentative comparison
between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims would suggest that ethnodoxy is
stronger for the former.

The next step in testing the usability of etlmodoxy as a concept that explains
the ethno-religious relationship among Russian Muslims is to decipher the

relationships between its indicators. Doing this will determine if these indicators are
measuring the same phenomenon, or capturing multiple phenomena and should be
removed from the model. Principle component analysis was administeredto

accomplish this task as it identifies underlying themes, or latent factor(s), among
indicators, as was done with the indicators of ethnodoxy for ethnic Russians. The

results from this analysis are presented in Table 52. In short, only one factor was
extracted. This result has two major consequences. First, each of the five indicators

loaded together in one common factor, thereby allowing each item to remain in the
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Table 51. Operationalization and Frequency Distribution of Ethnodoxy among
Russian Muslims

Do not have to pray
or attend mosque to

Inborn

faithfulness

be Muslim

Converts to non-

Exclusion of
apostates

Frequency

Percentage

712

80.8

Disagree

76

8.6

LTnsure

31

3.5

Agree

419

47.5

Disagree

295

33.5

105

11.9

Agree

329

37.3

Disagree

386

43.8

Unsure

104

11.8

Agree

152

17.2

Disagree

574

65.1

93

10.6

Propositions

Etlmodoxy
Component

Muslim religion tire
no longer
representative of

Agree

Unsure

nation

Marginalization
ofconverts

Russian person will
never truly be
Muslim

Orthodox churches in

Presumptionof

Muslim regions are
harmful

harm

Unsure

Religious
superiority

Authorities in

Agree

529

60.1

Muslim regions
should protect

Disagree

182

20.6

Muslims from

Unsure

108

12.3

opponents
«=819

model Second, the fact that all five indicators loaded in one factor suggests that each

item is capturing a dimension of the same underlying theme. It is important to note
that this factor structure was not strong (explaining less than half of the variance), but

can still offer insight into the relationship between religion and etlmicity for Russian
Muslims.

Unlike the factor model for ethnic Russians, which identified two separate

factors (hard and soft), etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims is expressed in one. The
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Table 52. Component Matrix for Indicators of Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims
Variable
Component
Do not have to pray or attend mosque to be
Muslim

.480

Converts to non-Muslim religion are no longer
representative of nation

.643

Russian person will never truly be Muslim

.725

Orthodox churches in Muslim regions are
harmful

Authorities in Muslim regions should protect
Muslims from opponents
Eigenvalue

.731

.737

2.246

Total variance explained

44.925%

unidimensionality of ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims is indicative of a different form
or version of etlmodoxy when compared to ethnic Russians. Whether the concept in
general is a weaker 'fit' for explaining the ethno-religious link for Russian Muslims is
less apparent.

Etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims
The tentative finding from the previous section is that etlmodoxy among
Russian Muslims is not as widespread compared to ethnic Russians. However, a

majority of respondents do agree with some of the statements indicating etlmodoxy.
Therefore, a more determined investigation is pursued, providing a better
understanding of the Russian Muslims for which etlmodoxy makes sense. This is
done in three parts. First, the social demographics of Russian Muslims exhibiting
ethnodoxy are explored. Second, the religiosity of these Russian Muslims is
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analyzed. Third, the relationship between religious tolerance and adherence to

ethnodoxy is examined. Completing these tasks will offer a comprehensive depiction
of Russian Muslims that affiliate with some dimension of ethnodoxy, thereby

showing the usefulness of this particular concept outside of ethnic Russians.

Social Determinants of Etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims
Tables 53 and 54 present the crosstabulation results of social demographic
variables and indicators of etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims. In tenns of region,
more respondents agree with the first item of ethnodoxy (prayer and mosque
attendance are not necessary to Muslim) than any other item, regardless of location.
However, there is a sizeable difference in percentages based on region for the other

four items. While 52.4% of respondents in Bashkortostan agree that a Russian person

will never truly be Muslim, only 22% of respondents agreed in Dagestan. The fourth
item (Orthodox churches are harmful) is relatively unpopular across each region but

has the strongest support in Kabardino-Balkaria (26.2%) and Dagestan (21.4%). For
the last item (authorities should protect Muslims), 70.6% of respondents in Dagestan

agreed while only 53.2% of respondents in Bashkortostan felt this was necessary. In
short, some dimension of ethnodoxy exists in each region but the aspect most

emphasized may vary. A look at the socio-historic context of each region may shed
light on this finding.

In particular, the ethnic make-up and location of each region may provide
some explanation toward these differences. Table 55 illustrates both the geographical
location and dominant etlmic groups for each region. In short, regions in western
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Table 53. Adherence to Etlmodoxy for Russian Muslims by Region (%)
Do not

Converts to

Russian

Orthodox

Authorities

have to

non-Muslim

person

churches in

in Muslim

pray or

will never

Muslim

regions

truly be

regions are

should

mosque

religion are no
longer
representative

Muslim

harmful

protect

to be

of nation

attend

Muslims
from

Muslim

opponents
Tatarstan

93.9

53.4

46.6

12.9

60.1

Dagestan

78.6

46

21.8

21.4

70.6

89.6

59.6

49.2

26.2

66.7

91.1

38.7

52.4

8.9

53.2

KabardinoBalkaria
Bashkortostan

Russia (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), typically identified as European Russia, have
larger proportions of ethnic Russians. Whereas regions in the North Caucuses

(Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria), bordering Georgia and Azerbaijan, have smaller
percentages of ethnic Russians. Accordingly, these differences may impact the
adherence to some ethnodox beliefs over others. For instance, regions located in the

North Caucus have larger proportions of respondents that believe authorities in their

region should protect Muslims and that Orthodox churches are harmful. Moreover,
these regions have smaller proportions of respondents that hold inclusive definitions
of being Muslim(i.e., prayer or mosque attendance is unnecessary).

The demographic makeup of Russian Muslims that adhere to etlmodoxy offers
further insight into the application of the concept outside of Orthodox Russians. In

general, adherence to ethnodoxy did not vary across sex, age group, or place of
residence. However, adherence to the last three items of ethnodoxy does vary
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Table 54a. Crosstabulation of Indicators of Social Detenninants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims
Do not have to pray
Converts to nonRussian person will Orthodox churches
nevertruly be
in Muslim regions
or attendmosque to Muslim religion are
be Muslim

no longer
representative of

Muslim

are harmful

should protect
Muslims from
opponents

nation
Sex

Age

Education

Income

Residence

Male

85.9

52.7

41.4

19.4

67

Female

87.9

49.8

39

17.8

62.4

Over 60

89.3

52.3

45.6

22.1

71.8

41-60

87

55.8

39.1

18.1

61.4

31-40

87.5

47.4

40.5

17.2

62.5

30 or younger

84.8

49.8

37.2

17.9

65

Incomplete higher,
higher or advanced

85.3

54.5

33

14.7

56

Secondary or technical

86.9

49.8

41.7

18.5

65.3

Incomplete secondary

89.5

51.6

45.2

25

75

High

86.2

62.1

45.5

17

53

Low

92.7

45.8

42.7

17.1

74.2

52

40.5

16.7

57.2

50.4

39.8

20.4

71.7

Urban

Rural
to

Authorities in
Muslim regions

85.1

Table 54b. Levels of Significance for Associations between Indicators of Social Determinants and Indicators of Ethnodoxy for
Russian Muslims

Do not have to pray
or attend mosque to
be Muslim

Converts to nonMuslim religion are
no longer
representative of

Russian person will
never truly be
Muslim

Orthodox churches
in Muslim regions
are harmful

Muslims from

opponents

nation

Sex

Gamma

.076

-.076

-.087

-.053

-.120*

Age

Gamma

.089

.031

.000*

.057

.039

Education

Gamma

-.093

.070

-.082**

-.083

-.176**

Income

Gamma

-.321***

.087

-.058

- 390***

Residence

Gamma

.154

-.004

-.117

- 282***

p<.05; **/?<.01 ;***p<.001

to

to
4^

Authorities in

Muslim regions
should protect

.034

Table 55. Etlmic Make-up of Predominantly Muslim Regions in
Region
Location
Ethnic Group
Tatarstan
European
Tatar
Russia
yy
Dagestan

Northern
Caucasus

Russia

Percentage*
53.2

Russian

39.7

Avar, Dargin, Kumyk, and
Lezgian

74.6

3.6

Russian

Kabardino-

Northern

Kabarday and Balkan

Balkaria

Caucasus

„

Russian

22.5

Bashkortostan

European
Russia

Bashkir and Tatar
r>

54.9

Russian

69.9

36.1

* Source: 2010 Russian Census

according to level of education. Not surprising, given the literature discussed in
Chapter VII, lower education is related to a higher percentage of respondents

adhering to ethnodoxy items. For all but one item, low-income is associated with

higher proportions of adherents to ethnodoxy. However, respondents that agreed
converts to a non-Muslim religion are no longer representatives of their nation had

overwhelmingly higher incomes (62.1% compared to 45.8% for low-income

respondents). In general, the relationship between social demographic variables and
indicators of ethnodoxy did not yield very significant results. This implies, like

ethnodoxy among ethnic Russians, that adherence to ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims
does not vary based on differences in social makeup, but does by region.

The Relationship between Religiosity and Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims
Next, the relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy among Russian
Muslims is assessed. As with ethnic Russians, religiosity is an important aspect of

etlmodoxy, regardless of the case being explored. Nonetheless, differences in level of
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religiousness and how religiosity is related to etlmodoxy may exist according to each

group. The following task will explore this further. Three indicators of religiosity
were selected for analysis: belief in God, frequency of attendance to Friday services,
and whether a respondent practices Ramadan. As described in Chapter V,

comparative research requires that a functional equivalence among concepts and their

operationalizations be reached. Comparing Orthodoxy and Islam necessitates this
consideration. Therefore, these three items were chosen as functionally equivalent

measures of religiosity for Russian Muslims as belief in core Christian tenets and

frequency of churchattendance are for Orthodox Russians. Table 56 presents the
frequency distribution of these indicators. While a majority of Russian Muslims
believe in God (87.9%) and, to some extent, fast during Ramadan (68.7%), most

never attend Friday service (55.4%). As withethnic Russians, understanding what it
means to be religious for Russian Muslims is not a simple answer.

The relationship between religiosity and etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims

provides further complications (see Table 57). Adherence to ethnodoxy does not
seem to differ based on belief, or doubt, in God and those who fast during Ramadan

have generally higher percentages that adhere to ethnodox items. Theassociation
between attendance to Friday services and ethnodoxy is not as clear. Respondents
who never attend or attend infrequently have comparable, if not higher, percentages
of adherents to etlmodoxy than those attending more often.
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Table 56. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Religiosity among Russian
Muslims

Belief in God

Attend Friday
service at Mosque

Frequency

Percentage

Yes

774

87.9

No

48

5.4

Unsure

59

6.7

Weekly

251

28.5

Monthly

51

5.8

68

7.7

Yearly

23

2.6

Never

488

55.4

Yes, completely

284

32.2

To some extent

322

36.5

No

275

31.2

Several times a
year

Fast in Ramadan

The Relationship between Tolerance and Ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims
Next, the level of religious tolerance among Russian Muslims is examined.

As in the analysis of tolerance for etlmic Russians, two groups have been selected: a
traditional Russian faith (i.e., Russian Orthodoxy) and a foreign religious group (i.e.,
new churches). Russian Muslims were also asked questions about willingness to

extend rights to these groups. Tables 58 and 59 present the frequency distribution of
these items. In general, Russian Muslims are relatively tolerant of Orthodox in

society. For instance, 72% would allow an Orthodox church to be built in their
region, 71% would allow Orthodox charity activities, 65% would allow Orthodox
fundraising, and nearly half of respondents, or more, would allow Orthodox to

publish literature (55%), preach in public (44%) or on TV (49%), and open Orthodox
schools (53%). While Russian Muslims are not particularly keen to have Orthodoxy
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Table 57. Crosstabulation between Indicators of Religiosity and Indicators of Ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims
Do not have to pray
or attend mosque to
be Muslim

Converts to nonMuslim religion are
no longer
representative of

Russian person will
never truly be

Orthodox churches
in Muslim regions

Muslim

are harmful

nation
Belief in God

Attend Friday

service at Mosque

66.2

6.5

58.7

41.5

9.4

47.2

111

.055'

.359'

.276*

163

54.7

30.5

25

69.1

Monthly

87.8

61.2

42.9

30.6

83.7

Several times a year

90.2

54.1

39.3

18

54.1

Yearly

89.5

68.4

21.1

21.1

42.1

Never

91.9

47.1

45.8

13.9

62.6

.427

.106

138"

163**

102'

Yes, completely

80

53.3

36.7

26.7

74.8

To some extent

88.8

52.7

46.7

16.7

60.9

No

92.2

47.1

40.2

12.2

58

87.4

51.7

No

87

52.2

Unsure

81.1

43.4

Gamma

.163'

Weekly

Gamma

*p<.05, **p<.0\, ***p<.00\
to
oo

opponents
20

Yes

Gamma

Fast in Ramadan

Authorities in
Muslim regions
should protect
Muslims from

-.330"

.070

38.9

.030"

.180***

be taught in their schools (50% against), they are generally tolerant of Orthodox,
especially when compared to new churches.
Indeed, Russian Muslims, not unlike etlmic Orthodox Russians, are less

willing to allow rights for new churches. As illustrated in Table 59, more than half of
Russian Muslims prohibits every right for new churches. Clearly, intolerance toward
new, non-traditional religious groups is a trait shared by both Orthodox and Muslims
in Russia. These results correspond with the findings from previous studies (Karpov

and Lisovskaya, 2007, 2008). As is discussed later, this may be explained by the
majority/minority dynamic inherent in Orthodox-Muslim relations.
Moreover, intolerance towards Russian Orthodox and new churches differs by-

region. Tables 60 and 61 show attitudes toward Russian Orthodox and new churches
for Russian Muslims by region. As with adherence to ethnodoxy, Russian Muslims

residing in the North Caucasus (i.e., Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria) have higher

percentages of intolerant attitudes than respondents living in European Russia (i.e.,
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). Clearly, the location and demographic make-up of

these regions impacts the views and beliefs regarding religious tolerance and ethnoreligious identities for many Russian Muslims.

Regardless of region, however, Russian Muslims are more tolerant of Russian
Orthodox than new churches. The tolerance of some but not others poses an

interesting problem concerning the application of ethnodoxy among Russian
Muslims. Again, the in/out-group notion of ethnodoxy creates the threat of opponents
and, therefore, the need for protection. This component of ethnodoxy was evident

among ethnic Russians, but may not be as pervasive among Russian Muslims. In
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Table 58. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Tolerance toward the Russian
Orthodox among Russian Muslims
Allow Orthodox to
build church

Allow Orthodox to

preach in public

Allow Orthodox to

publish

Allow Orthodox
schools

Allow public
schools to teach

about Orthodoxy
Allow Orthodox to

preach on TV

Allow Orthodox

charity activities

Allow Orthodox

fundraising

Frequency

Percentage

Allow

632

71.7

Prohibit

145

16.5

Unsure

104

11.8

Allow

384

43.6

Prohibit

331

37.6

Unsure

166

18.8

Allow

485

55.1

Prohibit

239

27.1

Unsure

157

17.8

Allow

466

52.9

Prohibit

250

28.4

Unsure

165

18.7

Allow

254

28.8

Prohibit

436

49.5

Unsure

191

21.7

Allow

435

49.4

Prohibit

275

31.2

Unsure

171

19.4

Allow

626

71.1

Prohibit

115

13.1

Unsure

140

15.9

Allow

577

65.5

Prohibit

166

18.8

Unsure

138

15.7

«=881
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Table 59. Frequency Distribution of Indicators of Attitudes toward New Churches
for Russian Muslims
Allow new church
to build church

Allow new church

to preach in public

Allow new church

to publish

Allow new church
schools

Allow public
schools to teach

Frequency

Percentage

Allow

190

21.6

Prohibit

551

62.5

Unsure

140

15.9

Allow

120

13.6

Prohibit

605

68.7

Unsure

156

17.7

Allow

164

18.6

Prohibit

554

62.9

Unsure

163

18.5

Allow

120

13.6

Prohibit

585

66.4

Unsure

176

20

Allow

72

8.2

Prohibit

650

73.8

Unsure

159

18

Allow7

136

15.4

Prohibit

576

65.4

Unsure

169

19.2

Allow

259

29.4

Prohibit

449

51

Unsure

173

19.6

Allow

203

23

Prohibit

508

57.7

Unsure

170

19.3

about new church
Allow new church

to preach on TV

Allow new church

charity activities

Allow new church

fundraising

w=881
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Table 60. Attitudes toward Russian Orthodox among
Dagestan
Tatarstan

Russian Muslims
Kabardino-

by Region (%)
Bashkortostan

Balkaria

Allow

Allow

European

Northern

Northern

European

Russia

Caucasus

Caucasus

Russia

87.9

60.7

63.4

84.9

22.8

1.6

Orthodox to
build

church
Allow

Prohibit

6.7

Unsure

5.5

14.1

13.8

13.5

Allow

55.8

36.6

26

68.3

Prohibit

30.3

46

50.4

9.5

Unsure

13.9

17.4

23.6

22.2

Allow

75.8

48.3

34.6

74.6

Prohibit

13.9

35.9

39.8

5.6

Unsure

10.3

15.8

25.6

19.8

Allow

74.5

46.6

34.1

65.9

Prohibit

13.9

35.2

44.7

7.9

Unsure

11.5

18.1

221.1

26.2

Allow

26.7

24.2

27.2

41.3

Prohibit

52.7

57.7

52.8

27

Unsure

20.6

18.1

19.9

31.7

Allow

62.4

35.8

61.9

Prohibit

23.6

37.6

41.1

14.3

Unsure

13.9

18.1

23.2

23.8

Allow

91.5

63.4

59.8

78.6

Prohibit

.6

21.1

18.3

3.2

Unsure

7.9

15.4

22

18.3

Allow

77.6

52

68.3

70.6

Prohibit

11.5

30.2

19.1

7.1

Unsure

10.9

17.8

12.6

22.2

Orthodox to

preach in
public
Allow
Orthodox to

publish

Allow

Orthodox
schools

Allow

public
schools to

teach about

Orthodoxy
Allow
Orthodox to

preach on
TV

Allow
Orthodox

charity
activities
Allow
Orthodox

fundraising
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Table 61. Attitudes toward New Churches among Russian Muslims by Region (%)
Bashkortostan
Tatarstan
Dagestan
KabardinoBalkaria

Allow new

European

Northern

Northern

European

Russia

Caucasus

Caucasus

Russia

Allow

25.5

18.8

19.5

23.8

Prohibit

54.5

70.5

69.9

46.8

Unsure

20

10.7

10.6

29.4

Allow

19.4

10.7

10.2

17.5

Prohibit

61.8

78.2

74.4

50

Unsure

18.8

11.1

15.4

32.5

Allow

31.5

16.4

8.9

21.4

Prohibit

49.7

70.5

74

46

Unsure

18.8

13.1

17.1

32.5

Allow

20.6

11.4

8.5

17.5

Prohibit

55.5

75.5

74

49.2

Unsure

24.2

13.1

17.5

33.3

Allow

7.3

8.1

8.5

7.1

Prohibit

72.1

80.9

74.8

60.3

Unsure

20.6

11.1

16.7

32.5

Allow

21.8

13.4

10.2

16.7

Prohibit

57

73.2

72.8

51.6

Unsure

21.2

13.4

17.1

31.7

Allow

40

27.2

24.8

26,2

Prohibit

39.4

57

59.8

40.5

Unsure

20.6

15.8

15.4

33.3

Allow

28.5

17.4

28.5

17.5

Prohibit

47.3

67.1

60.6

49.2

Unsure

24.2

15.4

11

33.3

church to
build
church

Allow new
church to

preach in
public
Allow new

church to

publish

Allow new
church
schools

Allow

public
schools to
teach about

new church
Allow new
church to

preach on
TV

Allow new
church

charity
activities
Allow new
church

fundraising
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order to address this problem, the following empirical task tests the relationship
between tolerance and ethnodoxy.

In particular, this analysis correlates tolerance toward both Orthodox and new
churches with ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims. To do this, principle components

analysis was administered, as was done with tolerance items for ethnic Russians, on a
set of tolerance items for both groups (i.e., Orthodox and new churches). The

component matrix for both tests is presented in Table 62. As shown, every item
loaded to one factor for each group, thereby suggesting that one underlying theme

exists (i.e., religious tolerance). Then, these factor scores were correlated with the

ethnodoxy factor scores. These results are presented in Table 63. Although the

relationships between ethnodoxy and tolerance toward Orthodox and new churches
are weak, they are both statistically significant and, interestingly, associated in a

positive direction. In other words, as ethnodoxy increases, so does tolerance toward
both Orthodox and new churches.

Initially, this relationship between ethnodoxy and tolerance may be surprising.

Again, ethnodoxy stresses the distinction between 'us' and 'them,' thereby creating
rigid in/out-group boundaries, and instilling an element of fear and threat toward any
possible opponents. Forethnic Russians, any non-Orthodox group (albeit Western
more than Muslim) is seen as such a threat. For Russian Muslims, however,
Orthodox influences are tolerated more compared to new churches. This may be

explained due to Russian Muslim's status as both a majority and minority group. On
the one hand, Russian Muslims are clearly an ethno-religious minority group within

Russian society writ large. On the other hand, the regions analyzed in this chapter
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Table 62. Component Matrix for Indicators of Religious Tolerance
Tolerance toward
Orthodox

Tolerance toward New
Churches

Allow group to build church

.718

.807

Allow group to preach in
public

.851

.917

.893

.918

Allow religious schools

.825

.911

Allow public schools to
teach about religion

.750

.901

.846

.910

.869

.874

.791

.841

Eigenvalue

5.377

6.277

Total variance explained

67.217

78.464

Allow new church to

publish

Allow group to preach on
TV

Allow group charity
activities

Allow group fundraising

Table 63. Correlation Matrix betw een Tolerance and Ethnodoxy Factor Scores

Etlmodoxy among Russian Muslims
Tolerance toward Orthodoxy

.158*

Tolerance toward New Churches

.249*

V<.oi

have focused on predominantly Muslim areas in Russia (as depicted in Table 50).
Therefore, the Russian Muslims residing in these regions are in some sense members

of groups with both minority and majority status. In addition, the fact that ethnodoxy,
while in differing ways, has been empirically tested as a useful conceptual device to
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explain the ethno-religious linkages for both ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims

suggest that strict boundaries exist and define what it means to be Orthodox and
Muslim. Simply, Russian Muslims do not see Orthodox as a threat because for both

groups, being a 'true' Orthodox or Muslim isn't just religious, but ethnic too.
The influence of the West and other new churches is a different problem for

two reasons. First, these are groups with no historical presence in Russia. As

described in the literature, while the presence of Islam in Russia has not always been

peaceful, it has existed for centuries and become an important part of the country's
history. Western churches are new, unknown, and carry the direct mission of

proselytizing. Thus, intolerant attitudes from both Russian Orthodox and Russian
Muslims are hardly surprising. Second, new churches do not include the ethnic

component. In fact, a motive for missionizing inforeign countries isthe idea that
ethnic or national backgrounds matter far less than religious conviction. For instance,
American and Russian Seventh Day Adventists are both Seventh Day Adventists, no

one being 'truer' than the next. This characteristic ofnew churches is problematic for
Russian Orthodox and Muslims, where ethno-religious groups are no longer clearly

defined. In short, the threat of conversion to another traditionally Russian faith

(either Orthodox or Islam) is relatively smaller compared to the new risk posed by
Western churches.

To conclude, intolerance is not as emphasized for Russian Muslims adhering

to ethnodoxy compared to ethnic Russians. The dual status of Russian Muslims, as

both majority and minority group, may contribute to this difference. Finally, inthe
next section I suggest that differences in fonns of ethnodoxy between etlmic Russians
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and Russian Muslims stem from the supra-ethnic/nationai/civilizational quality of
Islam.

In Comparison: Ethnodoxy among Ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims
While ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims share similar attitudes toward

new churches, the overall fonn or type of ethnodoxy is still different for both groups.
In this section I explore the differences in etlmodoxy between ethnic Russians and
Russian Muslims and offer tentative explanations for these variations.

Methods of Comparative Analysis

As discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, certain methods should be
adopted when conducting comparative analyses. Again, comparative analyses are
usually defined as variable-oriented or case-oriented approaches. As I explained in

Chapter V, the comparative analyses in this study emphasize elements of both
approaches. For instance, certain variables (e.g., indicators measuring ethnodoxy) are
used to describe phenomenon for each case or group. At the same time, a socio-

historic background is provided, thereby grounding the results in a context-specific
foundation.

Oftentimes, the same variable(s) cannot be used to measure the same concept
across different cases. This is especially true in cross-cultural research. For example,

in attempting to understand the level of religiosity between Cliristian and Muslim
groups, frequency of prayer would fall short due, in part, to differences in
expectations about how often members of each group should pray. The concept of
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ethnodoxy is no different. Therefore, it is important that measures, while different, be

included that capture the main components of ethnodoxy with the results from

analyses compared on these levels. By doing this, a functional equivalence of
measures is reached whereby the indicators, albeit formally different, are capturing

the same general essence of a concept. For example, the indicators measuring ethnic
Russian attitudes about the presence of Western churches and Russian Muslim

attitudes about the presence of Orthodox are items capturing the component of
ethnodoxy termed 'presumption of harm.'
By looking at groups and cases on this component level, a comparison is more
easily reached. This approach is similar to Verba's 'bootstrap operations' (1971),
which is based on Duijker and Rokkan's *second-order comparisons' (1964), where
variables that are fonnally different are compared on higher levels of analysis in order

to achieve functional equivalence in substance. The task of this section is to
administer similar comparisons by exploring the differences in ethnodoxy between
etlmic Russians and Russian Muslims.

The Variability of Etlmodoxy
As outlined in Chapter V, Karpov and Lisovskaya operationalized ethnodoxy

into five different components: 1) inborn faithfulness, 2) religious superiority, 3)
exclusion of apostates, 4) marginalization of converts, and 5) presumption of harm.
Again, while the measurement items may differ across each group, the general
essence captured is the same.
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By examining the adherence, or lack of adherence, for each component across

both groups, a reasonable comparison of ethnodoxy is obtained. To do this,

frequency distributions are compared between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims
in tenns of adherence to indicators measuring these five components of ethnodoxy

(Table 64). For both groups, inborn faithfulness is stronglysupported. Indeed, over

80%of respondents from each group adhered to the ideathat one's ethnicity is

intimately tied to that group's dominant religion. The ideathat a group's religion is
more superior than others, thereby requiring special privileges, is also supported by a
majority from each group. The remaining three components of ethnodoxy, however,
receive different levels of support between ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims.
For instance, while ethnic Russians have a larger proportion of respondents that

adhere to the marginalization of converts and presumption of harm components,

Russian Muslims have a higher percentage of respondents thatadhere to the exclusion

of apostates. These differing distributions of adherence to the components of
ethnodoxy tell us a few things.

First, this distribution illustrates the variability in form that ethnodoxy can

have. Ethnodoxy is a multi-dimensional concept that stresses different components.

Therefore, it is not surprising that certain components will be more popular for some

groups than others. This does not make ethnodoxy any less relevant in explaining the
etlmo-religious link found in groups, just different.

Second, since groups will find some components of ethnodoxy more

appeasing than others, based on case-specific idiosyncrasies, a question raised is how
are each components weighted? In other words, does each component have the same
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Table 64. Adherents to Components of Ethnodoxy for Etlmic Russians and Russian
Muslims (%)
Ethnodoxy Component

Ethnic Russians

Russian Muslims

85.3

80.8

76/54.8

60.1

Exclusion of apostates

34.3

47.5

Marginalization of converts

49.2

37.3

Presumption of harm

54.3

17.2

Inborn faithfulness

Religious superiority

significance and influence indicating the presence ofetlmodoxy, orcan they be

weighted differently and, ifso, how? For instance, ifpresumption ofharm is viewed
as a more essential component for ethnic Russians than Russian Muslims, then the
fact that etlmic Russians have a largerproportion of adherents to this component

(54.3% versus 17.2%) becomes less meaningful - or at least, meaningful in a
different way.

Simply, the differences should be accounted for when conducting a

comparative analysis. So, let us take a look atthe components that differ the greatest.
Etlmic Russians have higher percentages of respondents that adhere to the

marginalization ofconverts and the presumption ofharm. In other words, the idea
that non-Russians camiot be 'tmly' Russian or Orthodox and that external groups and
influences are harmful is seenas more important for ethnic Russians than Russian
Muslims. Whereas Russian Muslims have a larger proportion of respondents that

adhere to the exclusion of apostates, orthe notion that converts to a non-Muslim faith

are no longer representatives oftheir nationality. As described below, the different

240

emphases among each fonn of ethnodoxy may be indicative of each group's

minority/majority status and/or the idiosyncrasies of each faith.

Conclusion

The task of this chapter was to explore the concept of ethnodoxy outside of

Orthodoxy. To do this, contemporary Russian Muslims were selected, a group that
has been described as exhibiting similar ethno-religious linkages. Based on survey

items constmcted specifically to measure ethnodoxy within this group, the analyses in

this chapter offer a unique insight into the relationship between ethnicity and religion
among Russian Muslims often overlooked.
First, an assessment of social demographics depicted ethnodoxy as not

varying across sex, age, or place of residence and only slightly across income and
education. However, some pattern exists regarding the particular region of Russian

Muslims, where respondents in the North Caucuses are noticeably less tolerant of
Orthodox than respondents in European Russia. The results from investigating the

relationship between religiosity and ethnodoxy were inconclusive. Belief in God and
the likelihood of fasting during Ramadan mattered little but attendance to Friday
services had an unexpected association with ethnodoxy. Finally, giventhe

importance of the in/out-group element and boundary making of ethnodoxy, religious
tolerance was addressed. Russian Muslims are relatively tolerant of Orthodox and

markedly less so toward new churches. Again, this finding is in correspondence to
the findings in Karpov and Lisovskay's studies (2007, 2008).
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Finally, ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims was compared to ethnodoxy for
ethnic Russians. The findings from this analysis show that different forms of
ethnodoxy can exist, stressing different components of ethnodoxy for some groups

over others. One form of ethnodoxy stresses the maintenance of the status quo (i.e.,
for ethnic Russians), by restricting growth (marginalization of converts) and

guaranteeing a group's traditional and *rightful' position in society (presumption of
harm). The other form of ethnodoxy (i.e., for Russian Muslims) emphasizes the

important link between faith and nation (exclusion of apostates).

Taken together, the findings from this chapter not only depict two forms of
ethnodoxy, but one that is also less embedded. For instance, overall adherence,
beside one component of ethnodoxy, is weaker for Russian Muslims compared to
ethnic Russians. Moreover, principles component analysis showed that the indicators

of ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims loaded into one factor compared to two factors for
ethnic Russians, suggesting a multi-dimensional quality for the latter. What is more,
the factor structure for ethnodoxy among Russian Muslims explained less variance

(45%) compared to the factor structure for ethnodoxy among ethnic Russians (53%).
These results suggest that ethnodoxy for ethnic Russians is more widespread as well

as having a more complicated structure than ethnodoxy for Russian Muslims.
Based on the literature review above, this may be explained by understanding

the supra-ethnic/national quality of Islam, which views Muslims as Muslims first and
all other social identities as less important. Certainly ethnic and national identities

matter, along with their relationships with religion (as indicated in the presence of a
form of etlmodoxy), they simply matter less so compared to other groups like ethnic
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Orthodox Russians. To conclude, ethnodoxy is a relevant conceptual device for
explaining the ethno-religious link among Russian Muslims, but in a different way
compared to ethnic Russians. Of course, the application of ethnodoxy is not limited
to the setting of contemporary Russia either. The next chapter offers a preliminary
glimpse into tentative evidence of etlmodoxy across cases outside of Russia.
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CHAPTER XIV: BEYOND RUSSIA: RELIGIOUS AND ETHNO-NATIONAL
IDENTITY IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Is ethnodoxy a context-specific phenomenon, which exists due to particular
sets of social conditions inherent in settings like Russia? Or, are forms of ethnodoxy

apparent elsewhere? As shown in ChapterXIII, the concept of ethnodoxy is not
limited to explaining ethno-religious linkages among ethnic Orthodox Russians, but
can be used, albeit differently, to explain a similar relationship among Russian
Muslims. Therefore, this theoretical device has the potential to be applied in other

contexts as well. In this way, the final task of this study offers a preliminary

investigation into other contexts where ethnodoxy may be applied.

Ethnodoxy Beyond: Two Ideal Conditions

As discussed in Chapter III, the link between religion and ethnicity has been
noted across different religions, ethnicities, nations, and time periods. Accordingly,
such relationships can take different forms, varying across contexts and groups. For

instance, the relationship between religion andethnicity is different for Irish Catholics
in Northern Ireland than Protestants in the United States. The reasons for such

variability are many and depend on the specific context, such as historical dominance

of a religious tradition in society, legal regulations and religious rights, and ethnic and
national diversity.

This study has focused on a particular type of relationship between ethnicity
and religion. Ethnodoxy is an ideology usedto explain a specific type of ethnoreligious link, one that includes certain components, albeit in different ways as seen
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in the previous chapter. Therefore, it is important to note that ethnodoxy may be a

useful explanatory device for some groups but not others. Up until now, this study

has provided evidence for two groups where ethnodoxy can be applied successfully:
contemporary ethnic Russians and Russian Muslims. This shows that each group,
while emphasizing different components, is aligned with the basic ideological essence

of ethnodoxy. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the scope of applying

ethnodoxy in settings outside of Russia. In doing so, two 'ideal' conditions where
ethnodoxy may exist is examined: 1) the establishment of a national religion and 2)
modern histories that include official atheism.

The Influence of (Un)Official National Religions

The first condition that may be ideal for the development of ethnodoxy is

whether a society has established, officially or unofficially, a national religion. On
the one hand, societies that designate a religious organization as the official religious
institutionof the state may be a relevant setting for the adherence of ethnodoxy.

According to the fundamental components of ethnodoxy, adherents to this belief
system view the relationship between religion and the state in intimate temis. For
instance, ethnodoxy includes the beliefthat the state should protect the etlmic group's

dominant religion from possible threats of its opponents. This has been demonstrated
in this study as in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church in contemporary Russia.
However, some societies may not have officially selected national churches,

but may be described as unofficially affiliated with a particular religious faith. The
United States may be depicted as such a case. For instance, Heclo's analysis of
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whether or not America is a Christian nation uncovered several possible ways one

could answer this question (2007). For instance, three-quarters of Americans

identify as Christian, but less than half say religion is important in their lives and even
less attend religious services. Furthermore, Christianity has undoubtedly played an

important role in American history and is viewed as part of our national heritage, but

Heclo argued most Americans lack actual doctrinal knowledge about their 'faith.'
Therefore, depending on the popular conceptualization of what it means to be

religious and its relationship with other identities, societies without clearly defined
national churches may still be perceived as having national religions. Simply, if the

public perception of a nation is associated with a particularreligious faith, then it is so
in its consequences, regardless of genuine religious belief or behavior.
Finland offers another illustration of this problem. Officially, Finland

recognizes the Evangelical Lutheran Church as its national church. However,

according to the most recent ISSP Religion module (2008), 41% of Finns pray less
than once a year or never and only 6% attend church monthly or more. At the same
time, 73% of Finns have confidence in the Church and 64% believe religion has the

rightamount of powerin society. This contradiction in popular perceptions of
religion in society among Finns highlights two important considerations. First, the
role of religion in society undoubtedly has multiple functions. This has been
discussed in some detail earlier and addressed again in the next section. In short, the

case of Finland demonstrates the role of religion as having less to do about authentic

religious beliefs and practices, and more about serving as a public utility.
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Second, regardless of societal-level self-descriptions (i.e., official decrees
about the relationship between religion and the state), the on-the-ground, popular

perceptions of everyday individuals are the best source of information when

determining whether ethnodoxy is a viable conceptual apparatus. For instance, if one

were to make a judgment about the role of religion in Finland based only on the fact
that it has an established national church, assumptions about religious belief and

behavior may be misleading. Similarly, assumptions about the separation between
church and state in the American constitution may not provide the best depiction of

the importance of religion for most of its citizens. A task in this chapter is to
acknowledge these considerations when exploring societies with 'good-fit'
characteristics for applying ethnodoxy as a useful concept.

Consequences from Established Atheism

Another ideal condition for ethnodoxy is whether a society has experienced

official atheism in recent history. Of particular interestare the conditions and
occunences that develop after official atheism has been discarded, requiring new

perspectives and attitudes about the role of religion in society. Investigating the role
of religion in these circumstances has been discussed. Jurgen Habermas' (2008) and
Charles Taylor's (2007) separate efforts on post-secular religiosity along with
Mikhail Epstein (Epstein, Genis, and Vladiv-Glover, 1999) and later, Jonathon
Sutton's (2006) work on post-atheist religion explored resurgent religionin

previously atheist settings. Common among all these approaches is how the role of
religion is shaped and viewed in a previously anti-religious setting. Referring to the
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emergence of religion in post-socialist societies with small numbers of believers,
Grace Davie asks: "Why, for example, are the churches so important that they are
worth the all-too-evident effort to re-establish them?" (2005, p. 142). Clearly, the

role, or perhaps function, of religion is far more complicated than meeting the
spiritual demand of religious believers.

For example, Davie explained how the function of religion in Europe is

different compared to the United States. In Europe, religion is increasingly seenas

"public utilities maintained for the common good" (2005, p. 143). Berger, Davie, and
Focus have also acknowledged this comparison, stating "Europeans, as a consequence

of the state church system, regard their churches as public utilizes rather than

competing firms" (2008, p.35). Inthis sense, the role of religion provides certain
needs that are not necessarily related to genuine spiritual or religious growth. This

may include the maintenance ofcommunity services (e.g., food pantries, homeless
shelters, etc.) or, due to the traditionally close relationship between church and state
inEurope noted above, the role of ethnic or national identities. In other words,
national churches historically prevalent across Europe fill a traditional role of identity
to a largercommunity not present in the United States.

This traditional role of religion becomes particularly important for post-atheist

societies. For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many newly sovereign
states, including the Russian Federation, had to (reconstruct national identities that

distinguished peoples from a once unified communist state. For many, traditional

religions were anobvious source for 'remembering' pre-atheist identities. As Davie
noted, many were 'vicariously religious' where religious practice was not as
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important, and could be achieved by proxy through others (2005). Again, the

ideological components of etlmodoxy do not stress religious practice or belief as
much as affiliation and the belief that religious and etlmic/national identity go hand in

hand. It is in this way that the conditions of a post-atheist society may be conducive
for the existent of ethnodoxy. Simply, post-socialist societies may be more

'interested' in (re)establishing traditional religions as a component of newly forming
and transfonning ethnic and national identities.

Hypotheses

While this analysis is largely exploratory, some initial hypotheses may be

generated, based on the above discussion, to betterguide an empirical analysis. Since
the conceptof ethnodoxy emphasizes a strict relationship between an ethnic group

and its dominant religion, / expect societies that have established official national
churches to exhibit higher levels ofreligio-national relationships (Hypothesis 9a). In

addition, I expect societies that experienced official atheism to exhibit higher levels of
religio-national relationships (Hypothesis 9b). In short, I do not expect the specific
religious tradition to be as significant a predictor of ethnodoxy as the socio-cultural
environment and conditions for religion in a particular society. Therefore, {project

the relationship between religion andnational identity to be unrelated to a particular
faith tradition (Hypothesis 9c).
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Operationalizing the Linkage between Religious and National Identity CrossNationally
Unfortunately, cross-national data capturing etlmo-religious identity is few
and far between. Moreover, no survey program includes indicators measuring the

breadth of ethnodoxy as conceptualized in this paper. However, the International
Social Survey Programme's National Identity modules (1995 and 2003) include one

item that emphasizes the relationship between religious and national identity. This
item captures the importance of identification to a society's dominant religionas a

component of national identity. While this one survey item does not encapsulate all
the dimensions of etlmodoxy, it does measure its main essence: the inextricable link
between ethno-national and religious identities.

Based on this one indicator, a tentative profile of possible settings where

etlmodoxy may be further tested is made. As described above, particular note is made

regarding patterns among societies that have national religions and/or churches and
shared atheist histories. It is also important to note that, due to the nature of the ISSP

survey indicator, this analysis is limited to the dominant ethnic/national groups and
the perceived relationship with thatsociety's dominant religious tradition. No
conclusions can be made regarding minority etlmic and national groups. In addition,

for many countries included in the survey, the dominant religion may be expressed as
either a particular ethno/national church (e.g., Russian Orthodoxy in Russia,
Catholicism in Ireland) or more broadly (e.g., Christianity in the United States).

Despite these limitations, the findings from this analysis offer a valuable

description of settings where some fonn or variation of ethnodoxy may exist, thereby
providing further evidence of its theoretical relevance and applicability. Moreover,
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the breadth of the ISSP survey program includes countries throughout the world,
including Europe, North America, Central and South America, and even parts of the
Middle East, Africa, and Asia. In this way, the following analysis offers a

comprehensive study of the relationship between religious and national identity
across different religions, cultures, and histories.

Findings from a Cross-National Analysis on die Relationship between Religious and
National Identity
This analysis includes three empirical tasks. First, a descriptive account

provides a preliminary profile of religio-national relationships throughout the world.
Second, countries are selected based on the presence of a national church to test the

first hypothesis. Similarly, and third, countries with atheist pasts are selected to test
the second hypothesis.

Preliminary Profile

The empirical analysis in this chapter explores a particular item in the ISSP
National Identity modules. In short, respondents are asked if they believe affiliation
to the dominant religion in their country is important to their national identity. Table

65 presents the percentage of respondents from each country that believes this is
important. Overall, it appears that the general importance of religion in national
identity construction is not limited to contemporary Russia. Many countries

throughout the world, spanning a variety of dominant religions, governments, and
cultures, show evidence of this relationship. In fact, over 50% of respondents

believed affiliation to the dominant religion was an important component for their
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Table 65. Percentage of Respondents that View Affiliation to Dominant Religion as
Important for their National Identity
Year of Study Dominant Religion
Important (%)
Country
North America
LInited States

1995
2003

1995
Canada

Christian
Christian

2003

53.7
65.9
24.5
54.1

Central/South America

Chile

2003

Catholic

54.1

Uruguay

2003

Catholic

28.8

Venezuela

2003

Catholic

71.3

2003

Christian

79

Africa
South Africa

Western Europe
Austria

1995
2003

Christian

54.2
53.2

Denmark

2003

Christian

33.2

Finland

2003

Christian

22.9

France

2003

Catholic

17.5

Germany (West)
Germany (East)
Great Britain
Ireland

Italy
Netherlands

Norway

Portugal

Spain
Sweden
Switzerland

1995

Christian

2003

1995

Christian

2003
1995

Christian

2003

1995
2003

1995
1995

Catholic
Catholic

Christian

33.8

37.2
21.7
13.3
35.5

34.8
54.4
57.8
52.3

7.3

2003

13.1

1995

21.4

2003
2003

1995
2003

1995
2003
2003

Protestant

Catholic

Catholic
Christian
Catholic

20.3
65.6
46.8
44

17.4
17.2
39.2
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Table 65 cont.

Country

Year of

Dominant Religion

Important (%)

Study

Eastern/Central Europe

Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Hungary

1995
1995
1995

Slovakian republic

29.3
43.2
22.5
52.7

74.9
39.7

Orthodox

2003

Christian

2003
1995

Slovenia

Catholic

2003

1995

22.2

35.3

Christian

2003

1995

Russia

71.1
76.2

35.9

Christian

2003

1995

Poland

Christian

2003

1995

Latvia

Christian

2003

58.3
27

49.7
33.8

Catholic

2003

32.4

Asia/Oceana
1995

Australia

Japan

2003

37

1995

26.5

Philippines

Buddhist or Shinto

2003
1995

New Zealand

31.4

Christian

30.2

Christian

2003
1995

25.4
37.5
82.9

Catholic

2003

84.4

South Korea

2003

Christian

41

Taiwan

2003

Buddhist

26

2003

Jewish

84

2003

Muslim

23.7

Middle East

Israel (Jews)
Israel (Arabs)

national identity in 15 of the 35 participating countries across both waves. Clearly,

the application ofethnodoxy inother settings is more than relevant. In addition, this

provides evidence that while the role and function ofreligion may certainly differ
throughout the world, it is still perceived as an important institution regardless of
religious faith, type of government, or geography.
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Importance of a National Church

The first hypothesis proposed in this chapterwas that countries with
established national churches should show relatively stronger linkages. Table 66

presents six countries withofficially recognized statechurches. As illustrated, these
countries vary according to geography, histories, and, to a degree, religious traditions.
One may note that besides Bulgaria, all othernational religions stem from Reformed
Christianity. While many countries that are predominantly Catholic have large

portions of the population that view religion as an important partof their national
identity (e.g., Venezuela, Ireland, Poland), the Roman Catholic Church is best
described as a transnational institution, not officially associated with a particular

political entity. Many Protestant and Eastern Orthodox organizations, however, are
not.

Yet, the selection of churches in Table 66 does not conclusively supportthe

first hypothesis. Forinstance, while most Scandinavian countries have national
Lutheran churches, with relatively high affiliation, less than a third believe religion is

important for their national identity. In fact, Bulgaria is the only country with a
nationally recognized church with a high percentage of respondents adhering to this

belief. Coupled with the findings from this study on Russia, one might wonder if
there is something essential about Eastern Orthodoxy and/or the unique socio
political history shared by such countries.
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Table 66. Selected Countries with Established National Churches
Country

Russia

National Church

Russian Orthodox
Church

Bulgaria

Bulgarian Orthodox
Church

Denmark

Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Denmark

Finland

Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Finland

Religious
Affiliation (%)*

Religion Important for
National Identity (%)
(1995/2003)**

15-2031

39.7/58.3

82.6

71.1/76.2

95

NA/33.2

82.5

NA/22.9

7I.632

35.5/34.8

19.6

33.5/22.5

87

17.4/17.2

Great

Britain

Church of England

Latvia

Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Latvia

Sweden

Church of Sweden

(Lutheran)
* Source: CIA World Factbook

** Source: ISSP National Identity

Impact of Atheist History

The second hypothesis proposed was that countries having a legacy of official
atheism would show particularly strong relationships between religion and national
identity. As much of the literature purports, many of these societies have turned to

traditional sources of identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia
exemplifies this notion as detailed throughout this paper. But, what of other countries
with similar histories?

31 CIA World Factbook explains thatthis percentage is over 'practicing worshipers' and admits that a
far higher percentage affiliate with the ROC.
32

Percent includes all self-identified Christians

255

Table 67 lists countries that have experienced official atheism. Of course, not
all countries share the same history of oppressed atheism. For instance, despite

attempts to establish widespread atheism in Poland, the Catholic Church remained an

importantaspect of Polish life (Froese and Pfaff, 2001). Of the eight post-Soviet
countries included in the survey, five (Russia, Slovakian Republic, Bulgaria,

Hungary, and Poland) have populations with nearly halfor more adhering to the
belief that religion is important for their national identity. The Czech Republic,
Latvia, and Slovenia have one third or less of respondents adhering to this belief.

Moreover, the type of religious tradition does not seem to make a difference as
exemplified with Catholic Poland.

Basedon this preliminary analysis, it may be that having an atheisthistory

somehow influences a stronger relationship between religion and national identity.

Justhowthis happens is beyond the scope of this study and would require case-

specific analyses that investigate the role of religion before, during, and after
communist control. For instance, the role of religion was particularly important in

Poland during the Soviet era. The Catholic Church played a vital part in anticommunist movements and was a sanctuary in both religious and socio-political

capacities. Doing so clearly generated a powerful bond between religious and Polish
identity as Soviet forces infiltrated Polish life andsociety. But, the same effects are
not seen in other countries like Latvia or Slovenia. Czechoslovakia is an interesting

case as its post-communist division is seen in the proportion of respondents exhibiting

religio-national identities. Regardless of the context-specific conditions that have led
to the construction of such indicators of ethnodoxy, the fact remains that across
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Table 67. Selected Countries having Atheist Past
Religion Important for
Country
Period of
National Identity (%)
Communist Control
(1995/2003)*
Czechoslovakia

Czech Republic

22.2/29.3
1948-1992

Slovakian Republic

27/49.7

Bulgaria

1944-1989

71.1/76.2

Hungary

1947-1991

35.9/43.2

Latvia

1944-1991

35.3/22.5

Poland

1945-1990

52,7/74.9

Slovenia

1947-1992

33.8/32.4

Russia

1917-1991

39.7/58.3

* Source: ISSP National Identity

today's modern societies, the role of religion has become an essential component of
many national and ethnic identities.

Conclusion

Based on the preliminary analyses conducted in this chapter, evidence of
relationships that link religion, national identity, and, at times, ethnicity are found
throughout the world, spanning different religious traditions, socio-political histories,
and geography. Tentative findings show that an association between countries with
established national churches and high levels of religio-national relationships is
inconclusive. Whereas a pattern may exist between countries that have experienced

official atheism and relationships between religion and national identity. Of course,
further analysis is required to substantiate these claims.
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Overall, the important finding for this chapter is that such relationships are
found in other contexts outside of Russia. Moreover, it would appear that these

relationships are not weakening, but are in many cases growing stronger. Since the
data sources used in this analysis include two waves, a crude longitudinal comparison

may be conducted to extract the percent change between 1995 and 2003. Doing so

will showpossible trends of the breadth of this relationship. Table 68 presents these

percentages. Of the 23 countries included in both survey waves, 16show positive

changes among respondents who view religion as an important component to their
national identity. Moreover, many of these trends show dramatic increases. For
instance, views in Canada increased by 120%, 80% in the Netherlands, and 84% in

the Slovakian Republic. Countries showing negative trends were comparatively
smaller. The largest decrease is found in Latvia (-36%) and East Germany (-39%),
while all other decreases were less than 5%. In short, these findings show that not

only is the importance of religion for national identity held across many countries, but
these views appear to be gaining popularity over time.

Again, the findings in this chapter are tentative, and limited to the data and

type of measures available at this time. While the survey item used to measure this
relationship does not reflect the multi-dimensional structure of ethnodoxy, it does
indicate a fundamental essence of the concept. As a result, societies where the

relationship between religion and national identity are strong may present a relevant
case for the application of ethnodoxy in continued investigation. In doing so, the

preliminary findings in this chapter, coupled with the extensive application in Russia,
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Table 68. Percent Change of Importance of Religion for National Identity between
1995 and 2003

Country

Percent Change

North America
United States

22.7

Canada

120.8

Western Europe
Austria

-1.8

Germany (West)

10.1

Germany (East)

-38.7

Great Britain

-2

Ireland

6.25

Netherlands

79.5

Norway

1.1

Spain

-6

Sweden

East/Central Europe
Bulgaria

Czech Republic

-1.1

7.2
32

Hungary

20.3

Latvia

-36.3

Poland

42.1

Russia

46.9

Slovakian Republic

84.1

Slovenia

4.1

Asia/Oceana

Australia

17.8

Japan

-4.2

New Zealand

24.2

Philippines

1.8

Source: ISSP National Identity

demonstrates the obvious relevance and usefulness of ethnodoxy as a concept that can

explain ethno/national-religious relationships across many contexts and settings.
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CHAPTER XV: DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to test a concept that explains a specific

relationship between religion and ethnicity. This concept (i.e., ethnodoxy) refers to
the belief that affiliation to an ethnic group's dominant religion is essential to their

ethnic identity. In this way, ethnodoxy is a belief system, by which a particular
ideology that links religion and ethnicity is maintained. A specific setting was

identified, i.e., post-communist Russia, as exhibiting ideal conditions to apply and

empirically explore this concept. Not surprisingly, a majority of ethnic Russians
adhere to some dimension of this belief system. Furthermore, empirical analyses

conducted throughout this study demonstrate the depth and breadth of this ideology,

spanning across demographic, religious, social, and political differences. Atthe same
time, etlmodoxy was found to be associated with social, religious, and political
orientations and attitudes. To summarize, these analyses showed a relationship

between ethnodoxy and xenophobia, nationalism, and social and religious intolerance.

In this final chapter, I discuss the consequences of these findings. In doing so, I offer

some important considerations about the maintenance and legitimation of ethnodoxy
(i.e., its plausibility structure) as a popular ideology, its dissemination, and
speculations about its survival.

The Embeddedness of Etlmodoxy

As the study shows, the scope of ethnodoxy, across social, religious, and

political orientations, is extensive. However, some variations also exist, particularly
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with differences between soft and hard ethnodoxy. Again, the conceptual differences

between soft and hard ethnodoxy are best characterized in terms of strictness and

level of exclusivity. Whereby, hard ethnodoxy evokes a stronger sense of rigidity,
exclusiveness, and protectionism than soft ethnodoxy. In general, at least half of

respondents, regardless of a particular religious, political, or social orientation, adhere
to indicators of soft ethnodoxy. For instance, religious believer, non-believer, and

atheist alike, nearly half of respondents in each category agreed with most statements
of soft ethnodoxy. Similarresults are found across political and social orientations as
well. In short, adherence to soft etlmodoxy was high (from 50-90%), no matter the

level of nationalism, political orientation, attitudes about abortion and homosexuals,
and level of religious tolerance and xenophobia.

At the same time, statistically significant relationships between indicators of

ethnodoxy and most indicators of religious, political, and social attitudes and
behaviors were found.33 Notsurprisingly, levels of ethnodoxy were particularly

higher among believers and those who believed in God (82-91%), but were similarly
high regardless of church attendance and the belief that religion is important in one's
life. In addition, higher levels of intolerance towards Muslims and, especially,
Western churches were associated with the adherence to soft ethnodoxy. Likewise,

stronger anti-West and nationalistic attitudes and orientations were also related to soft
ethnodoxy. In short, these analyses showthat overall mostethnic Russians adhere to
soft ethnodoxy. But, some variations exist, as expected based on the components of
ethnodoxy.

33 While most relationships between variables are statistically significant at the .001 level of
significance and had a positive direction of association, it is important to note that the strength of
association was usually weak to moderate.
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While fewer share belief central to hard ethnodoxy, the proportion and

characteristics of its adherents is still noteworthy. For example, similar to adherents

of soft ethnodoxy, religious believers and believers in God had high levelsof
affiliationto hard ethnodoxy (nearly half or more). At least one third of respondents,

in some cases as high as 70%, agreed with statements of hard ethnodoxy, regardless
of variation in religious, political, and social orientations. Yet, there were also

significant patterns associated with demographic, religious, and socio-political
differences. For instance, religious intolerance, xenophobia, and nationalistic
attitudes and orientations were also associated with adherence to hard ethnodoxy.

These results uncover the existence of a sweeping and deeply rooted facet of

contemporary Russian identity. No matter the particularities in religious, political,
and social attitudes and behaviors, most etlmic Russians hold that affiliation with

Russian Orthodoxy is important, even indespensable for their ethnic identity.
At the same time, the empirical analyses conducted in this study show that

adherence to ethnodoxy is associated with specific religious, political, and social
attitudes and behaviors. Again, nearly every relationship between indicators of

ethnodoxy and indicators of religious, political, and social attitudes and behaviors
was statistically significant. The strength of associations varied from weak to

moderately strong.34 Inshort, the level ofadherence to ethnodoxy is related to more
intolerant, xenophobic, and nationalist dispositions. This is notsurprising given the
ideological foundation of etlmodoxy.

34 For instance, the relationships between indicators ofsoft ethnodoxy and opinions about the West
weakening Russia were positively associated at moderate strength (gamma coefficients were .216,
.303, and .311), demonstrating higher levels ofadherence toethnodoxy asanti-West beliefs increased.
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Clearly, ethnodoxy is a relevant and useful concept that can help us

understand a specific relationship between religion and etlmicity in post-communist
Russia. Indeed, the embeddedness of ethnodoxy among most ethnic Russians

suggests that it is maintained and legitimated in everyday life. In other words,

adhering to ethnodoxy has become, quite immediately, a normalized and taken-forgranted way of understanding one's identity in contemporary Russia. The
ramifications of this are crucial. How, or from whom, is this ideology disseminated,

maintained, and legitimated? How likely is ethnodoxy to remain such a popular

belief system? While these questions go beyond the scope of this study, I offer some
considerations by exploring etlmodoxy in tenns of its plausibility structure.

Maintaining the Plausibility of Ethnodoxy in Contemporary Russia

Indeed, this study has presented empirical evidence supporting the popular

acceptance of ethnodoxy among most ethnic Russians. The expansive embeddedness
of ethnodoxy suggests that it plays an important role in the way thatmost etlmic
Russians understandtheir social world. In this way, one may ask how ethnodoxyis

spread and maintained? This section draws onBerger's notion of plausibility
structures to further explain the structure and dissemination of ethnodoxy.

Two Considerations about Plausibility Structures

As discussed in Chapter III, a plausibility structure refers to the 'social base'

inherent in anysocial word, which provides order andmeaning to social life (Berger,
1967). Specifically, Berger described plausibility structures as both providing
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meaning to a social world and the particular processes that maintain and legitimate a
belief system. In other words, plausibility structures are the taken-for-granted norms

and expectations, as well as the interactions and processes, which legitimate a

particular system of belief. Although somewhat vague (e.g., are plausibility structures

meaning-systems, social processes, or both?), the essence of this concept may still be
useful in understanding how a belief system is popularized.

Again, I argue that ethnodoxy has become a belief system that is normalized
in the everyday lives of most ethnic Russians. For example, according to the

empirical analyses in this study, mostethnic Russians identify with Russian

Orthodoxy, consider non-Russians as incapable of being 'truly' Orthodox, and adhere
to certain beliefs that promote the preservation of Russian Orthodoxy from its

opponents. Therefore, a plausibility structure exists (including specific norms and
processes) thathas transmitted, maintained, and legitimated ethnodoxy as a

prominent, taken-for-granted ideology. To better understand the plausibility structure
of ethnodoxy, I offer two important considerations.

The Relationship between Plausibility Structures and the Social World
The first consideration highlights the relationship between plausibility
structures and the social world. According to Berger, plausibility structures have a

dialectic relationship with the social world, one influencing the other. Therefore, the

stability of one can greatly impact the other. Berger talked about this in terms of
'firmness.' In short, the firmer the plausibility structure, the firmer the social world
and vice versa. But, this is an ideal type. A plausibility structure or social world that
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is absolutely firm, does not require legitimation for its' existence. In other words, if
every individual in a society views their social world in exactly the same way and in
complete conformity, no reasoning is necessary to explain why things are the way
they are. According to Berger, individuals will always doubt, question, and propose

change, thereby requiring the legitimation of, or attempt to legitimate, a plausibility
structure and, therefore, social world. In addition, any given society may have

multiple beliefsystems, each with plausibility structures that can conflict or overlap,
which necessitates legitimation in order to distinguish between 'right' from 'wrong,'
'accepted' versus 'unaccepted,' and so on.

This aspect of plausibility structures is particularly interesting in the case of
post-communist Russia. In short, this is a setting where large-scale societal
transformations have been taking place in a relatively short amount of time. Empirical
evidence of these transitions is exemplified in Chapter XI, whereby new discourse

about abortion, including a ROC influenced set of beliefs, seem to be replacing the
once widely supported Soviet-era abortion culture. Thus, plausibility structures must
also sustain threats to 'firmness' or 'stability' over time, in addition to conflicting

social bases. Although further investigation is required, I suggest that ethnodoxy is

increasing in influence and scope as a popular worldview for most ethnic Russians.
Indeed, the ISSP National Identity surveys show that 20% more Russians believe that

being Orthodox is important for their national identity in 2003 than 1995. Clearly,
ethnodoxy has become an increasingly popular source of world-construction. Just

how popular and enduring etlmodoxy will continue to be is an important question and
one discussed further below.
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Plausibility Structures based on Nomas over Logic

Finally, plausibility structures may not always be logical. Similar to

Converse's understanding of mass beliefsystems, plausibility structures may not be

logically coherent. This consideration is notspecifically described by Berger, butis

important nonetheless. Inshort, the maintenance and legitimation of a plausibility
structure is less about making rational sense as it is about normal andaccepted beliefs
and behaviors. For instance, Berger refers to a few historical contexts thatemphasize

the influence of religions, such as Christianity and Islam, on constructing and

preserving plausibility structures. Social worlds based on Christian and Islamic

plausibility structures have historically been in conflict for the perceived sake of
societal (even civilizational) preservation and survival, despite doctrinal emphases of
peace andtolerance found in both theologies.
As discussed in Chapter XII, many have acknowledged the disconnect
between Russian Orthodox doctrine and practice in terms of social and religious
tolerance. On the one hand, Orthodox theology can be interpreted as embracing

acceptance, pluralism, and other democratic ideals (e.g., Bartholomew, 1994;

Papademetriou, 2002; and Stockl, 2006). However, popular attitudes ofOrthodox are
rarely depicted in this way. Instead, the findings in this study show that affiliating
with ethnodoxy in Russia today is associated with attitudes of social and religious
intolerance, xenophobia, and generally negative attitudes about democracy and the
West. While seemingly illogical and paradoxical, this is an essential element of

ethnodoxy and held by most ethnic Russians. Again, the issue is not that these beliefs
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and behaviors make rational sense, but that they fulfill the expectations and norms

generated and maintained by individuals according to how they understand their
social worlds.

In this way, the plausibility structure of ethnodoxy includes processes and
interactions that stress popular beliefs about what it means to be Russian and
Orthodox, and less about maintaining genuine theological, or civic for that matter,

doctrine. Again, evidence of such interactions have already been detailed as

exemplified in public addresses by prominent religious and politicalelites, who have
stressed the relationship between the Church and state and the important role that

Russian Orthodoxy has played, and should continueto play, for Russian identity.

The Dissemination of Ethnodoxy

Clearly, the wide acceptance of ethnodoxy among most etlmic Russians
indicates the importance of this ideology today. While this is in itself a crucial

finding for understanding post-communist Russian identity, one must ask from where
do such ideologies originate? The puipose of this section is to offer some preliminary
considerations about the dissemination of ethnodoxy, particularly in the case of postcommunist Russia.

The Function of Society: Meaning and 'Order'?

According to Berger, we create our social worlds (i.e., 'world-building') so

that it has meaning and order (1967). Indeed, a function of any society is nomization,
or establishment of a meaningful order upon reality. Furthermore, constructing and
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legitimating a social world is done collectively with others. "In other words, the
cultural world is not only collectively produced, but it remains real by virtue of

collective recognition. To be in culture means to share in a particular world of

objectivities with others" (Berger, 1967, p.10). In the case of contemporary Russia,
for example, the combined efforts of etlmic Russians that share similar beliefs and

practices regarding their identity as Russian together create a particular social world
that has substance and structure for them. This way of understanding how social

worlds are constructed is empowering. In short, all members of a society have some
influence toward the creation and maintenance of their social world.

However, as I described above, this 'order' may not be based on logical and

coherent foundations. Lippy also discussed this idea regarding popular religiosity.

For Lippy, popular religiosity refers to "the blending of beliefs and practices from
many sources to create a personal world of meaning" (1994, p.9). But, as Lippy

argued, because popular religiosity pulls from multiple sources of knowledge, it lacks
order and organization.

The syncretism of popularreligiosity and its lack of organization mean
not onlythat individuals may espouse some ideas that the religious tradition
with which they may personally identify would condemn but that they may
simultaneously espouse beliefs that would seem contradictory (Lippy, 1994,
p.ll).

In this way, I argue that systems of meaning such as popular religiosity in fact
provide meaning andperceived, over rational, order. Members of a society construct
and maintain their social world by giving it meaning and order in terms of what
makes sense to them, not necessarily based on logical constructs from the particular

system of which they use. This is an important consideration whentrying to
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understand how, and from where, dominant belief systems like ethnodoxy are created
and disseminated. In short, if social worlds are based on social norms and popular

expectations over sources of logical meaning, where do these norms and values come
from?

Again, Berger's explanation seems to emphasize a quality ofauthenticity that
each member contributes, in both the internalization and collective externalization,

when constructing and maintain a particular social world. This quality of authenticity
refers to individuals constructing social worlds that are genuine and original.

However, the idea that each individual member is authentically building a shared

social world is not complete. All of us are social beings, existing in relationship with
others and influenced by those interactions. Instead, I suggest that there are also
external sources from which world-building stems.

The Flow of Influence and Power in World-Building

Indeed, it is naive to thinkthat all members of a given society are creating and

maintaining a popular social world in complete authenticity. Instead, external sources
of meaning surely influence the norms and expectations by which individuals
understand and create their social worlds. Steve Lukes' work on power and decision

making may shed some light on this issue.

Lukes' (2005) thesis adds to the conventional two dimensions of power (i.e.,
decision and non-decision making) by providing a third dimension which emphasizes
the role that cultural norms and values play in influencing individuals' decision

making. In short, individuals make decisions about their attitudes, beliefs, and
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behaviors based on what is socially acceptable and normatively 'right.' Moreover,

these norms and values are often based on particular political and social agendas and
movements that aim at instilling a dominant cultural ideology. For example, when

elites such as Patriarch Kirill make public announcements like the following, specific

knowledge is transmitted which can greatly influence attitudes and behaviors en
masse. "Political situations come and go and change, but those ties, which span

centuries, always survive. Orthodoxy is an important factor of national selfidentification both for Russians and for Greeks" (Kirill, 2012). In this way, external

sources of meaning, often including specific social and political agendas, may
contribute greatly to the process of world-building.

Karpov's work ondesecularization offers further insight onthe origin to such

agendas and movements that influence individuals' decision-making. According to
Karpov, the process ofdesecularization can be carried out by actors 'from below' or
'fromabove' (2010). As Karpov explained, both models are ideal types andcanoccur

simultaneously in a given context. In short, desecularization from below, or on the

grassroots level, requires a "high level ofmass involvement" and substantial
resources including both material (e.g., financial) and political support (Karpov,

2010). As soon as actors gain a significant amount of influence, a 'desecularizing
regime' is instilled. This refers to "a particular normative and politico-ideological
mode in which desecularization is carried out, expanded, and sustained" (Karpov,

2010, p.24). This regime includes four main objectives: 1) establishing the scope of
transformation, 2) securing 'institutional arrangements' by which power and
influence is maintained, 3) creating a particular method to enforce the transformation,
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and 4) instilling an ideological source for legimitating this transformation (Karpov,
2010).

This construct may be used to explain other societal transformations beyond

desecularization. In particular, this model may be used to explain the spread of

ethnodoxy in post-communist Russia. Although a more comprehensive application is
bettersuited for another study, a few considerations are offered highlighting its

usability. Asdescribed in Chapter IV, the collapse of the Soviet Union created large

populations of people, once united (at varying degrees) under the same socio-political
ideology and worldview, in need of new sources of meaning andperceived order.

Many groups reverted to traditional, pre-Soviet, foundations of meaning to (re)create

their group identity and construct a new shared social world. For instance, inthe
Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan, traditional practices such as bride kidnapping,

which was illegal during the Soviet Union, have increased dramatically since the
1990s. Furthermore, such 'rememberings' often included an increase in the

importance of, comparatively, religious institutions. The rise ofetlmic Russian
affiliation to Russian Orthodoxy is a case in point. Clearly, individuals, from below,

have actively sought such systems of belief and meaning in order to (re)create new
social and cultural identities. Furthermore, the rapid spread of accepting such

systems of meaning is evidence of high levels of mass involvement.
On the other hand, there is evidence that these societal transformations are
influenced from above as well. As discussed throughout this study, relationships
between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state, Slavophile socio-political

agendas carried by Putin, United Russia, and other key religious and political leaders
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and groups have further contributed to the creation, maintenance, and legitimation of

a post-communist Russian society based on the ideological foundation of ethnodoxy.
As such, 1) the scope of this transformation appears societal-wide, 2) is fueled by

symphonic relationships between the Church and state, 3) is enforced both formally

through policy (e.g., privileges for the ROC) and informally through the norms and
values that are 4) perpetuated by a spreading ideology that emphasizes strictin/out-

group boundaries, secured social andpolitical status, and fear of external threats.

This application of Karpov's below/above model is rudimentary, necessitating
further investigation; however, these basic considerations nonetheless offer tentative

support to its usability. Continued analysis should expand onthese considerations.

Ethnodoxy and the Fortitude of Belief Systems

Again, an important theme inthis study, if not the main empirical finding, is
that etlmodoxy has become a prominent ideology that most contemporary ethnic
Russians identify with. While ethnodoxy is not the only ideological system that

individuals may adhere to, it seems that it has become a main one. Therefore, it is

important to explore how ethnodoxy fits with other 'competing' ideologies and to

speculate the likelihood ofethnodoxy remaining asprominent as it appears to be.
In particular, at least two other woridviews exist that resonate for many

contemporary Russians. Both of them, along with ethnodoxy, can be important for
understanding what it means to be Russian and what the norms andexpectations

surrounding this identity are. The first is adherence to social and political agendas
inherited from communism and sustained by communist and other left-wing
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movements, groups, and political parties. More than two decades after the official
disbandment of the Soviet Union, communist ideology and its adherence through

formal and informal institutions (e.g., political parties, popular publications, public

demonstrations, etc.) still exist. As discussed in Chapter X, the CPRF is the second

most supported political party. Furthermore, other Soviet-era orientations remain

(e.g., as demonstrated by the residual 'abortion-culture' described by Karpov and
Kaaiiainen [2005] and explored in Chapter XI). Clearly, a worldview influenced by
Soviet communism is still an important source of identity for many contemporary
Russians.

A second worldview that can be a source of identity for Russians today

stresses a more accepting relationship with the West, particularly with Europe.

Compared to ethnodox and communist perspectives, this last view is best described as

a general worldview, rather than a specific ideology per se. Whereas etlmodoxy and
communism are more structured belief systems (e.g., manifested by particular

institutions and organizations), a pro-West worldview is a less homogenous setof
ideas about Russian citizenry and the perception of Russia as a positive contributor to
Western civilization. Adherence to a 'Western' worldview is shown in this study as

exemplified in younger cohorts more likely to have positive attitudes about the West,
democracy, and civil rights toward out-groups than older cohorts.

The fact that multiple sources of identity exist is crucial in understanding postcommunist Russians specifically. Afternearly a century of ideological

monopolization, having more options for individuals to choose from makes
understanding what it means to be Russian more nuanced. In addition, having

273

multiple systems of belief and meaning requires some degree of competition for
legitimation and, therefore, acceptance. In this way, a discord exists when an

etlmodox person believes being Orthodox is essential for being ethnically Russian
while the pro-West or communist may disagree (albeit there are neo-communists who

also identify as Orthodox). At the same time, etlmodox and communist individuals
may have more exclusive views about being Russian while a pro-Western

understanding may be more inclusive, if not supra-national.

Referring back to Berger, only when belief systems have a "monopoly on a

society-wide basis, that is, as long as it can continue to utilize the entire society as its
plausibility structure," does it reach a state of complete 'firmness' or 'stability' (1967,

p.49). Based on this notion, each of these woridviews are competing for acceptance
and survival. The question then becomes, how likely will the persistence of
ethnodoxy be?

Answering this question is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief
glimpse into Russian history may provide some insight. While the Soviet-era
consisted of the establishment and maintenance of one ideological system, pre-Soviet

Russia was far more diverse. In fact, Russia during the nineteenth century looked
more like Russia today in this respect.

For instance, Hosking described two particular groups that had very different

approaches toward understanding what it meant to be Russian. On the one hand,
'Slavophiles' held that

...Russia had its own rich cultural heritage, derived from Byzantium

and transmitted by the Orthodox Church. Russia had actually preserved the
integrity of the Christian faith, which the West had lost, thanks to the popes'
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greed for secular power and to the countervailing but equally sterile
individualism and rationalism of the Protestants (Hosking, 2001, p.275).

This group, not unlike the ethnodox described in my study, understood the special

role of Orthodoxy and was particularly skeptical of the West. On the other hand,
'Westerners'

...looked forward to Russia's becoming the most advanced European
civilization in the next stage of history, borrowing from Europe but at the

same time transforming its own youthfulness and inexperience into a blessing
which would enable it to offer leadership (Hosking, 2001, p.277).

As detailed in my study, evidence of more positive attitudes about the West,

particularly toward Europe, was also expressed by many contemporary Russians.

The point of this observation is not to imply that this is evidence of some cyclical
periodization of history. Instead, I suggest that the identities, beliefs, and attitudes
held by individuals are far more enduring than we may think. This is especially true
when those orientations become essential for the creation of social groups. Again,

this is not to say that the ethnodox of today are virtually the same as nineteenth

century Slavophiles or the same for Westerners. However, at the very least, the
similarities in woridviews do show the fortitude of our ideas and beliefs.

The lengevity of ethnodoxy is difficult to predict. In line with Berger, the
more ideologies in competition, the harder maintaining and legitimating ethnodoxy as

the status quo will be. If these 'competitor ideologies' are somehow restrained,

thereby creating yet again another ideological monopoly, then the survival of
ethnodoxy seems more likely. Recent events seem to point to the latter. Indeed, it is
not uncommon to see 'outspoken' Russian journalists, business entrepreneurs,
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politicians, or even musicians detained due to remarks or actions critical of the ROC
and its role in the Russian state.

Moreover, the apparent institutionalization of ethnodoxy in Russian society

poses important moral questions about the consequences of this belief system. On the
one hand, an ideology that stresses rigid in/out-group boundaries creates a strong

sense of unityand solidarity, which can be particularly helpful in times of societal
change and uncertainty. On the other hand, ideologies that stress intolerance and

xenophobia are often associated with injustice and human rights issues. Just how

ethnodoxy will play out, in and outside Russia and in all its forms and variations, will
continue to be an important area of study.
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